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Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL

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7 NOVEMBER 1986

WORLDWIDE REPORT

ARMS CONTROL

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

TASS: PERLE SAYS U.S. TO CONTINUE SDI

LD202149 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1530 GMT 20 Oct 86

[Text] London, 20 Oct (TASS) -- TASS correspondent Nikolay Pakhomov reports: The U.S. intention to continue implementation of the star wars program and the absence of any sincere desire on Washington's part to aim for a reduction and liquidation of nuclear weapons arsenals are the main reasons that an arms control accord was not reached in Reykjavik. This was reaffirmed by statements made by Richard Perle, U.S. assistant secretary of defense, who has arrived in Great Britain to take part in a regular session of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, which opens tomorrow in Glenagles (Scotland). In an interview for BBC television, the "hawk" stated that he was "as proud and happy as he could be" that the Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik was not crowned with an agreement.

R. Perle stressed that the U.S. Administration intends to continue at full speed with work on the 'Strategic Defense Initiative,' having made it clear that restricting this work to just laboratory research does not figure in Washington's plans.

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CSO: 5200/1040

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR'S GERASIMOV CITES 'CHEAPER' COUNTERMEASURES TO SDI

LD211408 Moscow TASS in English 1403 GMT 21 Oct 86

[Text] Moscow October 21 TASS -- If the United States goes ahead with its Strategic Defense Initiative the Soviet Union will take countermeasures which will be adequate but not identical, Gennadiy Gerasimov, chief of the Information Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, said at a briefing in the press centre of the Soviet Foreign Ministry today.

According to him, Soviet scientists have estimated that countermeasures to neutralize SDI will be far cheaper than the Strategic Defense Initiative program itself and well within the Soviet Union's possibilities. Some scientists believe that countermeasures fully to neutralize SDI will cost a mere 5 per cent of the SDI spending.

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USSR MEDIA ON U.S. 'STAR WARS' DEVELOPMENTS

Livermore Research

OW200435 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1220 GMT 17 Oct 86

[From "The World Today" program presented by Aleksandr Zholkver]

[Text] Last night, militaristic America once again made itself heard. This is the America of the generals and the bosses of military concerns.

It was they who achieved one more nuclear explosion on the proving range in Nevada, this time of such great power that, as was reported from Las Vegas which is situated more than 100 miles from the range, the earth shook there.

Not far from the Nevada nuclear proving range, at the sadly famous Livermore Laboratory, work on the preparation for star wars is being speeded up. The use of the so-called nuclear-filled lasers [lazeri s yadernoy nachinkoy] is also planned. It is precisely this that explains why during the period of the Soviet moratorium, 22 nuclear explosions took place in the United States, including those which have not been officially reported but which were nevertheless registered by sensitive seismic equipment. So it is not a matter, here, of difficulties in verification. The matter is quite different: It lies in the lack of desire to end the arms race.

It is precisely this that Patricia Schroeder, a member of the U.S. House of Representatives, spoke about after the new explosion in Nevada: It became completely obvious that the President's declared statement that he supposedly aspires to arms control is nothing more than empty words.

New Space-Based Reactor

LD181647 Moscow TASS in English 1528 GMT 18 Oct 86

[Text] San Francisco October 18 TASS -- The United States has started developing space-based nuclear-power plants, which are designed to become the key element of Reagan's "Strategic Defence Initiative". As the newspaper "SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER" said, a new type of atomic reactor is being developed at a Sunnyvale facility of the General Electric Company in the north of California at official Washington's request. "It will be small enough to be carried aboard a space shuttle."

The reactor named SP-100 is of vital significance for the Star Wars programme drawn up by the Reagan administration, the newspaper said. It can be put in orbit in 1993. This is a forerunner of much larger nuclear-powered systems that would use lasers and particle beams. Such a system ultimately could involve hundreds of these Star Wars weapons. Already now, according to the newspaper, work has been started at the U.S. military centres to develop space reactors with a power tens of thousands of times that of SP-100.

Test for Ground Laser Device

LD211748 Moscow TASS in English 1554 GMT 21 Oct 86

[Text] New York October 21 TASS -- Preparations for the testing of a ground laser device intended for obtaining a light beam capable of destroying ballistic missiles in space is in full swing in the United States. This information was provided to the UPI news agency by officials of the missile testing ground in White Sands, New Mexico.

According to the officials, the National Radiation Laboratory in Livermore, which is the U.S. leading centre for the development of the most up-to-date armaments, is taking part in the tests. The testing of a laser device in White Sands is part of the research program within the framework of President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, UPI points out.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

MOSCOW: U.S. SATELLITE PHOTOGRAPHY, ABM TREATY

LD181054 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in German 2030 GMT 18 Oct 86

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] In the United States it has become a kind of written rule to justify in advance its own military preparations by references to a Soviet arms buildup. This has been the case several times in the past, and something similar is happening now, when across the ocean they have started work on the SDI, which envisages the creation and development of offensive space weapons.

In this connection, an article in the U.S. magazine AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY is indicative. It reports, among other things, that a U.S. Air Force spy satellite has photographed two new objects in Soviet Central Asia. The magazine maintains that these objects have been constructed on the basis of the most modern technology.

Well, what is unusual about that, one might ask? There are thousands of new construction sites in the Soviet Union, including those based on the most modern technology. These include factories, housing blocks, sanatoria, convalescent homes and the like. Why, then, have these two in particular attracted the attention of the United States? First, because, as the magazine writes, they are huge; and second, they are situated on mountain tops. This is sufficient to draw a significant conclusion -- that this is allegedly nothing other than perhaps an operational antisatellite laser system. In other words, the Soviet Union already possesses what the creators of SDI are wracking their brains over.

Although this justification is quite (?stupid), the magazine accuses the Soviet Union in all seriousness of violating the ABM Treaty by creating antimissile systems and new control centers. One is involuntarily reminded of a similar story of recent vintage. In the region of Krasnoyarsk in Siberia a Soviet radio direction finding station is under construction. What have they not said about this in the West? Invented reasons were cited, claiming that this station was intended as a missile early-warning system against missile attack. In fact, it was all much more simple. The station has no relation to an early-warning system of missile attack. This was officially communicated to the U.S. side. The Krasnoyarsk station is intended for the observation of space objects and for the continuation of the extensive program of peaceful use of space. After this Washington was compelled to tone down its false accusations against the USSR for a time, but the need to justify its own policy of preparing for star wars remained.

Broad sections of progressive public opinion are speaking out increasingly strongly against the policy of the Reagan administration, and that is why new, or better to say renewed, fabrications on an old theme have begun. It is this relevant to state that the U.S. intelligence authorities have refrained from an assessment. The intelligence authorities are not decided, and the magazine -- more precisely, those behind it -- have already cobbled together appropriate conclusions. Immediately after this, the management of the SDI project stated hurriedly: Whatever the objects photographed by the satellites were, they bore no relation to any U.S. laser weapon objects. Consequently, such objects really exist in the United States. In connection with this, the question arises: Who, then, is infringing upon the ABM treaty?

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TASS: CHERNYSHEV TERMS ARGUMENTS FOR SDI 'ABSURD'

LD181552 Moscow TASS in English 1417 GMT 18 Oct 86

[Text] Moscow October 18 TASS -- By TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev:

After the Soviet-U.S. summit in Reykjavik it became absolutely clear to the whole world that SDI, or "star wars" program, is the main obstacle to reaching agreement on reduction and, finally, elimination of nuclear arms, on the road to a world without nuclear arms.

Particularly surprising is the reasoning of the President of the USA about the "need" for SDI even if strategic offensive arms are eliminated.

The White House came up with two arguments: first, that the anti-missile "shield" will allegedly be a guarantee that the Soviet Union is honouring agreement, second, that it will protect the USA if some maniac will get hold of a missile with a nuclear charge.

Both arguments are simply absurd. First, if two great powers are seeking agreement on an extremely serious step, joint elimination of offensive strategic arms, this, undoubtedly, must promote a sharp increase of mutual confidence. If confidence is lacking it will be useless to embark on such an undertaking. At the same time, there must be absolute clarity about verification in order to ensure complete confidence that the obligations adopted are being implemented. And the Soviet leader said firmly in Reykjavik that in view of the readiness to make deep cuts in nuclear arms, in connection with embarking on a concrete stage of the elimination of nuclear weapons, verification must become tougher. The USSR confirmed its readiness for any form of verification. It declared for triple verification which should guarantee absolute confidence for each side that it would not be led into a trap. To propose to accumulate large amounts of weapons in space and to try to pass these weapons as "system of control" is not serious, to say the least. What is more, it is ridiculous.

Let us consider the second "argument," so to say, about a "maniac" who might get it into his head to prevail over the "defenseless", non-nuclear United States. Such a script can clearly be traced to the Hollywood. But even the notorious Hollywood hit [as received] managed to get by without a system of the "star wars" type and without nuclear explosions. Seriously speaking, how can pragmatic American taxpayers seriously contemplate the spending of thousands of billions of dollars to inundate outer space with space weaponry platforms, guiding themselves by the idea of the possible arrival of a "mythical personality" that will be able to manufacture hundreds of nuclear charges in secret (a large-scale system must be ready to rebuff an ambushed strike, or else why concoct all this)?

Elementary logic dictates this: If agreement is sought for scrapping swords, then there is no need for shields. But if a shield is actually conceived as an addition to a sword, there is nothing to camouflage this. Mankind is not to be misled.

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

KYODO: GERASIMOV DENIES USSR WORKING ON NUCLEAR LASER SYSTEM

OW220035 Tokyo KYODO in English 0003 GMT 22 Oct 86

[Text] Moscow, Oct. 21 KYODO -- The Soviet Union Tuesday charged as groundless a statement attributed to Japan's Foreign Minister Tadashi Kuranari that the Soviets are developing a nuclear laser weapon. Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov singled out Kuranari for criticism at a news conference at the Foreign Ministry, saying that the allegation he said Kuranari made at the Japanese Diet was aimed at justifying U.S. nuclear tests.

Gerasimov was reacting to questions on the U.S.-Soviet summit at Reykjavik when, in an unusual move, he cited what he described as a groundless and "unique" interpretation made by Kuranari. He said Kuranari told the Diet that the Americans are developing the space-based antimissile system, known formally as strategic defense initiative (SDI), as a countermeasure against a nuclear laser system now being developed by the Soviets and so the U.S. needs to conduct nuclear tests.

The Soviet Union has no such development program, Gerasimov said.

He said Kuranari's remarks not only run counter to Japan's nuclear policy but even contradict with statements made by Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone and U.S. President Ronald Reagan that the SDI is a nonnuclear system.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

PRC JOURNAL COMMENTS ON SUMMIT FAILURES

Beijing BEIJING REVIEW in English Vol 29, No 42, 20 Oct 86 p 10

[Article by Chang Qing. First paragraph BEIJING REVIEW comment]

[Text] The two-day meeting between U.S. President Reagan and Soviet leader Gorbachev failed to reach any concrete agreement. This once again proves that the defence of world peace rests with the peoples of all countries and not only with the superpowers.

The two-day summit between US President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev ended in Reykjavik, Iceland, on October 12 with no specific agreement finalized and no exact date fixed for a full-scale summit, due to be held in Washington by the end of this year.

Speaking to US servicemen near Reykjavik, Reagan said he had made the Soviet leader a historic offer on arms control which Gorbachev rejected. Gorbachev, addressing a news conference in Reykjavik, said the US leader had come to the meeting with empty hands and the talks had collapsed.

Reports say the summit failed because of a dispute over the US Star Wars programme to build a space-based anti-missile shield. Gorbachev proposed "strengthening" the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty over a 10-year period while offering to accept US "laboratory testing" for the Star Wars programme. But Reagan insisted tests must be carried out in space and not only in the laboratory.

Why are the two superpowers so serious about the Star Wars programme? Because both the

United States and the Soviet Union are saturated with nuclear weapons, and the relative strategic balance that has existed between the two countries since the 1970s will not be upset by any improvements in the quality or quantity of their strategic arms. However, whoever masters space weaponry could gain a first-strike capability.

Of course, the dispute over the Star Wars programme is only one aspect of the overall confrontation between the two superpowers. Another reason for the failure of the talks is that the summit meeting was arranged in a hurry, and the two leaders went to the meeting with domestic political purposes in mind. Reagan hoped a successful summit would give a boost to the Republican campaign in the mid-term US elections in November. Gorbachev wanted to bring the costly arms race under control so that the Soviet Union can devote more attention to domestic economic development.

In the two months before the meeting in Iceland, the United States and the Soviet Union held a series of consultations to explore the possibilities of reaching agreements on arms control,

regional conflicts and the observance of anti-ballistic missile treaty. Both sides made compromises and also came up with proposals of their own. However, neither yielded an inch on the Star Wars programme.

In the first three rounds of the summit talks the two sides moved closer on the issues of medium-range missiles, the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons, regional conflicts, human rights and bilateral relations. The Soviet Union proposed that both sides reduce strategic offensive weapons by one half, and the United States was ready to agree to this. However, in the last round of the talks the atmosphere worsened sharply as a result of the dispute over the Star Wars programme.

Observers believe that although this meeting failed, it does not mean that relations between Washington and Moscow will necessarily deteriorate. Both Gorbachev and US Secretary of State George Shultz said it was not the end of the road. "We'll return to Geneva and I suppose they will," Shultz said, while Gorbachev indicated that "this meeting has brought us to the point where accords are possible."

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

GORBACHEV 22 OCT TV ADDRESS ON REYKJAVIK OUTCOME

LD222054 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 22 Oct 86

[From the "Vremya" program; speech to the nation by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, from Moscow on 22 October--live or recorded]

[Text] [Video shows Gorbachev sitting in studio] Good evening, dear comrades! I am once again meeting with you and once again it's on the same issue--Reykjavik. This is an extremely serious matter; the outcome of the meeting with the U.S. President has aroused the whole world.

In the previous days much new information requiring assessment has appeared; information which I would like to share with you tonight. You remember I said at the press conference in Reykjavik that we will return more than once to the meeting between the leaders of the USSR and the United States. I am sure that we are not yet aware of the whole importance of what happened. But we will definitely come to understand it. If not now, then tomorrow we will understand the entire significance of Reykjavik and give both the achievements and gains, as well as the missed chances and the losses, their due.

For all the drama of both the progress of the talks and their results, the meeting in Reykjavik--perhaps for the first time in many decades--advanced us so far in our search for ways toward nuclear disarmament.

I think even now that is a result of the meeting we have become elevated to a higher level not only in the analysis of the situation, but also in defining the aims and the framework of possible accords [dogovorennosti] on nuclear disarmament. Having been a few steps away from a practical accord on such a difficult and vitally important problem, we have all begun to understand infinitely more the danger in which the world finds itself, and we feel more strongly the necessity for urgent decisions and, what is most important, we now know that elimination of the nuclear threat is realistic and possible.

I would like to note here that even quite recently the Soviet program for liquidating nuclear weapons by the year 2000 was declared by many pillars of world politics to be illusion and an unrealizable dream. Here, indeed, is that very case when past experience is neither wealth nor a counsellor but a burden hampering a search for solutions.

But Reykjavik not only gave rise to hope; Reykjavik also highlighted the difficulties on the path to a nuclear-free world. The results of the Iceland meeting cannot be properly assessed without an understanding of this fact. The forces opposed to the tendency toward disarmament are great. We felt this at the meeting itself, and now. There is much talk about Reykjavik now. The meeting in Iceland is viewed by realistically thinking people as a major political event. The fact that as a result of it we have managed to reach new qualitative levels in the struggle against nuclear weapons is welcome. The results of Reykjavik, as they appear to the Soviet leadership, encourage all those who want a change for the better. Interesting assessments are being expressed in state, public, and scientific circles in the majority of countries. The possibilities that have taken shape are described as responding to the aspirations of all mankind. In the general view, the meeting raised to a new level the Soviet-U.S. dialogue, just as it did the East-West dialogue as a whole.

It was brought out of the plane of technical computations and numerical comparisons and on to new parameters and dimensions. From this height can be seen new prospects in solving those problems which face us so acutely today. I have in mind security, nuclear disarmament, the prevention of new spirals of the arms race and a new understanding of the opportunities which have opened out before mankind.

It may be said that the worldwide debate on the results of the meeting is still only developing. I believe -- more than that, I am convinced -- that it will grow. We believe that the common efforts of the peoples and of political and public circles, directed toward realizing the opportunities which were opened up at the meeting in Reykjavik, will also grow. It was there that was signposted -- I would put it this way -- a route to move toward a solution to some of the most important problems on which mankind's very destiny depends.

But the period since Reykjavik has shown something else, too. The circles connected with militarism, with the profits from the arms race, are evidently alarmed. They are striving with all their might to cope with the new situation, and by coordinating their actions, are striving in every way to confuse people, to take control of the moods of broad circles of the world's public, extinguish their enthusiasm for peace and to prevent governments from adopting a clear stance at this crucial moment in history. These circles have at their disposal political power, economic levers, and powerful information media. One should not, of course, overestimate their strength, but neither should one underestimate it. To all appearances it will be a tough struggle.

A fresh regrouping of forces has started among the opponents of detente and disarmament. Feverish efforts are being made to set up obstacles so that the progress started in Reykjavik will become bogged down. In these conditions, I consider it necessary to return to the issues which have come to be acute ones on the agenda in connection with the meeting in Iceland. Our point of view, which I expressed 1 hour after it ended, has not changed. I consider it necessary to speak about this not only in order to reaffirm the assessment previously made. I am doing it in order to draw your attention to the chopping and changing [chekhorda] dissonance that we are observing, whether they be the result of confusion and bewilderment, or whether they be actions thought out in advance in order to swindle ordinary people.

Various explanations of the objectives set before the meeting are current. From the initial curses directed toward Reykjavik they have rapidly and simultaneously gone into

talk of triumph. A noisy campaign has begun to appropriate proposals made by others, and the main forces have been directed in defense of SDI, which was disgraced in Reykjavik. In sum, there is a great deal of bustle in Washington at the moment.

Is this a pre-election game which needs success in Reykjavik? Or are we faced with an unpredictable policy for the forthcoming years?

This phenomenon requires serious study. It has not escaped our attention how and where certain political circles are trying to direct the discussion of the outcome of the meeting. It is worth speaking about the chief aspects of such a campaign. They would like to whitewash the destructive position of the U.S. Administration, which came to the meeting unprepared, and I would say again, with their old baggage.

And when there was no escaping it and the situation demanded clear answers, the administration wrecked the possibility of concluding the meeting with accords. They want to coerce the USSR, in the new situation which has come about following Reykjavik to return to the old approach, to draw it back to fruitless discussions of numbers, to wandering in a circle in a deadlocked situation.

It is evident that there are not a few of this kind of politician in the West whom they talk in Geneva suit as a screen rather than as a forum for seeking accords. What we previously carefully masked is now becoming clearer.

There are powerful forces in the American and West European ruling circles which are striving to wreck the process of nuclear disarmament. Some people have again begun to assert that nuclear arms are almost a blessing. It is said that half-truths are the most dangerous kind of lies. And it is very alarming that this position -- sometime it is one of pure deceit -- has been taken up not only by the right-wing mass media but also by highly placed figures in the U.S. Administration.

I have already had the opportunity to say what happened at Reykjavik. We arrived for the meeting with constructive proposals, the most radical in the history of Soviet-U.S. talks, for arms reductions. They take account of the interests of both sides. Having arrived in Iceland, I talked about this on the eve of the meeting in a conversation with that country's leaders, and in the middle of the first conversation with the U.S. President, these proposals were handed to him. Far-reaching and inter-related, they form a complete package, and they are based on our program announced on 15 January, for the elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000.

First: Reduce by half all strategic weapons without exception.

Second: Completely eliminate Soviet and U.S. intermediate-range missiles in Europe and embark immediately on talks on missiles of that type in Asia, as well as on missile with a range of less than 1,000 km, the numbers of which we proposed to freeze immediately.

Third: Consolidate the ABM regime and begin full-scale talks on the total banning of nuclear tests.

It was on the basis of the Soviet proposals that discussions began in Reykjavik -- of which I spoke in detail in my earlier addresses.

As a result of difficult struggle and keen arguments, an encouraging drawing together of the positions on two of the three directions took place. The logic of the talks led

the sides to determine specific dates for the elimination of strategic offensive weapons.

President Ronald Reagan and I came to agreement that such armaments of the USSR and the United States can and should be completely liquidated by 1996. An accord was also reached on the complete liquidation of the U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe, and a radical reduction in that class of missiles in Asia.

We attach principle importance to these accords between the USSR and the United States. They have shown that nuclear disarmament is possible. That is the first half of the truth about Reykjavik.

But there is another half as well. It lies in the fact, as I have already said, that the U.S. side wrecked the agreement which seemed just a stone's throw away.

The U.S. Administration is now trying as hard as it can to convince everyone that a possible major success leading to specific agreements was not achieved because of the unyielding attitude of the Soviet side over the program of the so-called strategic Defense Initiative. They are even saying that we lured the President into a trap by putting forward breathtaking proposals on reducing strategic offensive armaments and medium-range missiles, and then, they are saying, we demanded in the form of an ultimatum that they reject SDI.

But the essence of our position and our proposals is this: We are in favor of a reduction, and then the complete liquidation, of nuclear weapons, and we are resolutely opposed to a new stage in the arms race and transferring it to outer space. Hence we are against SDI and for strengthening the ABM Treaty.

Every sensible person understands that if we embark upon the road of profound reductions, and then complete elimination, of nuclear weapons, we have to exclude any possibility that could be used either by the Soviet or by the U.S. side to achieve unilateral military superiority. We see the main danger of the SDI as an attempt to extend the arms race into a new sphere, the desire to move into space with offensive weapons, and thus to achieve military superiority. SDI stands in the way of ending the arms race, and getting rid of nuclear weapons; it is the main obstacle on the road to a nonnuclear world, and when Mr Shultz, the U.S. secretary of state, tell the American people that SDI is a kind of insurance policy for the United States, this is, at least, an attempt to mislead the American people.

In fact, SDI does not strengthen the United States' security. It does not strengthen it. By opening a fresh stage in the arms race it destabilizes the military-political situation and thereby weakens both the security of the United States and general security too. The American must know this. They must also know that the U.S. position on SDI, which was announced in Reykjavik, is fundamentally at variance with the ABM Treaty. Article 15 of the treaty does indeed let one depart from the treaty but only under definite circumstances -- namely, if extraordinary circumstances pose a threat to the supreme interests of the participants in the treaty. No such circumstances have existed nor do they exist now. It is clear that the elimination of nuclear weapons, were it to start, would render the occurrence of such extraordinary circumstances even less likely. It is logical.

Article 13 of the ABM Treaty makes provision for something else--namely, that the sides must consider, as it becomes necessary, possible proposals to further enhance the viability of the existing treaty. The United States is actually striving for the

reverse: to devalue the treaty, to deprive it of meaning. These are all quotations from the document signed by the supreme representative of the United States.

They have made up a lot of fables to raise the prestige of SDI. One of them is that the Russians are terribly afraid of it. Another is that it was SDI that brought the Russians to the Geneva talks and then to Reykjavik. The third is that SDI is American's only salvation from the Soviet threat. The fourth is that SDI will give the United States a big technological advance on the Soviet Union and other countries, and so on and so forth.

Now, knowing what the problem is, I can only say one thing: Continuation of the SDI will draw the world into a new stage of the arms race and destabilize the strategic situation. Everything else that is ascribed to SDI is largely extremely dubious and is being done to sell this suspicious and dangerous commodity in attractive packaging.

The President, in defending his position which led to the wrecking of an accord in Reykjavik, asks rhetorical questions: Why are the Russians demanding so insistently that the United States remain eternally vulnerable to a Soviet missile strike? Why does the Soviet Union insist that we should be left eternally defenseless?

I confess I am surprised by such questions. They seem to imply that the U.S. President has the ability to make his country invulnerable, to reliably defend it from a nuclear strike. But as long as nuclear arms exist and the arms race continues, he has no such ability. Nor, of course, have we. If the President is here counting on SDI, it is in vain. The system will be effective only if all missiles are liquidated. But why, then, one may ask, is antimissile defense needed at all? Why build it?

I still have not mentioned the resources scattered to the winds, the cost of this system. According to some estimates it will reach several trillion dollars. For the time being, we are striving, trying to persuade the United States to abandon its dangerous venture. We are trying to persuade the U.S. Administration to seek invulnerability, protection, on another path, the path of totally scrapping nuclear weapons and the creation of a comprehensive system of international security, which excludes all wars, both nuclear and conventional.

However, today the SDI program remains an integral part of U.S. military doctrine. The defense guidelines for 1984-88, which emerged from the bowels of the Pentagon at the beginning of Reagan's presidency and which are still in force, directly envisage the development of space-based systems, including weapons which can destroy Soviet satellites, and accelerated development of antimissile defense systems for the territory of the United States, with the possible withdrawal of the United States from the ABM Treaty. This document stresses that the military rivalry with the USSR must be channelled into new spheres, thereby rendering all previous Soviet spending on defense pointless and making all Soviet weapons obsolete.

As you can see, here again is the pursuit of a mirage; here again, in the words of former President Nixon, we see hopes of wearing out the Soviet Union.

The present administration is slow to learn.

Is this not the answer to the question: Why do they cling so stubbornly to SDI? Star Wars plans have become the main obstacle to accord on elimination of the nuclear threat. And Washington is now trying in vain to present matters as if we were moving toward agreement.

Only political simpletons could accept the elimination of nuclear weapons as a means to deter U.S. aggression, while receiving a threat from space in return. There are no such simpletons in the Soviet leadership.

It is difficult to reconcile oneself to the fact that because of all this a unique chance has been missed for ridding mankind of the nuclear threat.

Having this in mind, I said at the press conference in Reykjavik that we did not regard the dialogue as finished, and we hoped that, after he returned home, President Reagan would consult with the U.S. Congress and the American people, and would adopt the decision whose need stems logically from what was achieved in Reykjavik.

Something quite different happened. Besides the distortion of the whole picture of the Reykjavik talks -- about which I shall have more to say -- actions have been taken in recent days which, to the normal human view, look simply wild after so important a meeting at the level of the top leadership of the two countries. I am referring to the expulsion from the United States of a further 55 workers from the Soviet Embassy and Consulate. We will of course take retaliatory measures -- very tough measures, so to speak -- on an equal basis. We do not intend to tolerate such a disgrace.

But now I shall speak about something different. What sort of government is it; what can be expected from it in other matters on the international scene; what degree does the unpredictability of its actions reach? It turns out that it not only has no constructive proposals on the key questions of disarmament, but it does not even have the desire to maintain an atmosphere essential for the normal continuation of a dialogue. It turns out that Washington is prepared for neither one nor the other. The conclusion that arises -- and it is a conclusion confirmed by no small experience -- is that every time a ray of light appears in attitudes to the major questions of Soviet-U.S. relations, to the settlement of questions which involve the interests of the whole of mankind, a provocation follows, calculated to wreck the possibility of a positive solution and to poison the atmosphere.

But where is the true face of the U.S. administration? Is it in favor of seeking ways to sort things out and look for solutions, or does it finally want to destroy everything which could serve as the basis for progress, and deliberately rule out every kind of normalization? A very unseemly portrait emerges of the administration of a great country which is quick to take destructive, wrecking actions. Either the President cannot cope with his entourage, which literally breathes hatred toward the Soviet Union and toward everything that can divert international affairs into a calm channel, or he himself wants things to be like this. At any rate, there is no attempt in the White House to control the hawks. And this is very dangerous.

As for informing the American people about Reykjavik, this is what happened, absolutely in keeping with what has been said earlier. They concealed the facts from them. They were told only the half-truth about which I spoke earlier. They distorted matters to appear that the United States, acting from a position of strength, practically wrung from the Soviet Union agreement to reach an accord on U.S. conditions. And the day is not far off when the United States, they say, will get what it wants. There must be no let-up in the tempo of military preparations, the Star Wars program must be pushed through, and pressure be stepped up in all directions, they say.

These last few days showed a great cause drowning in petty politicking. They are sacrificing the vital interests of their own people, their allies, and international security as a whole to the weapons' manufacturers. How much has been said about the openness of American society and about the freedom of information, about pluralism of opinions, and about the fact that everyone may see and hear what he or she wants.

In Reykjavik the President, in pointing out the differences between our systems, said to me: We recognize the freedom of the press and the right to hear any point of view.

I am quoting his words here. But what is the actual state of affairs? Here's a very recent fact. I was told that our public organization APN [NOVOSTI news agency] has published in English the texts of my press conference in Reykjavik and speech on Soviet television. APN has sent them off to numerous countries, including the United States. But the brochure with these texts has been held up for several days now by U.S. customs; it is not being allowed through to U.S. readers. So much for the right to hear out any point of view.

Or, concerning humanitarian affairs, I said to the President: Take cinema, for example. A huge number of U.S. films are shown on Soviet screens. Through these films Soviet people have the opportunity to picture the Americans' way of life and way of thinking. In free America, Soviet films are hardly shown at all. The President avoided answering and, as is usual in such cases, took cover behind private enterprise, which, as he said, does what it likes.

I also spoke to him about the publication of U.S. books in our country, and of our books in the United States; there is a ratio here of approximately 20 to 1. I also brought up with the President the question of radio information. I said that here, too, we are in an unequal situation. You have surrounded the Soviet Union with a network of radio transmitters and you broadcast whatever you like 24 hours a day from the territory of other countries and in many languages of the Soviet Union. Taking advantage of the fact that we are not close neighbors, the United States has used the medium-waves to fence itself off from the information carried by our radios. There they only have medium-wave receivers. The President was unable to put up any argument to this either.

I then proposed to him that we should do the following: We shall stop jamming the Voice of America and you shall give us the opportunity on your territory or somewhere nearby of setting up radio broadcasts to the United States so that it will get through to the population of your country. The President promised he would think about it.

It would seem the United States is becoming an increasingly closed society; they are cunningly and efficiently cutting the people there off from objective information. This is a dangerous process.

The American people should know the truth of what goes on in the Soviet Union, the true content of Soviet foreign policy, our real intentions, and indeed the truth about the situation in the world as a whole. I would say that at the current stage this takes on exceptional significance.

Now, about the way the results of Reykjavik are being presented in the United States: It only took a few hours, or days at most, to start submerging everything that was discussed in Reykjavik in a fog of inventions and fantasies. They are trying to kill off the seeds of trust before they put out shoots. A few days ago the President stated that only ballistic missiles were the subject of agreement, and his aides said plainly that bombers and all cruise missiles remain untouchable. The secretary of state provided a different version, that accord concerned all strategic weapons. By the way, he was present at my conversations with the President, as was Comrade Shevardnadze, our minister of foreign affairs. Mr Speakes, on behalf of the White House, stated that perhaps Reagan had not been properly understood, and that the President had never agreed to the elimination of all nuclear arms.

Matters have gone as far as plain misrepresentations. For example, it is being asserted that at the meeting which took place, the President of the United States had not agreed to the Soviet proposal for total elimination of all offensive strategic weapons of the USSR and the United States by 1996, and that it had not been possible to come to a single point of view about this proposal of ours. With a complete sense of responsibility, as a participant in the talks, I state: The President gave his agreement, although not with any particular enthusiasm, to eliminating all offensive strategic weapons, I stress, all, and not just some individual ones, and scrapping them over a period of 10 years, in two stages.

The interpretations of the discussion of the problem of nuclear tests are also far from the truth. The unilateral approach to this question by the United States is being portrayed such that the Soviet Union is supposed to have expressed full agreement with it. There was nothing of the kind, nor could there be. The issue of scrapping medium-range missiles in Europe is also not being presented correctly. It is bad enough that it is being withdrawn from the package proposed by the Soviet side. But even our agreement to freezing the number of missiles with a range of less than 1,000 km is beginning to be portrayed as an acknowledgement of the part of the Soviet Union of the United States' right to deploy [razmestit'] in Western Europe U.S. missiles of the same class.

If these are the interpretations put on things, one soon starts having doubts. What were we talking about in Reykjavik, then? About removing the nuclear threat, about reducing and getting rid of nuclear weapons; or was it about how this threat can be further increased, about diversifying nuclear arsenals, about making into an arena of military confrontation not only the whole planet but also outer space and the universe? This is the impression one gets, comrades.

The prospect of a possible Soviet-U.S. mutual understanding has frightened certain people so much so that they have set about, well in advance, the construction of insurmountable barriers and the invention of preliminary conditions. An assistant of the President went so far as to say that the United States, before commencing on nuclear disarmament, should see a change in the political climate in the Soviet Union. All this is frivolous, extremely frivolous.

When similar claims were put forward 70 or even 40 years ago they could be interpreted as being thoughtless, as historical blindness. Right now this is a demonstration of a total lack of understanding of reality. The matter of conventional armaments is also being named as a preliminary condition. This is a quite serious matter in itself.

To this day the assertion about the superiority of the Soviet Union and the states of the Warsaw Pact in conventional armaments was a widespread thesis. It is that which allegedly forces NATO to constantly build up its nuclear potential. Of course, there is no imbalance at all. After Reykjavik, this fact was admitted for the first time in public by Mr Shultz and Mr. Regan. But the essence of the problem does not boil down to the maintenance of parity. We do not wish the arms race to be transferred from the sphere of nuclear arms to the sphere of conventional weapons.

May I remind you that our January proposals on eliminating nuclear weapons before the end of the century also contained provisions for doing away with chemical weapons and profoundly reducing conventional weapons. We have repeatedly returned to this issues since January, too.

In their most developed form, the proposals of the Warsaw Pact countries were drawn up this summer in Budapest. We sent them to the other side, by which I mean the members of NATO. To date there has been no reply.

Each day since Reykjavik demonstrates that the meeting in Iceland was the touchstone against which one can measure the true worth of the words and declarations of politicians. How many times was it recited that we must rid ourselves of the nuclear nightmare, how one could breathe easily in a nuclear-free world if only the USSR and the United States could move this problem out of deadlock? But no sooner had a gleam of hope appeared than many of those who just yesterday were cursing nuclear weapons and proclaiming adherence to the idea of a nuclear-free world made themselves scarce. You can even hear voices in Western Europe saying that it is hard to give up American nuclear weapons, American missiles. It is evidently the case that those who make policy in the West do not think of nuclear weapons on the defensive level at all. Otherwise it is difficult to explain why they are now seeking out pretexts for keeping the missiles or expressing their support for the SDI program at government level. There is something here to ponder for both us and for the West European public.

There are even more refined maneuvers going on alongside the frontal attacks. You cannot take from the negotiating table what is more advantageous, while ignoring what, for various reasons, is not to your liking. They say that we -- the Soviet side -- put forward our fundamental proposals in a package. But a package is a balance of interests and concessions, a balance for removing anxieties, an interdependence of security interests. It is as if everything here is on one side of the scales. Both sides have to be balanced.

This is probably why the West wants this logically based and just option for total accord split up into parts, without doing anything to restore the balance of composition. All our proposals advanced in Reykjavik are objectively linked to central strategic weapons systems.

Our concessions are also part of the package. If there is not package, there will be no concessions either. This is a reality of our national security. But such an approach would also guarantee the security of the United States and all other countries. That is also why we attach such importance to strengthening the ABM

Treaty. For our part, there is no attempt to put an end to it. On the contrary, we are against revising supplementing it, or the like, and especially against replacing it with something else, as the President said in Reykjavik, or maybe he made a mistake. I was, I must admit, very surprised when during the meeting he started trying to convince the Soviet side and me personally: If you don't treat the ABM Treaty as holy scripture, then how do you treat treaties? As a piece of paper, or what? Without strict observance of treaties, and especially such a fundamental one, you will not ensure international order and elementary stability. Then arbitrariness and chaos will reign in the world.

I say again: When they prefer SDI to nuclear disarmament, only one conclusion is possible: By means of this military program they are attempting to refute the axiom of international relations in our epoch contained in the simple and clear words beneath which the U.S. President and I put our signature last year. Here are those words: Nuclear war must not be waged. Victory cannot be gained in it.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR: SHEVARDNADZE BRIEFS ROMANIANS ON SUMMIT, REACTIONS

Meeting With Totu

PM200911 Moscow IZVESTIYA (Morning Edition) in Russian 17 Oct 86 p 5

[Excerpts] Bucharest, 15 Oct (TASS)--An official visit of friendship of Eduard Shevardnadze, a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, to Romania began today. Eduard Shevardnadze had talks with Romania's foreign minister, Ioan Totu, an alternate member of the Political Executive Committee of the Romanian Communist Party.

The sides had an in-depth exchange of opinion on outstanding international problems. They stressed that the main task facing mankind today was to remove the threat of nuclear catastrophe. Special importance was attached in this context to the Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik. Although it failed to produce concrete accords on problems of the limitation and reduction of nuclear armaments and the non-extension of the arms race into outer space because of the stand taken by the U.S. Administration, the latest compromise proposals tabled by the Soviet Union have basic importance. They are putting struggle for nuclear disarmament onto a higher plane and offering a possibility for a dramatic turnaround in international relations and for developing peaceful cooperation among states.

It was noted that in the current qualitatively new situation the sides were fully resolved in close cooperation with the other Warsaw Treaty countries further to build up efforts to secure radical reductions in and the total abolition of nuclear weapons, and also to improve the world situation.

Meeting With Ceausescu

PM161347 Moscow PRAVDA (First Edition) in Russian 16 Oct 86 p 4

[Excerpts] Bucharest, 5 Oct (TASS)--There was a meeting here today between N. Ceausescu, general secretary of the RCP, president of the Socialist Republic of Romania, and E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, USSR minister of foreign affairs, who has come here in connection with the session of the Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Warsaw Treaty states being held in the Romanian capital.

E.A. Shevardnadze informed N. Ceausescu in detail about the meeting held in Reykjavik between M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and U.S. President R. Reagan. Particular attention was paid to the new constructive proposals put forward at the meeting by M.S. Gorbachev, the implementation of which would make it possible to rid mankind of the nuclear threat and radically improve the world situation.

The sides expressed the hope that the U.S. Administration will also make its contribution to the attainment of mutually acceptable accords in the field of limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons and the improvement of the international situation as a whole. This would serve the interests of all countries and peoples.

Further on Ceausescu Meeting

LD161941 Moscow TASS in English 1832 GMT 16 Oct 86

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] In the course of their conversation the sides discussed ways of further broadening and improving Soviet-Romanian cooperation and concerted actions of the two countries on the international scene.

Discussing the key problems of world politics, the sides concentrated on the further invigoration of the efforts of the socialist countries and all the peace forces in averting the nuclear threat, curbing the arms race, promoting disarmament and establishing a comprehensive system of international peace and security. Special importance is attached in this context to the implementation of a complex of new initiatives put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev in Reykjavik, initiatives paving the way to a breakthrough in the development of international relations, the improvement of the overall world atmosphere and a return to detente.

Shevardnadze Press Conference

LD162147 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1915 GMT 16 Oct 86

[Excerpts] Bucharest, 16 Oct (TASS)--Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR minister of foreign affairs, who is on an official friendly visit here, held a press conference at which he made the following statement:

Our visit to Romania ends with our meeting with you. We have an urgent need to share with the press a number of impressions about the events of recent days. I hope they will not be without interest to you.

In the first place, we have carried out a responsible mission entrusted to us by M.S. Gorbachev -- to inform the leadership of the fraternal socialist countries promptly about the content and results of the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik, to expound our evaluations and to hear the opinion of our friends.

We had a meeting with Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu. During a very detailed and substantive conversation we analyzed in detail the Reykjavik negotiations and the situation that has arisen following their conclusion.

A working meeting of the foreign ministers of the Warsaw pact member states was also devoted to the results of Reykjavik. All the ministers highly evaluated the position of the Soviet Union and the course conducted at the negotiations by M.S. Gorbachev. In the difficult and dramatic discussion on the destiny of the world the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee defended the position not just of our state alone: he was acting in the interests of all the socialist countries, of the socialist community and of all mankind.

The Reykjavik meeting raises the moral and political prestige of socialism to an even higher level. It has shown the world how great is the price we are prepared to pay for a stable and reliable peace and how unshakable is our commitment to principle in the defense of its fundamental interests.

The Bucharest session of the Committee of Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Pact member states has deepened our cooperation. Having exchanged views on the situation in the world in the light of the results of the Soviet-U.S. talks, we coordinated our further actions and defined the priorities and directions of joint efforts, whose aim is the implementation of the initiative of the fraternal countries to create a comprehensive system of international peace and security.

We continually return in our thoughts to what happened in Reykjavik on 11-12 October. The impressions of those days are superimposed on all today's matters, and the perception of them is all the more acute. All the more profound is the understanding of how difficult each step toward peace is. Never before has it been so broad as in those days at Reykjavik, and never before has it been severed so unreasonably as by our U.S. negotiating partners.

Why did this happen?

M. S. Gorbachev replied exhaustively to this at the press conference in Reykjavik in 12 October and in his speech on Soviet television.

However, broad discussion of the subject continues, and, in particular, reports are coming in which distort the true state of affairs. It is essential to comment on, so to speak, certain commentaries.

Whether it is relevant or not, our U.S. partners use the President's favorite phrase: "It's not that peoples distrust each other because they have a lot of weapons, but they arm themselves because there is no trust between them."

well, if in Washington they are so greatly concerned about the problems of trust, they themselves should not underminetrust.

This is precisely what they are doing when they now state that they, allegedly, proposed to us the elimination of nuclear weapons by the end of the present century.

It is as if the sides did not reach a mutual understanding on this central issue in Reykjavik by confirming that they would commit themselves to eliminate all nuclear weapons, including ballistic missiles, by the end of 1986. The mutual understanding on this issue is of historic significance.

I would reconstruct a minute-by-minute picture of how in Reykjavik we came to such an accord. However, at present, dark smears are being placed on this picture. All these

insinuations as to the imaginary violations by the Soviet Union of its treaty obligations and the inventions about its secret work in the sphere of defense installations are both irresponsible and immoral. The rhetorical passages to the effect that only talk from a position of strength forces the Soviet Union to agreement are immoral.

Great, very great is the U.S. military potential, but the potential for decency of some representatives of the administration has been seriously undermined.

In this regard one wishes to say: the times of the Talleyrands have long passed. Petty acts of cunning with great consequences which are characteristic of the age of secret diplomacy ought by now to have been shelved. When with bated breath millions of people look you in the face with hope and faith and listen to you, be honest with them. Do not distort, for example, what exactly was discussed in Reykjavik and how. This is an elementary demand.

Communique on Visit

LD161557 Moscow TASS in English 1550 GMT 16 Oct 86

[Excerpts] Bucharest, Oct 16 (TASS)--A communique issued here on the results of an official friendly visit paid to the Socialist Republic of Romania by Eduard Shevardnadze, a member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee and foreign minister of the USSR, has reiterated a resolve to act to advance fruitful Soviet-Romanian cooperation in the interests of both countries and peoples, the common cause of socialism, peace and international cooperation.

Stressing the importance of a program for reducing armed forces and conventional arms in Europe along with corresponding cuts in military expenditures of states, which is a joint initiative advanced by the Warsaw Treaty members, the sides exchanged information about efforts made by both countries towards its implementation. They spoke positively on the activity demonstrated by the USSR, Romania and other countries in this issue.

The ministers, who paid much attention to the Reykjavik meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan, emphasized the importance of large-scale and far-reaching proposals made there by the Soviet Union, whose implementation would make it possible in a short time to bring about a fundamental turn for the better in international affairs, achieve progress in all areas of work for disarmament, fend off the threat of a nuclear war, and start moving towards a nuclear-free world.

They called for the dialogue to be carried on and voiced the hope that the United States would take a constructive, realistic and responsible attitude to the Soviet proposals.

Stress was laid on the high significance of the assessments and proposals made in the final document of the Bucharest meeting of the Foreign Ministers' committee of the Warsaw Treaty member countries as meeting the basic interests and aspirations of the peoples of both these and other countries.

The sides spoke highly of the successful outcome of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe and stressed the importance of thorough preparation for the forthcoming meeting in Vienna and its conclusion with positive results.

The ministers spoke out for settling armed conflicts, tensions and contentious issues by way of talks, overcoming backwardness and establishing a new international economic order and for respect to be shown for the will and right of every nation to choose an own path of development freely, without outside interference.

The importance was stressed of strengthening the unity and cohesion of the member countries of the Warsaw Treaty which is an effective factor for ensuring peace in Europe and in the world as a whole.

Ceausescu Commentary on Reykjavik

LD201336 Moscow TASS in English 1109 GMT 20 Oct 86

[Text] Bucharest October 20 TASS -- Romania believes that the results of the Soviet-American summit meeting in Reykjavik should not be all in vain, Nicolae Ceausescu, general secretary of the Romanian Communist Party and president of Romania, has told a rally in the city of Slatina.

Important issues of disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, were discussed at the Reykjavik meeting, he said. The sides drew closer to each other on some of them.

"Everything must be done now to reach as early as possible a number of concrete agreements designed to abolish nuclear weapons in Europe and in the world as a whole. Everything must be done to turn to reducing conventional armaments. There is no other way," Ceausescu said.

The Romanian leader called on the peoples of Europe and the world at large to rally their forces to ensure peace and international security.

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CSO: 5200/1037

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR OFFICIALS BRIEF FOREIGNERS ON REYKJAVIK OUTCOME

Bessmertnykh, Mitterrand Meeting

LD141742 Moscow TASS in English 1725 GMT 14 Oct 86

[Text] Paris October 14 TASS -- Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, who arrived here from Reykjavik in accordance with the agreement reached, was received today by Francois Mitterrand, president of France. On the instruction of Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, he told the president about the Soviet-American summit meeting in Reykjavik.

The conversation was attended by Yakov Ryabov, USSR ambassador to France.

Bessmertnykh on UK, French Arms

LD151014 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2318 GMT 14 Oct 86

[Text] Paris, October 14 (TANJUG) -- Special envoy of Soviet party leader Mikhail Gorbachev, assistant Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh said this evening that for the present French and British nuclear potentials are being left aside in Soviet-U.S. disarmament talks. At a press conference here this evening Bessmertnykh, who today informed French President Francois Mitterrand on Soviet assessments of the Reykjavik summit, said that the action to free Europe from nuclear arms will largely depend in the future on the level of responsibility of all countries that possess nuclear weapons. Bessmertnykh said that he conveyed to President Mitterrand personal assessments of Gorbachev concerning his meeting with U.S. President Ronald Reagan in Reykjavik.

Mitterrand, on his part, conveyed to Bessmertnykh his views on the last week's summit.

Rogachev Briefing in PRC

LD151104 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1025 GMT 15 Oct 86

[Text] Beijing, 15 Oct (TASS) -- Igor Rogachev, special representative of the Soviet Government, deputy USSR minister of foreign affairs, and Oleg Troyanovskiy, USSR ambassador to the PRC, met with Qian Qichen, deputy PRC minister of foreign affairs, and briefed him on the results of the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Reykjavik.

The Soviet side stressed that the meeting in Iceland was an event of exceptional significance for the international life. Major far-reaching proposals by the Soviet Union on a number of key issues related to limiting and reducing nuclear armaments -- which were put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee -- were rendered. It was noted that the stand assumed by President Reagan on the SDI issue, prevented specific decisions from being reached.

The Chinese side expressed hope that the USSR and the United States would continue their efforts in the search for mutually acceptable accords in order to achieve substantial progress on the issue of monitoring armaments. That, in Qian Qichen's opinion, would assist in easing tensions in the world.

On completion of the ninth round of the Soviet-Chinese political consultations, Igor Rogachev left Beijing.

Karpov on Thatcher Meeting

LD141146 London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 1134 GMT 14 Oct 86

[By Paul Cheston, PA staff reporter]

[Excerpts] A top Soviet official today spoke to the world's press outside No. 10 Downing Street -- the first time such a high-ranking Russian envoy has done so. Chief arms negotiator Mr Viktor Karpov talked about his longer than expected one-and-a-half hour meeting with Mrs Thatcher.

The prime minister gave full-hearted support to President Reagan's defence of his star wars programme at the Iceland summit. But Mr Karpov emerged to say he had had "a very useful discussion" with Mrs Thatcher and talked of his hopes for new disarmament talks in Geneva.

Speaking in fluent English, Mr Karpov said: "I talked to the prime minister about the results of the Reykjavik meeting between General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan. I expressed our opinion about why the meeting failed to produce results that could mean a movement forward in resolving all the complicated but very important issues of nuclear disarmament."

Mr Karpov said that both he and Mrs Thatcher agreed that more effort was needed to break the deadlock in disarmament negotiations.

Asked about a new meeting, Mr Karpov said: "I think the results of the Reykjavik meeting should be pondered on by both sides and it could take some time." When pressed to name a time and place for a new meeting with President Reagan, Mr Karpov replied simply: "Geneva."

Mr Karpov then touched on his personal relationship with Mrs Thatcher, and when asked whether he had had a sympathetic hearing, he replied: "We had a discussion and, of course, not all our views coincide." [passage omitted]

Mr Karpov's meetings with Mrs Thatcher and Baroness Young, deputy foreign secretary, were arranged while he was in Reykjavik as part of Mr Gorbachev's team on Saturday. According to officials, a message was received by the foreign Office in London pointing out that he planned a series of European visits to discuss the summit and asking if it would be convenient to visit London.

Petrovskiy Report at UN

LD150705 Moscow TASS in English 0634 GMT 15 Oct 86

[Text] New York October 15 TASS -- The delegation of the USSR to the 41st session of the United Nations General Assembly Tuesday briefed session delegates on the results of the Reykjavik meeting between the Soviet and U.S. leaders.

Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister V. Petrovskiy told the General Assembly's First (Political) Committee that the meeting had aimed to give a fillip to constructive progress in the key areas of world politics, launch productive efforts to cut back on arms and reduce the risk of outbreak of a nuclear war, and start work, at long last, to fulfil the understandings reached at the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Geneva in November 1985. "The Soviet delegation did not come to the Icelandic capital empty-handed," he said. "It took there a whole package of major, compromise proposals which, had they been accepted, could indeed make for early breakthroughs in all areas of nuclear arms control, really fend off the threat of a nuclear war, and allow progress toward a nuclear-free world."

"The historic chance to come to terms on the whole package of agreements was squandered due to the obstructionist stand of the U.S. Administration," the Soviet representative said. "It cannot be said that the meeting in Reykjavik was in vain," he said. "It was a step in the difficult dialogue in a search for solutions."

"There emerged the outlines of almost final accords but it just did not prove possible to finalize them there," Petrovskiy explained, adding: "The very road covered to such major accords on so significant cuts in nuclear arms is by itself a tremendous amount of experience and a huge gain. "The Reykjavik meeting was an exceptionally important event in international life and a major landmark in the Soviet-U.S. relationship."

"We believe," he said, "that there is no reason to despair. The meeting led us to the very important stage of understanding where we stand, and showed that agreements are possible."

"The formula for the further march forward is very simple: dialogue, realism and a sense of responsibility," the Soviet deputy foreign minister said. "We are convinced that in efforts for such a continuation, we shall not be alone and shall be acting together with all peace-minded forces.:"

Bessmertnykh News Conference in Paris

LD151344 Moscow TASS in English 1250 GMT 15 Oct 86

[Text] Paris October 15 TASS -- Visiting Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh has met here with representatives of the mass media of France and other countries to brief them on the results of the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Reykjavik and explain the meaning of Soviet initiatives for nuclear disarmament and a lasting peace.

Bessmertnykh Talk with Craxi

LD152030 Moscow TASS in English 1904 GMT 15 Oct 86

[Text] Rome October 15 TASS -- Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, a deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, who arrived in Rome today under an agreement between the two sides, was received by Bettino Craxi, prime minister of Italy, and briefed him under instructions from Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on the Soviet-American summit meeting in Reykjavik.

Semenov Briefing for Koivisto

LD151813 Helsinki International Service in Finnish 1600 GMT 15 Oct 86

[Text] President of the Republic Mauno Koivisto met this afternoon with the Soviet special ambassador, Vladimir Semenov, who accounted for his country's viewpoints on the Reykjavik summit. Soviet Ambassador to Finland Vladimir Sobolev was also received by the president. Special Ambassador Semenov led the Soviet delegation to the SALT I talks in Helsinki in 1969-72.

President Koivisto and special Ambassador Semenov agreed that efforts must be continued after the meeting for a development in the superpower talks.

Aleksandrov Meeting in Denmark

LD160316 Moscow TASS in English 1902 GMT 15 Oct 86

[Text] Copenhagen October 15 TASS -- Danish Prime Minister Poul Schluter today received a special Soviet envoy, Ambassador A.M. Aleksandrov, who briefed him on the results of the meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and U.S. President Ronald Reagan in Reykjavik.

Petrovskiy Call on Perez de Cuellar

LD160424 Moscow TASS in English 2157 GMT 15 Oct 86

[Text] New York October 15 TASS -- Vladimir Petrovskiy, a deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, today called on United Nations Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar and briefed him on the results of the Soviet-American summit meeting in Reykjavik.

Milan: Bessmertnykh Rome News Conference on Summit

PM171452 [Editorial Report] Milan L'UNITA in Italian 16 October front-pages a 600-word report on Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh's 15 October talks in Rome with Italian Prime Minister Craxi and Foreign Minister Andreotti, and the following exchange with journalists before leaving the prime minister's office:

"[Journalist] What is Gorbachev's assessment of Reykjavik?

"[Bessmertnykh] The summit gave us causes for both satisfaction and disappointment -- satisfaction at the understandings on offensive strategic weapons and missiles in Europe that were almost reached but not made official. For the first time in the nuclear era we were only a step away from the destruction of offensive strategic weapons within a decade; even the parameters for the destruction of American and Soviet missiles in Europe were agreed on; and an understanding was also reached on the Soviet SS20's in Asia.

"[Journalist] What were the causes of disappointment?

"[Bessmertnykh] There was disappointment at the fact that we failed to make these understandings official because the United States was not ready to come to an agreement on the whole range of issues. Faced with the choice whether to destroy nuclear weapons or continue reaching for their 'shield', the Americans opted for the latter course. But we hope that this will not be the U.S. leadership's final word and that Washington will return to realism.

"[Journalist] Is there a chance now of another summit?

"[Bessmertnykh] Yes, I do not rule out the possibility of another meeting between the two leaders, but it is more difficult now to talk about timetables and dates.

"[Journalist] Why did the United States say 'no' to the Soviet proposals on the space shield?

"[Bessmertnykh] It seems to me that the United States is still convinced that it can acquire superiority over the USSR by means of the space shield. But this is a serious error and if the United States persists in this error then relations between the two countries and the international situation will approach a period of destabilization."

Karpov Briefing for SPD

LD151357 Hamburg DPA in German 1330 GMT 15 Oct 86

[Text] Bonn, 15 Oct (DPA) -- Viktor Karpov, head of the Soviet delegation at the Geneva disarmament negotiations, briefed the SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany] on 15 October on the course of the Soviet-U.S. summit talks in Reykjavik. He met SPD disarmament expert Egon Bahr for this purpose.

SPD Executive Spokesman Wolfgang Clement announced that Karpov had given his views on the possible results coming out of the conference, which were also important to Europe. The further course of the negotiations in Geneva and Vienna had also been discussed.

Karpov to FRG Press

LD151854 Hamburg DPA in German 1825 GMT 15 Oct 86

[Excerpt] Bonn 15 Oct (DPA) -- Despite the foundering of the Soviet summit meeting in Reykjavik, the Soviet Union is still prepared to negotiate with the United States on a reduction of medium-range missiles and a comprehensive nuclear test ban and to (?conclude) appropriate agreements. This was stated on Wednesday, 15 October, by the

Soviet chief negotiator in Geneva, Viktor Karpov, in Bonn, where he had briefed the Federal Government on behalf of party chief Mikhail Gorbachev on the results of Reykjavik.

At the same time, Karpov stressed at a news conference in the Soviet Embassy that agreements on long-range strategic weapons remain possible for Moscow if the United States were to dispense with the development of the SDI program. The testing of such "space-based" weapons system beyond laboratory testing was clearly forbidden by the U.S.-Soviet ABM treaty (on missile defense).

The meeting in Iceland foundered on the dispute over the U.S. SDI program. Karpov stated that it was primarily the United States that now had to draw the conclusions from Reykjavik. Moscow was prepared to continue the dialogue for the purpose of overcoming the differences of opinion, on the basis of that progress that had been made at the summit.

In response to a question on whether he considered a new summit meeting between Gorbachev and President Ronald Reagan in the United States possible in the foreseeable future -- before the end of this year -- he said that this depended not on the Soviet Union, but on the U.S. side. [passage omitted]

Rogachev Briefs Qian Qichen

PM200801 Moscow PRAVDA (First Edition) in Russian 16 Oct 86 p 5

[TASS report under the general heading "Political Consultations"]

[Text] Beijing, 15 Oct -- I.A. Rogachev, the Soviet Government's special envoy and USSR deputy foreign minister, and O.A. Troyanovskiy, USSR ambassador to the United States, met with PRC Deputy Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and briefed him on the results of the Soviet-U.S. Reykjavik summit.

The Soviet side stressed that the Iceland meeting was an exceptionally important event in international life. The Soviet Union set out the major, far-reaching proposals on a number of the central issues linked with nuclear arms limitation and reduction, which were put forward by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. It was noted that the position adopted by U.S. President R. Reagan on the SDI question did not make it possible to achieve any specific solutions.

The Chinese side expressed the hope that the USSR and the United States would continue their efforts in seeking mutually acceptable accords in order to achieve substantive progress on the arms control question. This, in Qian Qichen's opinion, would promote an easing of tension in the world.

I.A. Rogachev left Beijing after the conclusion of the ninth round of Soviet-Chinese consultations.

Hu Qili Cited on Talks

LD172207 Moscow TASS in English 1806 GMT 17 Oct 86

[Text] Tokyo October 17 TASS -- Hu Qili, Member of the Politbureau of the Central Committee, member of the Secretariat of the Communist Party of China Central Committee,

said in connection with the Reykjavik summit, among other things, that China consistently favours the continuation of a dialogue, since it is by far better than confrontation. No agreement has been reached at [the] Reykjavik meeting, nevertheless preparedness was declared to continue the dialogue. We also wish for its continuation. We would like an ultimate result be achieved at the future talks to make a contribution to the cause of peace all over the world, without doing damage to the interests of other states.

As far as the EDI problem is concerned, Hu Qili continued, we hold that the exploration of outer space should contribute to peace all over the world, while its use with military aims boosts the weapons race. Therefore we oppose the Strategic Defence Initiative.

Semenov-Tindemans Talk

LD162220 Moscow TASS in English 1903 GMT 16 Oct 86

[Text] Brussels October 16 TASS -- Ambassador Vladimir Semenov, special representative of the Soviet Union, who arrived today in the Belgian capital, had a meeting with Leo Tindemans, Belgian minister of foreign affairs.

At the talk held in an atmosphere of frankness, the Soviet representative dwelt at length on the results of the meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and U.S. President Ronald Reagan in Reykjavik. During the exchange of opinions the representative informed the Belgian side of the assessment of the results of the summit held in the Icelandic capital, given by the meeting of the Politbureau of the CPSU Central Committee held October 14. It was pointed out, for instance, that the Reykjavik summit had been an important event in international life and in the struggle against the arms race and for banning and liquidating nuclear weapons.

18 October Briefings

LD182013 Moscow TASS in English 1941 GMT 18 Oct 86

[Text] London October 18 TASS -- Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of Great Britain received Viktor Karpov, head of the Soviet delegation to the Soviet-U.S. negotiations on nuclear and space weapons in Geneva. During the meeting the head of the British Government was informed about the results of the meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and U.S. President Ronald Reagan in Reykjavik.

Bonn October 18 TASS -- Viktor Karpov was received by Hans-Dietrich Genscher, minister of foreign affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany. Karpov also met with other members of the West German Government dealing with arms limitation and disarmament matters. The Soviet representative informed them about the results of the meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan in Reykjavik.

Helsinki October 18 TASS -- President Mauno Koivisto of Finland received Ambassador Vladimir Semenov, special envoy of the U.S.S.R. President Koivisto was informed about the results of the Soviet-American summit meeting in Reykjavik.

Stockholm October 18 TASS -- Sten Andersson, minister of foreign affairs of Sweden, received Ambassador Andrey Aleksandrov, special envoy of the U.S.S.R., who informed the Government of Sweden about the results of the meeting between the Soviet and U.S. leaders in the capital of Iceland.

Belongov to UN First Committee

LD202102 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2026 GMT 20 Oct 86

[Text] New York, 20 Oct (TASS) -- The task of preventing the militarization of space is at the center of attention of the First Committee of the UN General Assembly. The Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Reykjavik again revealed in all its vividness the key importance for the destinies of the world of preventing an arms race in space, said A.M. Belongov, permanent representative of the USSR in the United Nations, today. The talks which, as everyone now knows, were opening up real opportunities for freeing the planet in a very short time from nuclear weapons, became bogged down and did not lead to the expected result precisely because of the position of the U.S. Administration with regard to SDI and the ABM treaty. Time does not wait; it imperiously demands a multiplication of the efforts of USSR and the United States, the participation of all states in the activation of multilateral negotiations, and the imparting to them of dynamism in order to put into effect the UN decisions on prevention of the arms race in space.

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CSO: 5200/1050

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR'S GERASIMOV BRIEFS PRESS ON REYKJAVIK OUTCOME

TASS Report

LD161445 Moscow TASS in English 1430 GMT 16 Oct 86

[Text] Moscow October 16 TASS -- "Reykjavik is not the full stop, Reykjavik is a line after which fresh efforts need to be mobilized to achieve our common goal of disarmament," the head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Information Department said here today.

Speaking at a briefing for Soviet and foreign correspondents, Gennadiy Gerasimov added: "We believe that what has happened at Reykjavik should provide a powerful stimulus for all nations, mass organizations and governments to realize the need to join common efforts to consolidate peace."

Answering a question about the possibility of signing a separate agreement on medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe, the Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman said that both issues concerning strategic offensive nuclear arms and space weaponry and those concerning medium-range missiles could naturally be discussed at expert level separately.

"On the whole," he added, "our proposals are well-known: Presented in Reykjavik has been a package of major measures." [quotation marks as received]

Speaking of the position of the Soviet delegation in Geneva, Gerasimov said that the new initiatives made in Reykjavik were now on the table at the Soviet-U.S. talks in Switzerland.

Explaining what the Soviet side meant under strengthening the ABM Treaty, he said that the treaty by itself was a good one and life had borne out its expediency and that "what is meant specifically is that although the treaty envisages the possibility of either party going out of it on six-month notice, we suggest refraining from using this possibility for ten years."

World Service Report

LD162002 Moscow World Service in English 1810 GMT 16 Oct 86

[Text] The spokesman of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Gennadiy Gerasimov, has given a briefing here in Moscow. Most of the questions he was asked by foreign newsmen boil

down to the following: Is the Soviet Union prepared not to consider the package of proposals made at Reykjavik as an integral whole? And, are continued Soviet-American negotiations of various aspects of that package an indication of its readiness not to do so?

Here is what the Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman replied: The Soviet Union made colossal concessions at Reykjavik, and those concessions have astounded even the American side. It did so with the sole purpose of making a breakthrough toward disarmament in real terms. The Soviet Union advanced a whole package of proposals that was in the end turned down by the United States. But the Soviet Union is not calling off the talks that are under way in Geneva. There can be continued talks at expert level on medium-range missiles and nuclear space weapons, and there's no contradiction here.

The two sides discussed an agreement in principle at Reykjavik and, in order to carry such agreement out, one has to have details as to how verification should be exercised, how one is to go about eliminating the missiles and so on.

The Reykjavik meeting was in the focus of attention at the briefing. Gennadiy Gerasimov said that Reykjavik does not put paid to anything but rather it marks the beginning of greater understanding by all nations as to how their dream of peace and security may be realized.

The American side was prepared in principle to accept the Soviet package but the term laboratory proved to be the sticking point. The United States wants to carry out research under SDI both in the laboratory and in outer space.

Clearly the United States is after strategic superiority over the Soviet Union. We are against that, Gennadiy Gerasimov said, just as we are against the violation of the principle of equality and equal security. We are not going to attack the United States and we, just as any leading United States experts, believe that it is impossible to build a really effective space shield. The Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman said it is unclear why the United States has to carry on with nuclear tests if, as it has said, it is committed to banning nuclear weapons.

At the Geneva summit the Soviet and American sides agreed that the arms race on earth must be stopped and that it must be prevented from spreading to outer space; but the issue of space proved to be the stumbling block of Geneva. What took place at Reykjavik, Gennadiy Gerasimov said, should give us all a fresh impetus in working for a stronger peace.

Gerasimov, Semenov on INF Stand

AU161451 Paris AFP in English 1448 GMT 16 Oct 86

[Text] Moscow, Oct 16 (AFP) -- Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov Thursday poured cold water on hints by chief Soviet arms negotiator Viktor Karpov that an arms reduction agreement was possible without affecting the U.S. Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI).

Mr. Karpov had told journalists in London after last weekend's U.S.-Soviet summit in Reykjavik that an accord relating solely to intermediate nuclear weapons in Europe (INF) was possible. But Mr. Gerasimov said here Thursday that Moscow would not break

up the package on the table in Iceland -- INF reductions combined with a ten-year moratorium on research into space defence systems, a condition U.S. President Ronald Reagan considered would kill SDI on star wars.

Mr. Gerasimov said disarmament negotiations in Geneva should still produce a detailed formula for INF reductions, adding that the Kremlin had made enormous concessions at Reykjavik to come up with the package deal. He said the Soviet position was that it would continue to negotiate arms reductions but would not sign an agreement unless the whole package was ratified.

Mr. Gerasimov said his boss, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, would "very probably" meet with U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz at the next session of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Vienna in November 4.

Mr. Shultz said in an televised interview in the United States on Tuesday that a meeting with Mr. Shevardnadze at the conference "would be arranged", the first high-level U.S. -Soviet meeting since Reykjavik.

Meanwhile in Brussels Soviet Leader Mikhail Gorbachev's special envoy Vladimir Semenov Thursday told Belgian Foreign Minister Leo Tindemans the Soviet disarmament package was an "all or nothing" affair. Mr. Tindemans, speaking after the hour-long meeting, said Mr. Semenov had telephoned the Kremlin to confirm the Soviet position. Mr. Semenov had admitted that before Reykjavik the Soviet Union was ready to negotiate a separate agreement on INF, but said that in the light of new proposals made in Iceland the Kremlin now considered that an agreement on INF must be linked to the overall package. Mr. Semenov added that an historic opportunity was there for the taking and that Reykjavik had formed a very important element in U.S. -Soviet relations, and said he hoped there would still be a Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Washington despite the failure to reach agreement in Reykjavik.

On his part, the Belgian minister expressed the hope that the results achieved at the Soviet-American summit would be developed further at the Geneva negotiations on nuclear and space armaments.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR SPOKESMEN ON INF-SDI LINKAGE

INF-SDI Linkage In Force

PM151601 Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 13 Oct 86 p 1

[Interview with Soviet General Staff spokesman Navy Captain Yuriy Beketov by Ramon van den Boogaard: "The Soviet Union Returns to 'Linkage'"]

[Text] Moscow, 13 Oct -- The Soviet - U.S. negotiations on nuclear arms in Geneva will continue, but a separate accord on medium-range missiles in Europe (INF) is impossible unless Washington abandons further preparations for SDI, a spokesman for the Soviet General Staff told NRC HANDELSBLAD in an interview in Moscow this morning.

Navy Captain Yuriy Beketov said in an initial Soviet military comment on the Reykjavik summit that the Soviet proposals "form a package from which it is impossible (for the Americans) to take only the elements which suit them and leave those in which they have no interest."

His statements made it clear that Moscow has returned to the line from before the summit in Geneva last year: A separate agreement on SS-20's, cruise missiles, and Pershings depends on U.S. readiness to abandon its SDI space shield. The so-called "linkage" between space arms and other topics being discussed in Geneva by the Americans and the Russians (European and strategic missiles) had not, during and after the Geneva summit, been officially thrown overboard by the Soviet Union, but it was no longer mentioned, as a result of which the Western side put some faith in "Reykjavik" as a change of separate accords.

Beketov was involved as an "expert" in the SALT II and START negotiations, and in the present talks in Geneva on European, strategic, and space arms.

The problem for Moscow, he said, is that the Americans may well have declared their willingness in Reykjavik and Geneva to extend the ABM treaty, but they interpret this treaty (on antimissile systems) in such a way that the further development of SDI outside the laboratory is permitted. Moscow seems to have the same stance as it did before November 1985 -- that the ABM treaty and its appendices rule out SDI development.

The fact that it is now impossible in Geneva to isolate certain sections of the overall "package" and to ignore others was illustrated by Beketov with an example from the recent past. In a SALT II protocol, he said, it was agreed that further negotiations on cruise missiles would take place, but these were never held.

Beketov denied that on the subject of "linkage" Soviet leader Gorbachev had been "accommodating" in Geneva and "hard" in Reykjavik. The difference is, he said, that last year it was a first meeting between Gorbachev and Reagan and that at the time the Geneva talks on nuclear arms were only 1 year old. Now that we are a year further on the "working meeting in Reykjavik has shown exactly where the two sides stand," Beketov said. He denied that the difference in the Soviet approach to the two meetings could be the result of increased influence by the Soviet military top on foreign policy or even of opposition by the military to Gorbachev's approach to arms questions.

According to Beketov the link between SDI and possible accords is "not a military but a political question." Moscow's foreign policy, he said, is determined by "party, societal, and scientific interests." "We in the military do not dictate policy."

He also repeated Soviet positions well known before the Geneva summit, that a military-technical response to SDI "will be adequate, cheaper, and more effective," and that here specific "measures against SDI" will be under consideration.

Karpov: INF Possible Without SDI

LD142123 London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 2044 GMT 14 Oct 86

[Text] The Soviet Union's chief arms negotiator tonight in London offered a glimmer of hope on an America-Soviet arms deal.

Mr Viktor Karpov, speaking after a longer-than-expected meeting with Mrs Thatcher, said a deal on European medium range nuclear arms -- including British-based cruise missiles -- was possible without it being linked to the USA scrapping their Star Wars project.

This appeared to be a significant move away from the stance taken by the Soviets at the Reykjavik summit.

Mr Karpov told a press conference: "We do not deny the possibility of finding a solution to medium range nuclear weapons in Europe separately from the space and nuclear offensive arms."

He said the Russians did not seek to exploit the differences between the U.S. and their European allies.

But the move could be seen as an attempt by the Russians in their new high-profile diplomacy to put the pressure on President Reagan.

In Reykjavik the Russians firmly linked the scrapping of star wars to the other issues. But before the talks collapsed great strides had been made in agreeing to cut dramatically medium range nuclear missiles in Europe and Soviet Asia.

Mr Karpov's talks with Mrs Thatcher were the second time in 24 hours that she was drawn to centre stage on international arms control. On Monday night President Reagan telephoned her a few hours before he went on television to give the American people a robust defence of his negotiating stance. During the 15 minute chat Mr Reagan told her his personal version of the summit and discussed the way ahead. Then came Mr Karpov's visit.

The fact that the Soviet authorities have taken the rare step of ordering a top official to seek a meeting with the prime minister herself demonstrates the importance they attach to Britain's role in disarmament talks. Normally Britain's briefing by the Soviets would be at ambassador level.

Mr Karpov's meetings with Mrs Thatcher and Baroness Young, deputy foreign secretary, were arranged while he was in Reykjavik as part of Mr Gorbachev's team on Saturday. Late today he flew to Bonn to explain the Russian position to the West German Government before going to Moscow.

After the one-and-a-half hours of talks with Mrs Thatcher, Mr Karpov spoke to the world's press outside No. 10 Downing street -- the first time such a high-ranking Russian envoy has done so.

Mrs Thatcher gave full-hearted support to Mr Reagan's defence of his Star Wars project.

But Mr Karpov described the talks as "a useful discussion" before ending his impromptu press briefing in the middle of Downing Street by inviting reporters and camera crew back to the Soviet Embassy for a full press conference.

At the press conference Mr Karpov was repeatedly questioned on why the Soviets in Reykjavik had insisted on linking star wars and the other issues, medium and long-range missiles. He replied: "The Soviets suggested a complex solution at Reykjavik." Russia had also suggested a series of test ban talks, which could also be considered separately, he said.

When pressed to name a time and place for a new meeting with President Reagan, Mr Karpov replied simply "Geneva." He then said he was waiting for instructions from Moscow.

Later it appeared that this comment could have referred only to general discussions, probably at the level of government officials and not a Reagan-Gorbachev summit.

Mr Karpov refused to lay down any time limit for pondering the outcome of Reykjavik, but added: "It will be a speedy deliberation."

He disagreed with Baroness Young, who said after her meeting with him that Britain regarded it as "a step backwards" by the Soviet Union in making progress achieved at Reykjavik hostage to an amendment to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. He commented: "I believe Lady Young has the right to make her own assessment of what happened in Reykjavik. I have my right to disagree with her."

He declined to give details of his discussions with Mrs Thatcher saying that the exchanges were "confidential."

He felt that the star wars initiative "provides a false sense of security". He said: "If one side feels it has a shield so to speak it might in that situation imagine it could strike first and start a war."

Mr Karpov felt that the complex proposals put by the Soviets in Reykjavik represented "an historic opportunity" to change the course of events. President Reagan had said he wanted his star wars programme to be a programme of research and the Soviets had agreed. But they insisted that the programme should not go beyond research.

Genscher: No INF Linkage

LD151816 Hamburg DPA in German 1752 GMT 15 Oct 86

[Excerpts] Bonn, 15 Oct (DPA) -- For the Soviet Union there is evidently no linkage between a U.S. renunciation of the SDI research project and an agreement on the reduction of medium-range missiles. This emerges from a Foreign Ministry statement on a talk between Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Viktor Karpov, the Soviet negotiating leader at the Geneva disarmament talks, in Bonn on 15 October.

According to this, Karpov confirmed the Soviet Union's readiness to continue negotiating on the whole spectrum of disarmament issues. In this regard, as far as medium-range missiles are concerned, a disarmament agreement could be achieved independently of other matters. [passage omitted]

Genscher expressed the view that the Reykjavik meeting had been "important and necessary." What was achieved there must be preserved and brought into the existing negotiating bodies. Genscher and Karpov also discussed a worldwide ban on chemical weapons, which, it is said, was not a topic in Reykjavik.

As well as Genscher, the federal chancellor's foreign policy adviser, Horst Teltschik, and the SPD were briefed on the talks in Reykjavik on Wednesday. The partner in the talks on the SPD side was disarmament expert Egon Bahr.

UK Official Countered on Linkage

LD160442 Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland 2000 GMT 15 Oct 86

[Nikolay Borin commentary]

[Excerpts] Speaking on the World Service of the BBC today, the deputy foreign secretary, Lady Young, said this in part: We see the Soviet insistence when so much progress has truly been made over a great many very important areas. Insistence on linking this to the Americans giving up SDI was in fact a step back from their previous negotiating position. We think that, in fact, they played the card which they knew the Americans could not pick up. Nikolay Borin of our staff has this comment.

I'd say that statement by Lady Young is pretty unfounded. To begin with Moscow was prepared to accept the nuclear zero option for Europe. It's the American delegation that made a step back when it tried to return the talks to the interim option, providing not for the scrapping but only for the reduction of medium-range missiles in Europe. But the Soviet side did not let the Americans make this step back. [passage omitted]

The Soviet side took another considerable step forward in Reykjavik. It agreed to put aside the question of the British and French nuclear forces. In fact, the Soviet Union accepted the idea that the British and French nuclear forces would remain the only nuclear stop on the nuclear-free map of Europe. Mikhail Gorbachev described that as a serious concession at the talks with the United States. But at the same time it was a concession that took London's official stand into account.

One should be out of touch with reality to claim that the Soviet position in Reykjavik was a step back. It seems London, on its side, capitulates before the United States' desire to bring SDI from laboratories to space.

The agreement on Britain's participation in SDI contains a special reservation saying that any plans to lead the program out of the research stage should be coordinated with the American allies.

Does Lady Young's blind faith in SDI mean that London has virtually given up the mechanism that controls this condition of its participation in SDI? The reply to this question would be all the more relevant since it is Washington's attempt to deploy weapons in space that turned out to be the stumbling block in the way of reaching historic agreement in Reykjavik.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR: U.S. REACTION TO, JUSTIFICATION FOR REYKJAVIK

U.S. Legislators: 'Missed Opportunity'

PM141325 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (First Edition) in Russian 4 Oct 86 p 3

[TASS report: "Real Opportunity Missed: That Is What U.S. Legislators Are Saying"]

[Text] Washington, 13 Oct -- Sensible U.S. legislators do not hide their profound disappointment with the fact that, because of the U.S. side's obstinacy, a real opportunity to reach substantial agreements during the Soviet-U.S. summit in Reykjavik has been missed. "This has been a bitter day," Senator C. Pell stated in an AP interview. "We turned down a bird in the hand, the reduction of strategic offensive arms, for two in the bush, the 'Strategic Defense Initiative.' One can only hope," the senator continued, "that President Reagan will review his position and agree to the Soviet proposals."

Senator G. Hart, considered a possible Democratic Party contender for the Presidency in the 1988 presidential election, stated in a NEW YORK TIMES interview that the administration appears to consider implementation of the "star wars" program more important than effective measures in the arms control sphere. Many of us have tried to show that reckless adherence to a dubious space-based defense system will block real progress in the arms control sphere, the senator said. By all accounts, that is what has happened.

Congressman E. Markey stated that President Reagan missed an opportunity to "swap the 'star wars' program for the best deal the Russians have offered."

Millions of people throughout the world pinned their hopes on arms control progress during the Soviet-U.S. summit, Senator F. Lautenberg stated in an interview for AP. "If we want to progress in resolving the existing problems," he stressed, "the dialogue must be continued."

Senator S. Nunn, a Democrat and a leading member of the Armed Services Committee, stated: "It seems to me that the administration has changed its main priorities on the arms control issue. It began by considering it necessary to reduce the Soviet first-strike systems to a level which would strengthen stability. The administration's main focus and main priority has now become the defense of SDI, even at the cost of rejecting sharp reductions in the Soviet systems. There should be no rejoicing at this news." The senator predicted that the administration's requests for new appropriations for SDI will now be the "subject of more thorough scrutiny than ever before" in Congress. The United States is in a difficult financial position, S. Nunn noted. For that reason, SDI is not only a strategic decision but an economic one.

'Concern' Over Aftermath

PM141403 Moscow IZVESTIYA (Morning Edition) in Russian 14 Oct 86 p 4

[Own correspondent A. Blinov dispatch: "Not Without Prompting From Ultrarightists"]

[Text] Washington -- It is with a clear sense of concern that American newspapers are reporting that the Reykjavik meeting ended without reaching accords on questions of disarmament, although the two countries' leaders were close to doing so.

"Impasse Over SDI"; "Dreams of SDI Outweighed Hope of Arms Control" -- these are the headlines of articles in today's newspapers. The press cites the assessments of the meeting and its results which M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, made at a press conference in the Icelandic capital. It particularly singles out the words that the "historic opportunity" of reaching very important agreements in the disarmament sphere was missed because of the American side's stubborn reluctance to abandon the plans to deploy space weapons.

An article over the signature of Lou Cannon, THE WASHINGTON POST's White House correspondent, admits that "far-reaching potential nuclear arms reduction accords came up against an obstacle -- the 'star wars' program." As Robert Kaiser and Walter Pincus write in the same newspaper, "the 'star wars' program has pushed back real progress in the matter of implementing radical nuclear arms reductions." "SDI," the article reads, "has a powerful clan of supporters in weapons manufacturers, members of Congress, and military figures. Adherents of SDI both within the administration and in Congress and in the Republican Party have seized upon it as a 'sacred cause' that must be continued at any price. For example, on the eve of the Reykjavik meeting Congressman J. Kemp implored Reagan not to agree to anything in Reykjavik that might harm SDI."

The informed commentators R. Evans and R. Novak report that at the beginning of October, that is, literally on the eve of the Reykjavik meeting, a number of influential SDI adherents -- both Republicans and Democrats -- sent Reagan a letter with "extraordinary" contents. The letter recommended embarking on the immediate deployment of SDI without waiting for the final results of all the research. Those who signed the letter included Zbigniew Brzezinski, former permanent U.S. representative at the United Nations; and a number of senators and member of the House of Representatives.

Newspapers believe, however, that these actions could elicit a counterreaction from those Americans who understand the danger of intensifying the arms race.

Political 'Turmoil'

PM150803 Moscow IZVESTIYA (Morning Edition) in Russian 15 Oct 86 p 1

[Own correspondent L. Koryavin dispatch: "Washington After Reykjavik"]

[Text] Washington -- Washington is in turmoil. Political discussions on the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting which ended in Reykjavik are building up. Even though the meeting fell on Saturday and Sunday, followed by another public holiday in the United States -- Columbus Day, there proved to be a broad circle of political figures, representatives of the public, and journalists taking part in the debates.

The main topic of television commentaries, press material, and public and private conversations is the disarmament problem which was discussed in Reykjavik. Something many people in the United States deliberately wanted to avoid even yesterday is being actively debated in the country today: Hardly anyone can now dispute the truth that there is no more topical task for mankind than the task of preventing a nuclear catastrophe. And the first conclusion from today's situation:

The administration will not succeed in avoiding discussion of the key problems of disarmament, while the Soviet initiatives, which generated a major response here, gave an impetus for their practical solution and most serious deliberations.

When U.S. President R. Reagan came down the aircraft steps at Andrews Base one television commentator said that he has returned empty-handed. This comment needs amplification. The President did not bring the Americans any disarmament agreement because the United States refused to accept the USSR's constructive and sensible proposals.

Instead of seeking agreements, Washington is relying on a "policy of strength." Its arsenal still contains old formulations like, for example, "the way to disarmament lies only through the super-armament [sverkhvooruzheniye] of America." The U.S. President's latest statement was imbued with these very ideas. Correspondents expected a statement by R. Reagan on his return to Andrews Base from Reykjavik, and they also expected a press conference in the traditional Blue Room of the White House, but the head of the administration avoided meeting the press. The President spoke on television from the Oval Office and, as before, upheld his positions and primarily the "star wars" program.

The approach displayed toward the Reykjavik meeting became a kind of test of political maturity and sincerity in the solution of disarmament problems. The U.S. President's stance was backed primarily by the country's right-wing circles and the military-industrial complex. Incidentally, the approach toward the "star wars" program, as THE BALTIMORE SUN writes, has been turned by conservatives into their ideological test of loyalty to their principles. A television commentary by Assistant Secretary of Defense R. Perle reflected the viewpoint of military circles and contained the same stereotyped praise of SDI, which would supposedly bring security to the United States and would "force the Russians" to come to the agreements needed by Washington.

Observers emphasize that administration will have to face a difficult task: "how to justify the results of Reykjavik." It cannot fail to perceive the increased role of the public opinion factor in the United States. Now it is also necessary to take into account the opinion of West European allies, who had also placed hopes on the meeting. The White House is also perturbed by the prospect of relations with Congress. Congressman Foley said that Reagan's speech was just the first explanation, and it must be followed by other, more detailed explanations.

The reaction by Congress to the Reykjavik meeting is far from uniform. Those who sent the President off to the Soviet-U.S. meeting bidding him "not to falter," "not to give in" on disarmament questions, and particularly with respect to the "star wars" program, cannot hide their gratification. This was openly declared by Jack Kemp, leader of the "new right" congressmen. There are, however, other views in Congress. People here recall how Congress welcomed the President on his return from Geneva, where positive developments emerged in the process of disarmament and Soviet-U.S. relations. Today, observers point out, the President will not be given such a hospitable reception; on the contrary, his stance is being subjected to sharp criticism by many congressmen and senators.

Here it is also assumed that the debates on the "star wars" program, which blocked the reaching of agreement in Reykjavik, will be exacerbated in Congress.

The Republican administration's refusal to come to an agreement which would have played a historic role in the disarmament process will no doubt have an effect on the forthcoming elections to the country's supreme legislative body. Less than 3 weeks remain until the elections, and the champions of restrictions on military expenditure in the Democratic Party are taking a more active stance in the struggle for seats in Congress.

Summing up the initial results, it can be said that the intransigence of the administration's stance on questions of the arms race and the desire to transfer it to space create for it real difficulties not only in the international arena but also in the country's domestic political situation.

Speakes On Going 'Forward'

LD162152 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1953 GMT 16 Oct 86

[From "The World Today" program presented by Vitaliy Ilyashenko]

[Text] Hello comrades. To judge from the latest speeches by U.S. statesmen, a clear distribution of duties has taken shape in the White House. President Reagan is speaking in harsh tones when he talks about the results of Reykjavik and the star wars program while his aides have been given the role of expounding Washington's position on matters of disarmament. Reagan's statements are, of course, being seen as a mark of preparations for elections to Congress, which, as is known, will take place on 4 November.

Speaking in the state of Maryland at a preelection meeting, Reagan once again defended his favorite creation, the star wars program, and bombastically repeated that its renunciation, which the Soviet Union is supposedly striving for, would be a tragedy for the present generation of American people. [video shows Reagan making speech on rostrum]

For the American conservative attitude to the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative has become a kind of criterion of patriotism and loyalty.

The bellicose tone of Reagan's speech in Maryland was smoothed over by Speakes, the White House assistant press secretary. He read out the administration's official statement on the speech by Comrade Gorbachev on Soviet television. [video shows Speakes taking position on rostrum and delivering statement]

Speakes said: We consider that the accords reached in Iceland remain on the negotiating table. The talks which resumed today in Geneva will begin from the point where we ended work in Iceland. The talks in Reykjavik were highly important and a significant step in moving things forward. We want to build further work on the results attained in Iceland.

Since this statement reflects the official position of the White House, I'll quote his speech further: We note with pleasure, said Speakes, that both at his press conference in Reykjavik and in the address to the Soviet people, General Secretary Gorbachev stated that the work done will not pass by without leaving a trace. The way has now

been cleared for further advancement in the direction of a significant reduction in weapons. We also adhere to such a point of view. We consider that beginning from that point we can go forward in a business-like way. We must hear each other out; consider each other's views; look for common approaches and get agreement on decisions. In our view this aim was achieved in Reykjavik. The aim of any of our meeting should lie precisely in this.

As you can see it is a very optimistic and reassuring statement. The main thing now is that what has been said should be implemented by the Washington administration.

Reagan Grand Forks Speech

PM201437 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA (Second Edition) in Russian 19 Oct 86 p 3

[TASS report: "Trying To Distort"]

[Text] Washington, 18 Oct -- The U.S. Administration is continuing a massive propaganda campaign to foist on the world public its own interpretation distorting the results of the Soviet-American summit in Reykjavik.

Speaking in Grand Forks (North Dakota), President R. Reagan maintained that the meeting "marked a real move in our talks with the Soviet Union." At the same time he bluntly declared that "the only way to hold talks about peace is to do so from a position of strength." The administration head made another attempt to justify the U.S. Administration's refusal to limit the implementation of the outlined "star wars" plans. He gave an assurance that "SDI is a purely defensive, peaceful technology."

Soviet ABM Stance Distorted

PM171710 Moscow PRAVDA (First Edition) in Russian 18 Oct 86 p 4

[K. Georgiyev article: "Contrary to Facts and Logic"]

[Text] At the 12 October press conference in Reykjavik and in his 14 October Soviet television speech M. S. Gorbachev reproduced a photographically accurate and clear picture of how his meeting with U.S. President R. Reagan proceeded and how it ended.

The whole world received an accurate and clear idea of how, thanks to the Soviet side's persistence and, to be blunt, boldness the top leaders of the USSR and the United States came close to reaching an understanding on radically reducing and then totally eliminating nuclear arms -- both strategic and medium-range. It was equally clearly demonstrated why, through whose fault, this "breathtaking" prospect, in the felicitous expression of one Western figure, remained for the time being a potentiality and did not assume the form of an accord binding upon the sides.

You would think everything was clear to everyone. Nonetheless, high-ranking representatives of the U.S. Administration, including the secretary of state and the President's assistant for national security affairs, are continuing to persist in attempts to distort the true state of affairs.

Not denying the positive elements achieved at the Reykjavik meeting (moreover, actually attempting to take the main credit for them), the President and his spokesmen are doing

their utmost to persuade the world that the obstacle to everything in Reykjavik was the Soviet side's demand for changes in the ABM Treaty, which in its present form allegedly does not prevent implementation of the American SDI program right up to the start of the deployment of the space ABM means created within the framework of that program.

In an attempt to prove the supposed invalidity of the Soviet side's formulation of the question of not carrying out research into such means outside the laboratory, Secretary of State G. Shultz, for instance, openly stated: "The Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems makes no mention of this, so this would definitely be a change in it."

Is that claim consonant with the facts? Let us look at the facts -- that is always the most reliable way of establishing the truth.

Here is what Article V of the ABM Treaty says: "Each party undertakes not to develop [sozdavat], test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based."

As we can see, this speaks unambiguously of a pledge by the sides not only not to deploy but also not to test space-based ABM means. So you can only claim the opposite if you are counting on uninformed people, but is it permissible for statesmen to behave in this way?

In an attempt to confuse this extremely clear issue, people in Washington sometimes cite one of the agreed statements appended to the treaty; this statement allows of the possibility of the sides acquiring ABM means based on physical principles other than those which existed at the time the treaty was signed. Since, so they claim, it is precisely fundamentally new ABM means such as lasers, directed energy weapons, and so forth that are being developed [razrabotka] under the SDI program, the development [razrabotka] and testing of such means, including in space, do not fall under Article V of the treaty.

However, again counting on uninformed people, they fail to mention that the possibility of the appearance of such "exotic" means as replacements for those that previously existed is admitted by the statement in question only with regard to the limited ABM areas authorized by Article III of the treaty and only with regard to stationary land systems. In other words, it has no relevance whatever to Article V of the treaty, which prohibits space-based ABM means.

The text of both the treaty itself and of the appendices to it admit of no other interpretation. That is not simply the Soviet side's opinion. The official report of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency submitted to Congress 31 January 1983 -- that is, under the present administration -- states in black and white that the treaty's ban on the development [sozdaniye], testing, and deployment of space-based ABM systems or components for such systems "applies also to directed energy technology or any other technology utilized for this purpose."

It could not be put more clearly. As we can see, there were no divergences between the USSR and U.S. positions on this issue until on 23 March 1983, that is, 6 weeks after the aforementioned report, President R. Reagan announced the "strategic defense initiative." Then all of a sudden Washington began to portray "chalk as cheese." It is continuing to engage in this unsavory venture to this day.

Thus it is a matter of a desire on the part of the American side, and certainly not the Soviet side, to change, or to be more accurate, destroy the ABM Treaty. The Soviet Union is merely insisting on strict compliance with all provisions of the treaty.

That this is precisely the case is also proved by the fact that in Reykjavik the American side openly proposed replacing (and not merely changing) the ABM Treaty with some other treaty that would regulate the procedure for developing [sozdaniye] space ABM systems -- no less!

In this connection it is natural to ask the following question: Why did the President find it necessary to produce a proposal for replacing the ABM Treaty (a point which people in Washington now prefer not to mention, incidentally) if the SDI program really does fit in with the present treaty, as they endeavor to prove?

Washington is clearly at odds both with the fact and with logic.

Shultz Report to NATO Council

LD131727 Moscow TASS in English 1709 GMT 13 Oct 86

[Text] Brussels October 13 TASS--TASS correspondent Albert Balebanov reports:

A special session of the NATO Council at the level of foreign ministers of the NATO member-countries has been held here today to hear a report of U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz on the Soviet-American summit meeting, which closed in Reykjavik on Sunday.

George Shultz addressed a press conference on the results of the session, which demonstrated serious embarrassment of the U.S. Administration in face of the bitter disappointment among the allies at the outcome of the meeting. George Shultz was trying to justify the unconstructive stand of President Reagan on the basic problem of the present -- that of putting an end to the arms race on earth and preventing its spreading into outer space.

Reagan Television Address

LD141224 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1130 GMT 14 Oct 86

[Excerpt] President Ronald Reagan has gone on U.S. television with an address to the country on the results of the Soviet-U.S. summit-level meeting held in Reykjavik. His speech amounted to a justification of the unconstructive [nekonstruktivnaya] position by Washington, which wrecked [sorvat] the achievement of real and effective arms control measures. This, in point of fact, Reagan confirmed when he acknowledged that his tough position on the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative, known as the star wars program, hindered the realization of a far-reaching agreement outlined at the meeting in the field of nuclear arms reduction. He did not hide the fact that such an agreement does not suit Washington because it would have deprived the United States of the opportunity to implement the SDI program.

The White House's position, which pleases the interests of the U.S. military, threatens the vital interests of all humanity, including those of the American people, and evokes sharp criticism from sensible circles in the United States. [passage omitted]

Reagan Tries 'To Decline' Responsibility

LD140713 Moscow World Service in English 0700 GMT 14 Oct 86

[Text] Speaking on national television, President Reagan tried to decline all responsibility for the wrecking of agreements on the limitation of nuclear arms at the Soviet-American summit meeting in Reykjavik. The head of the American Administration explained his refusal to make a compromise on the question of the Strategic Defense Initiative by saying that the program was allegedly the key to a nuclear-free world.

Meanwhile, the President's stubborn striving to continue the realization of the "star wars" program blocked the working out of history making agreements in the field of disarmament. According to news analysts, by demonstrating his adherence to the SDI once again, the President has put to doubt the sincerity of his statements about being interested in arms control

White House Justification Campaign

LD160914 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2005 GMT 15 Oct 86

[From "The World Today" program presented by Eduard Mnatsakov]

[Text] In an attempt somehow to justify the unconstructive position of the United States at the Reykjavik talks, the White House has now launched a campaign aimed at U.S. public opinion. The U.S. President, Secretary of State Shultz, and Regan, the head of the White House staff, have joined in this, along with other high-ranking representatives of the U.S. Government. Their actions, the ABC television company reports, have taken on a somewhat frenzied aspect.

THE WASHINGTON POST published an interesting report today. It has discovered that on the eve of the meeting in Iceland a group of ultraright American figures sent Reagan a letter demanding that he immediately give the order to start deploying the space defense systems within the star wars program. The newspaper reports that this group includes Brzezinski, former national security aide to the President; former Secretary of State Haig; Kirkpatrick, former U.S. permanent UN representative; Edward Teller, father of the American hydrogen bomb; and a few others. What can one say? These are all famous personalities who have already gained sad notoriety as knights of the Cold War. They and their like incessantly exert pressure on the Reagan administration, trying to push ahead the militarization of space.

I cannot but cite another report from THE WASHINGTON POST -- this is quite different in character. As the newspaper writes, over 700 U.S. scientists have put their signature to a pledge declaring that under no circumstances will they ever take a direct or indirect part in work or research connected with the SDI program. They include 15 Nobel Prize winners for physics and chemistry.

Shultz Briefs Allies, Defends SDI

PM151131 Moscow IZVESTIYA (Morning Edition) in Russian 15 Oct 86 p 4

[Own correspondent V. Antonov report: "NATO: Consultations With Partners"]

[Text] Brussels -- Literally within a few hours of the end of the Soviet-U.S. summit in Reykjavik U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz arrived in Brussels.

A sitting of the NATO Council special session at the level of foreign minister and permanent representatives of this Western military-political organization's member countries has been held at the North Atlantic bloc's headquarters here. The working session took place in an atmosphere of heightened secrecy. Commentators here point out that the U.S. diplomatic leader informed his allies about the course of the talks in Reykjavik between M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and U.S. President R. Reagan, and on the position taken by the U.S. side there.

At a press conference held at the end of the session G. Shultz made a short statement in which he determinedly defended the "importance and expediency" for the United States and its bloc partners of continuing the development [razrabotka] of SDI, emphasizing its exclusively defensive character. Local and foreign journalists received no concrete reply to the numerous questions put to the U.S. secretary of state as to why the U.S. Administration needs the development [razrabotka] of the "star wars" program.

At the press conference journalists were also given a statement by Lord Carrington, NATO secretary general. It notes in particular that the Soviet-U.S. summit in Reykjavik created certain preconditions for progress across the whole range of East-West relations. In this connection the NATO allies stated that an opportunity has appeared for achieving significant progress on a number of aspects of disarmament and noted the importance of the energetic continuation of those efforts at the correspondent talks.

Poindexter 'Counterattack', Reaction

PM151523 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 15 Oct 86 p 3

[TASS correspondent I. Ignatyev telephone dispatch specially written for KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA: "The Echo of Reykjavik"]

[Text] Washington, 14 Oct -- Admiral John Poindexter looked somewhat tense, standing behind the podium in the White House press room. Carefully scrutinizing the journalists packed tightly in the room, he seemed to be trying to guess what they would write in their articles and commentaries. Even this surprise briefing was unusual, held on a Monday when, to mark the Columbus Day public holiday, all federal offices were closed. Another unusual aspect was the fact that instructions to "prime the press" were issued to the admiral, assistant to the President for national security affairs, who does not regard reporters with particular favor and tries to avoid them whenever possible. On the handful of occasions when, during his 10 months in this responsible position, he had decided to "share with" journalists "views" which the White House wanted published by the press, that was usually done only on the strict understanding that the name of the "high-ranking administration spokesman" was not to be revealed.

Now, however, everything was different. One American colleague summed up the completely obvious reason behind the sudden changes. He had remarked even prior to the briefing that now, following the meeting in Reykjavik, the administration "will have to try to put a brave face on a sorry business." Actually, Poindexter himself made no secret of the reason why he suddenly had to meet representatives of the Washington press corps. In his words, the White House decided to "brief" the journalists on "how the discussions went and what we achieved" in the capital of Iceland. That was a kind of counterattack on the numerous press and television commentaries and statements by

eminent U.S. politicians and experts on military-strategic questions who had already made their negative assessment of the fact that an historic opportunity had been missed by the White House through its pathological unwillingness to make any compromises whatsoever on the "star wars" question.

Many people were frankly perplexed by the fact that the President returned empty-handed from Reykjavik. "A unique chance existed in the capital of Iceland to reach a major accord on arms control, but the United States preferred not to take advantage of it," Princeton University Professor Stephen Cohen declared. "After all, the Russians arrived there ready to conclude an accord. But the U.S. side displayed its worst face. [paragraph continues]

"The American people now understand that the Reagan administration still believes only in the political virtue of the arms race. Desire on both sides is needed to conclude an accord, but in Reykjavik this was displayed by Mikhail Gorbachev alone."

Similar opinions were expressed by two other major authorities in this sphere -- Gerard Smith, former head of the U.S. delegation at the SALT I Treaty talks, and Paul Warnke, former head of the U.S. delegation at the SALT II Treaty talks. They openly pointed out the main reason why the summit meeting failed to produce specific results. The administration, G. Smith concluded, made a mistake in deciding that preparations for "star wars" would lead to establishment of arms control. "President Reagan," Paul Warnke stressed in his turn, "faced in Reykjavik the choice between arms control and the 'star wars' program. He chose 'star wars,' and that was incorrect."

Reaction in the U.S. Congress was no less stormy. Last November, on his return from Geneva, the President reported on the results of the first Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in a long time. Then he was welcomed with prolonged ovations at a joint session of the two chambers of the supreme U.S. legislative body. This time the legislators decided not to invite the head of the administration, while applause was heard only from Republican Party members, and not even all of them. President Reagan, Maryland Republican Senator C. Mathias stated, made a "mistake" by opting for "the theoretical possibilities of the 'star wars' program instead of the practical realities of substantial arms reductions." Eminent Democratic Party figure Senator Edward Kennedy was even more frank in his statement. "There was a tremendous historic chance in Iceland," he said, "but it was sacrificed to the uncertainty linked with SDI."

The very same feelings are shared by ordinary Americans. Democratic Congressman Thomas Downey, who was in his electoral district of Long Island, a part of New York City, a few days ago, stressed that the voters are disappointed. "Having talked with people, I got the impression that they really wanted to see some results. But the administration's commitment to arms is obviously greater than the desire for arms control," the congressman remarked.

The White House is now making feverish efforts to guide public opinion in the direction it wants, before it -- in the words of NBC-TV -- "crystallizes" finally in a negative assessment of the administration's actions. So Adm Poindexter and other high-ranking official spokesmen have to explain "how the discussions went" and to give a reason why the administration managed "to let slip the important accords" proposed by the Soviet.

U.S. Propaganda 'Tricks'

LD161400 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1323 GMT 16 Oct 86

["In a Distorted Mirror" -- TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, 16 Oct (TASS) -- Yuriy Kornilov, TASS political observer, writes:

Washington politicians and propagandists have been performing an astonishing -- let us say -- somersault recently. For a long time, it seems, the U.S. mass information media, commenting on the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik, have been noting that as a result of this meeting Washington has found itself facing a serious political defeat, and THE WASHINGTON POST noted that when the U.S. secretary of state reported on the results of the meeting, high-ranking U.S. representatives reacted with "long and gloomy faces." Only a few days have passed and we can see on the faces of these high-ranking representatives obviously officially programmed smiles, and the results of the meeting in the capital of Iceland are characterized by the U.S. press as -- "grandiose" and even a "breathtaking" success for the United States. What has happened?

Of course, the results of the meeting in Reykjavik have not changed, and could not change. The essence of what has taken place in the capital of Iceland is well-known. The Soviet Union came to the summit meeting with thoughts about detente and peace and put forward in Reykjavik a weighty package of major measures, whose implementation -- and this is being admitted everywhere -- would have initiated a new era in the life of our planet, and would have made it possible to start moving toward a nuclear-free world. This aim was pursued by the USSR's proposal to cut radically, by 50 percent, the most lethal weapons, the strategic ones, so as to eliminate them completely afterwards. That same aim is pursued by the Soviet initiative aimed at clearing Europe's land of intermediate-range nuclear weapons. No need to say with what relief millions of people would breathe if entire mountains of nuclear missiles were consigned to the scrap heap.

Such is the position of the USSR, dictated by a concern for peace -- an open, active, honest position. But in Reykjavik the sides which were on the verge of making decisions of major significance were not able to make such decisions, and the reasons for this are evident: They are that the U.S. side resolutely refused to review the aggressive plans, compiled by Washington, of preparation for "star wars." Can one really talk seriously about disarmament and simultaneously work to move the arms race to a fresh sphere? Can one sincerely agree to reduce some types of weapons, and then and there announce the development and plans to commission other much more sophisticated and powerful types, to stabilize the situation -- and simultaneously destroy the indefinite Soviet-U.S. ABM treaty which enables the arms race to be somehow restrained?

Political and public figures of different countries, and the press, today note with complete justification that the United States' ceaseless attempts, by rushing arms into space, to break the military-strategic parity which has taken shape is an irresponsible and dangerous course.

But it is this appraisal of Washington's aggressive and obstructionist position at the talks in the Icelandic capital which does not suit the architects of this position.

And now the U.S. President, aware of the immense magnetic force of the Soviet proposals, has taken up, and, without batting an eye, ascribed these proposals to himself. Stunned readers and television viewers had hardly had time to digest this "discovery" when they were bombarded by an avalanche of other statements, speeches, and interviews, the authors of which are at pains to prove that at Reykjavik the United States was contemplating nothing but peace and arms control; representatives of Washington's "upper circle," people like Perle and Poindexter, Regan and Buchanan, and others, vied with one another in trying to convince people that if real progress in disarmament was not reached in Iceland then it was not Washington's fault. They are being particularly diligent in this respect in their efforts to "brainwash the public" of Western Europe....

Propaganda tricks have long been an integral part of U.S. foreign policy, but they have never brought those responsible for them any political dividends. And no doubt that's how it will be this time. You can't expect a crooked tree to cast a straight shadow....

Kornilov Counters 'Lies'

LD221625 Moscow TASS in English 1524 GMT 22 Oct 86

["Understood Nothing and Learned Nothing" -- TASS take identifier]

[Text] Moscow October 22 TASS -- Political news analyst Yuriy Kornilov writes:

The higher the wave of international indignation and protests against Washington's negative, obstructionist stand in Reykjavik the more vigorously and cunningly are the American authorities trying to camouflage their aggressive, militaristic policy, to delude public opinion. Their chosen method is lies, runaway lies, I would even say pathological lies.

It is a lie that Washington went to the meeting in the Icelandic capital with thoughts, as it is now contended, of strengthening peace and trust, of ensuring arms control because it was already on the eve of Reykjavik that the American Administration had done virtually everything to step up tension, to spoil and aggravate Soviet-American relations. How else can one qualify the deliberate whipping of the "spy mania" in the United States interlaced with rabid anti-Sovietism? How else can one qualify Washington's absolutely unlawful, provocative "demand" that the staff of the Soviet mission to the United Nations be sharply reduced?

It is a lie that already in Reykjavik the United States, "motivated by concern for peace", had made "exceptionally important", almost "epochal" proposals to curb the arms race.

In reality the American delegations came to the summit meeting with nothing in its political baggage but moth-eaten rubbish nobody needed. If the Reykjavik meeting has really earned a place in the annals of international relations as a meeting that succeeded in gaining much ground (in the search of ways) in questions of disarmament, this happened only thanks to the USSR's persistent and active position.

It was the Soviet Union and not the United States that proposed in Reykjavik a package of major measures the fulfillment of which, and this is now acknowledged throughout the world, would make it possible to start genuine advance towards a nuclear-free world.

It was the Soviet Union and not the United States that proposed a radical cut, by fifty per cent, of the deadliest of weapons -- strategic weapons -- with a view to eventually totally eliminating them.

Moscow and not Washington came out for cleansing European soil of medium-range nuclear weapons and showed readiness to settle the question of the future of medium-range missiles in Asia and missiles with a range less than a thousand kilometres.

There is no need to say how millions of people would heave a sigh of relief when whole mountains of nuclear-missile weapons would be scrapped.

It is a lie that the USSR is at fault for the failure in Reykjavik to reach a dramatic, historical result in the sphere of disarmament. The Soviet proposals contained a broad positive programme and an unprecedented readiness for compromise, for concessions on an equal basis. But they were confronted with a desire to "outplay the Russians" at all cost, with the hypocritical talk about disarmament while the real intent is not only to continue the arms race but to quickly spread the arms race to a new sphere -- outer space.

It is natural to ask -- how can one "sincerely" agree to the reduction of some types of weapons and in the same stride announce the development of plans of putting into service of other types of weapons, much more sophisticated and powerful ones at that? How can one square words about desire to stabilise the situation and the intent to wreck the timeless Soviet-American ABM treaty, which makes it possible somehow to restrain the arms race? The reaching of accords capable of working a veritable breakthrough was frustrated precisely by the intent of the American leadership to achieve military superiority by means of SDI.

In 1984 the Pantheon publishing house in New York put out the book "There He Goes Again: R. Reagan's Reign of Error" by the American journalists Mark Green and Gail MacColl.

Noting that the President of the United States makes all information suit his ideological patterns the authors write further that if Reagan's pronouncements of the past 25 years were compared with authoritative sources it would transpire that on at least 300 occasions he had grossly distorted reality. These distortions, Green and MacColl write further, are used by way of six methods: Obvious exaggerations; deliberate omission of facts important for the understanding of the given problem; statements deliberately couched in the style of jokes; use of juggled statistics; rejection of "unpleasant" facts; and finally open deceit.

As the occupant of the White House advertises today his supposedly "positive" stand in Reykjavik he obviously puts to use his "method number six."

In his time, when making a sordid anti-Soviet and anti-Communist speech at the 41st annual convention of the National Association of Evangelists, Ronald Reagan praised a "young father" from his home state of California who had openly declared that he would prefer his daughters to perish in the flames of a nuclear conflagration rather than "live under communism." Judging by everything even after Reykjavik the people in Washington have not understood anything or learned anything. So sounding from there now like a sinister echo are the tunes of that old cannibalistic concept: "Better to be atomised than communised" and therefore there is only one course to be pursued: To arm, arm and once again to arm -- contrary to reason, contrary to the imperative and grim realities of the nuclear epoch.

These militaristic, imperial ambitions of Washington, aggravated by its lies and shameless propaganda tricks, cannot but give rise to the most serious and growing alarm of the international public.

PRAVDA Hits Perle, Buchanan

PM221520 Moscow PRAVDA (Second Edition) in Russian 19 Oct 86 p 4

[Yu. Kuznetsov "Sketch": "'Good Morning, America!'"]

[Text] There is a saying among our people that the morning brings more light. Meaning that you can think more easily when your mind is fresh. But in the United States, it appears, they now have a slightly different saying. There, the morning brings more obscurity. That emerged from a television program in which two prominent Washington figures spoke -- Assistant Defense Secretary R. Perle and White House Director of Communications P. Buchanan. The program was called "Good Morning, America!", but these gentlemen were so abstruse that the darkness of night seemed to fall before the viewers' eyes when they tried to follow their tortuous train of thought. The point is that Perle and Buchanan were expounding their (or rather, the White House's) version of the recent Reykjavik meeting. They were performing all kinds of contortions in order somehow to substantiate that version. Among the Washington administrators, for some reason, there was a lack of complete unanimity -- not to say elementary agreement -- on the question of how to regard the meeting and of how it ended. Some say it was a failure. Others, on the contrary, that it was a success. Others again, that it was a shining victory for Washington.

It is well known that variations of this kind require solid, strong logical backing. But here the backing was very fine and subtle. As subtle as can be. Yet it is sometimes said (again, among the people): "There is something fishy about too much subtlety."

In this connection the Washington propaganda agenda was bubbling over mainly with such questions as (a) who really wanted arms reductions in Reykjavik (and made corresponding proposals), and (b) who plotted against the talks and why?

Point (b) presented no difficulties. Under the present administration, it is as plain as daylight that in everything, always, and everywhere, yesterday, today, and in the future, "those Russians" are to blame. Point (a) is more complicated.

We must take another look at the variant readings in the sphere of Anglo-Russian vocabulary. In particular, the word "attribution" [pripiska]. On the banks of the Potomac, in recent days it has acquired its own special meaning. With the help and through the medium of this term, the astonished U.S. public are presented with a truly impressive composition of large-scale proposals on arms reduction submitted by... um... the U.S. Administration!

It appears that the administrators flung themselves wholeheartedly into striving to ensure that there were no interim agreements on missiles, no levels or sublevels of any kind, but radical steps, and so on, and so forth.

Fine. Let them make what attributions they like. At least this would be something plain to see, and for the common good.

Here, true, their own D. Regan rather dampened the impression of major unilateral U.S. initiatives. He was approached, as White House chief of staff, by NBC television. "As far as one can tell, much of what the Russians proposed in Iceland, including the major arms reduction and the elimination of medium-range missiles, was a surprise for you?" the correspondent asked.

And Regan replied hastily (it seems there is more than one pearl on the Washington scene): "Yes, perhaps, but I'm not sure. We were familiar with many of these proposals beforehand."

Oh, what a thing to say! How do well grounded administrators reply in such cases? Only like this:

"What Soviet proposals?! I know nothing about them! There were none, none, none..."

So why, one wonders in that case, did the Russians go to Reykjavik at all?

"It's obvious!" Perle and Buchanan declared, authoritatively and almost with one voice. "The Russians are terrified of our SDI. So they came to bury it."

Buchanan reported the stupefying, bloodcurdling details of how Moscow supposedly demanded: "Kill SDI in its cradle!"

Fortunately the administration was, as always, on the alert, and prevented the infanticide. Of course, it had to sacrifice the agreements which had already been prepared on radical arms reduction. What of it?

Stop, the reader cries, after all, it was only a question of a proposal to restrict the SDI program to laboratory research. Try proving that to P. Buchanan. I bet you won't succeed. He and many (alas!) of his colleagues, especially the seniors, are simply obsessed with the idea of covering the sky with a three-tier shield, so that the wily enemy would think the sky was going to fall on his head!

But is the game worth the candle? The administrators, especially the senior ones, don't want to think about that.

Especially since it will be other Americans who pay, and still others who rake it in. Those who are prepared to set fire to the whole planet for the sake of an order running into trillions of dollars, a fairy-tale order -- even for the empire of gold.

"It's a gold mine!" the weapon company managers and bankers whisper delightedly in California, Texas, and Nevada.

"Have you heard what Mr Adelman, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, said the other day?"

"What? What? What?"

"This: 'Renouncing SDI would mean killing the goose that lays the golden eggs!'"

So there you have it. "Golden eggs" for the monopolists. And for ordinary people? Only the threat of war, as many people, even in America, realize. So much for "good morning."

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CSO: 5200/1054

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR COMMENTARIES ON SUMMIT RESULTS, REACTION

IZVESTIYA on Summit End

PM131930 Moscow IZVESTIYA (Morning Edition) in Russian 14 Oct 86 p 4

[Dispatch by special correspondents A. Bovin, N. Yefimov, and A. Palladin: "Expectations and Unexpected Developments"]

[Text] Reykjavik -- The last day of the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik was a day of tense expectation for the 2,000 journalists here to cover the Soviet-U.S. summit talks. But let us narrate everything in its proper order.

It was learned the day before that the two sides had set up two working groups: one for disarmament questions, the second for humanitarian and regional problems and bilateral relations. Something else was also learned. Both groups were summoned to the Villa Hofdi and right away, without wasting any time, embarked on the elaboration of coordinated proposals. This issue of the newspaper carried a full account of M.S. Gorbachev's press conference in Reykjavik, and our readers know the scale of the proposals that were being discussed and coordinated there.

The working groups displayed both endurance and staying power. The first worked for 10 hours and 20 minutes, without closing an eye until morning. The second did not work quite as long, but also worked until dawn. The journalists drew the conclusion: Something is brewing and, in all probability, it is major decisions that are brewing. After all, matters of secondary importance are not discussed through the night.

On Sunday morning the journalists tried by hook and by crook to worm out of one another what they knew about what was happening and what was being prepared. Everything indicated that something important was in the air. U.S. journalists felt that their Soviet colleagues had more information. Soviet journalists felt the exact opposite. Everyone was glued to television screens at the press center.... Icelandic Television constantly kept an "eye" on the Villa Hofdi.

A press conference by M.S. Gorbachev was scheduled for 1400 hours. Journalists moved to take their places in the hall. But the press conference did not start at 1400 hours. Nor did it start at 1500 hours. It was announced that the summit meeting would be extended. There was no provision for this in the prearranged scenario. The press conference was postponed until 1800 hours. A correspondent of the American CNN-TV commented for the millions of viewers: "If it has been decided to extend the meeting, this means that both sides feel that accords are possible, and even more, that their

positions are very close and they now hope to cover the small distance between them and reach a compromise." Was the U.S. correspondent hasty? We do not think so. He was thinking logically. The world was very close to hearing about historic decisions. About decisions which would have had a colossal effect on Soviet-U.S. relations and on the entire course of international life.

Meanwhile, the unplanned round of talks went on for more than 4 hours. For the journalists this meant more than 4 hours of tension, expectation, and even disappointment. We stood in front of a television set in the lobby of the movie theater rented for the press conference. We were in the midst of a clamoring crowd of journalists and waited for M.S. Gorbachev (whose turn it was to play host at Hofdi) to see off the U.S. President. You should have heard the unanimous sigh that escaped the hundreds of people in front of the television set. That sigh contained disappointment and bitterness. The screen showed a closeup of the tense and, as it appeared to us, confused [skonfuzhenny] face of the U.S. President. The President even seemed to forget -- and he rarely does this -- that correspondents and television cameras were observing the farewell from a special platform. He did not glance at them, did not say farewell. When the President first appeared in front of the Villa Hofdi, a U.S. correspondent called out to him: "Are you ready to do business here?" He replied confidently: "This is what we are here for." But he proved not to be ready to do exactly this, to do business. It was as if the U.S. correspondent had sensed this in advance.

This is how the summit meeting ended. We are convinced that, even though an agreement was not reached in Reykjavik, the talks were not wasted. [paragraph continues]

They showed that nothing is impossible and that even most complex and most delicate disarmament problems can be solved. As you already know from M.S. Gorbachev's statements, the USSR and the United States were on the brink of making major decisions. They were. Had the U.S. ruling circles not believed in the illusion of military superiority over the Soviet Union, Reykjavik would have gone down in all annals not as an example of missed opportunities -- of great opportunities, actually -- but as a symbol of common sense and new thinking.

Reykjavik failed to become such a symbol. The Reagan administration and the forces that stand behind it and determine its course proved to be blind and shortsighted. Blind as politicians and shortsighted as statesmen.

This day ended in a most unexpected fashion. Altogether fantastic. President R. Reagan addressed servicemen at the U.S. base in Keflavik, near the Icelandic capital. The White House chief collected his wits and, taking advantage of the "blackout," in other words the two sides' agreement not to reveal to journalists any information about the course of the meeting, suddenly disclosed that apparently he and he alone made all the proposals at the negotiating table. This was said by the head of delegation who appeared in Reykjavik emptyhanded, without any political baggage. "I will unhesitatingly follow anyone who talks to me in the language of truth," W. Whitman wrote. To judge by the speech in Keflavik, Americans are being offered the exact opposite.

PRAVDA on European Reaction

PM141425 Moscow PRAVDA (First Edition) in Russian 14 Oct 86 p 4

[Own correspondent Yu. Kharlanov dispatch under general heading "The Echo of Reykjavik: Seeing the Historical Perspective"]

[Text] Brussels, 13 Oct -- U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz flew to the Belgian capital today in order to present the U.S. version of the course and results of the meeting between M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan at an extraordinary session of the NATO Council. The secretary of state's mission, as local observers point out, is by no means easy. It is really difficult, very difficult to explain to the U.S. NATO allies what happened in Reykjavik and why the U.S. side, clinging to the "star wars" program, wrecked the agreements which began emerging in Iceland and which would have been historically significant not only for the United States and the USSR but also for the fate of the whole world.

The U.S. stance caused particular disappointment among broad political circles in West Europe which linked the Reykjavik meeting with far-reaching hopes for progress along the path of arms reductions and particularly the solution of the problem of medium-range missiles deployed here. An agreement on medium-range missiles, former Belgian Foreign Minister H. Simpnnet stated, could have been an event of exceptional importance for Europe and would have influenced not only the foreign but also the domestic policy of several countries, including Belgium.

P. Lefevre, observer of the newspaper LE SOIR, asserts that in Reykjavik Reagan set his view of planetary security based on the "star wars" program, which is shared by only a part of U.S. political world, in opposition to the possibility of achieving a sharp reduction of nuclear missile weapons, which would have led to a real strengthening of security on the globe.

The newspaper LIBRE BELGIQUE, for its part, expresses the hope that even so, despite the failure in Reykjavik, the USSR and the United States would continue their contacts on questions of arms reduction with a view to achieving mutually acceptable solutions.

PRAVDA: Praise for Gorbachev

PM141429 Moscow PRAVDA (First Edition) in Russian 14 Oct 86 p 4

[Special correspondents T. Kolesnichenko and A. Maslennikov dispatch under general heading "The Echo of Reykjavik: Seeing the Historical Perspective"]

[Text] Reykjavik, 13 Oct -- The press conference given by M.S. Gorbachev in Reykjavik on the conclusion of the meeting with the U.S. President attracted great attention throughout the world. Its contents are already known to millions of people in all corners of the planet -- the press conference was televised to many countries.

The statement by the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee outlined real prospects for the continuation of the struggle for disarmament and the mobilization in this noble cause of all realistically minded politicians and peace-loving forces on the planet.

Following the conclusion of the press conference, we conversed with many Western colleagues and also with political scientists and specialists on military-strategic questions who had come to Reykjavik.

"I was greatly impressed by the press conference," we are told by J. (Barton) [as published], chief of NEWSWEEK's Moscow office. "I was stunned by M.S. Gorbachve's inexorable logic and his ability to single out the main issue. His analysis of the international situation makes us ponder the most important problems facing us all."

"The general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee painted a profound and convincing picture of why the disarmament talks held here now ended in deadlock," H. Pick, political observer of the British newspaper THE GUARDIAN, noted. "Now the question is how to resolve the contradictions, particularly the question of the fate of the 'star wars' program which became the main obstacle to a Soviet-U.S. accord."

"Of course we are disappointed," Doctor R.O'Neill, director of the London Institute for Strategic Studies, said in a conversation with us. "I fear that the unsuccessful outcome of this meeting could cast a shadow over the current disarmament talks. Reagan declared that he would never agree to any restrictions on the 'Strategic Defense Initiative' he has put forward. Even though the word 'never' is perhaps inappropriate in serious politics. We obviously must wait and see how events will develop in the future."

Literally a few minutes before filing this dispatch we were sought out by Y. Niidzuma, Moscow bureau chief of the Japanese newspaper ASAHI. "I honestly tried, " to find any somewhat coherent assessments of the results of the Reykjavik meeting in the statements by U.S. figures. All I found was total confusion -- not to put it more bluntly by saying a void. A really purposeful and highly convincing analysis of what happened here can be found only in M.S. Gorbachev's statements. I admire his political daring and clarity of view of world problems. Listening to him at the press conference I felt as if the Soviet and U.S. leaders, like mountain climbers, were ascending a very high, steep peak. They had climbed almost 90 percent of the mountain when one of the climbers found himself short of breath. I would like to hope that, having gained this experience, the Soviet Union and the United States will resume the climb and will conquer the peak whose name is nuclear disarmament and security throughout the world."

Ptashnikov: Meeting Not 'Fruitless'

LD131155 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0930 GMT 13 Oct 86

[Special correspondent Andrey Ptashnikov from Reykjavik]

[Text] The conversations on 12 October between Comrade Gorbachev and President Reagan lasted almost to the end of the day. At the very last moment, the time limit for the meeting was changed: instead of a previously planned three rounds of talks over the 2 days, a further extra round took place. This further heightened the already great interest in the press conference by Comrade Gorbachev, the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, which was held immediately following the conclusion of his conversations with the U.S. President. And this was the first opportunity in 2 days to find out how the conversations went, whether the participants had reached agreement, and whether any rapprochement between the sides had been achieved on the most important issues in the modern international situation.

The Central Hall of Reykjavik, where the press conference took place, was full. By the time you hear this dispatch, comrade listeners, you will already know what Comrade Gorbachev said. The progress of the discussions that took place once again confirmed that Washington officialdom as before does not intend to give up implementation of its aggressive star wars doctrine, and is striving any way it can to obtain military superiority over the USSR. The United States, as Comrade Gorbachev emphasized, came to Reykjavik empty-handed, and a lack of new ways of thinking could clearly be felt during the course of the talks.

Important accords could have been achieved in the Icelandic capital on key questions of halting the arms race and cutting nuclear arms. The USSR delegation did all it could to achieve this. A whole series of new constructive proposals was put on the table; not only was flexibility displayed but also a readiness to compromise, and even significant concessions. So the meeting at Reykjavik was not after all crowned with the success which was expected from it. And yet the current, extremely complex and tense international situation demands urgent, decisive and, most important of all, joint efforts by states to rid mankind of the threat of a nuclear catastrophe.

Can the Soviet-U.S. working summit meeting in Reykjavik be called absolutely fruitless? Of course not. Because the exchange of opinions took place after all, and, as Comrade Gorbachev emphasized, this meeting showed that the need for dialogue has grown even further, no matter how difficult it might be.

Lomeyko: 'Important Insights'

LD131217 Hamburg DPA in German 1104 GMT 13 Oct 86

[Text] Bonn, 13 Oct 86 (DPA) -- Even if in the absence of an SDI compromise no new rapprochement of the two great powers was feasible, the meeting at Reykjavik provided important insights. To this assessment of the meeting in Iceland, Vladimir Lomeyko, the Soviet special ambassador, added the expectation that in principle the conclusion of disarmament agreements was also possible separately from an SDI solution.

Lomeyko, former head of the press department at the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated at a press conference at the Soviet Embassy in Bonn: "was not in vain."

It had led to a comprehensive exchange of opinions, which had brought about more clarity on both sides. To repeated questions as to whether in particular the elimination of medium-range missiles was still possible, Lomeyko answered emphatically, yes. The Soviet diplomat, who had been taking part in an international conference in Hamburg, also underlined Soviet readiness for a zero solution on medium-range missiles in Europe. After this offer from Moscow, however, the United States had set new conditions, including the demand to be able to keep "several dozen" medium-range missiles in Europe.

Lomeyko explained the strict rejection of the U.S. concept of missile defenses in space (SDI) by the Soviet conviction that SDI would help the United States toward military superiority. Reagan had evidently "not been able to give way," said Lomeyko, who regarded the U.S. President as some kind of prisoner of the military and of interested industry: The "working meeting" at the Icelandic capital had nevertheless passed off as "interesting and promising."

Vinogradov: Peace Efforts Continue

LD131456 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1330 GMT 13 Oct 86

[Commentary by Academician Vladimir Alekseyevich Vinogradov]

[Text] Soviet people, and possible the majority of people on earth, welcomed the new Soviet initiative which led to the meeting between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and President Reagan Reykjavik.

Yes, this meeting really was capable of providing a new impulse to reducing international tension. The Soviet delegation arrived at the meeting with constructive and far-reaching proposals which envisaged a reduction of strategic missiles by 50 percent, the complete destruction of medium-range missiles in Europe, and much else.

However, President Reagan was unable to relinquish imperial ambitions, the desire -- even in conditions of nuclear disarmament -- to secure for the United States superiority over the Soviet Union by way of developing new weapons and deploying them in space within the framework of the so-called SDI. It was this also which determined the outcome of the talks.

There is no doubt that all people of good will on earth are disappointed and concerned with such an outcome. The entire blame for this lies with the U.S. Administration. One cannot disarm with one hand and prepare new weapons with the other. Such a policy is unacceptable.

We hope that common sense and also the hopes of the American people will exert an influence on the U.S. Administration and that the accords which did not come about in Reykjavik will find their substance in Washington. After all, the question of new meeting and the continuation of the talks has remained open.

At the press conference which we watched and heard on central television and radio, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev stated that despite the unsatisfactory results of this meeting, the Soviet Union will in no way slacken its struggle for peace, for averting the nuclear threat, and expressed certainty that this noble desire is supported by the peoples of all countries. We scientists fully share this position and will do everything we can for the triumph of peace on our planet.

Chernyshev: U.S. 'Space Rush' Specter

LD131503 Moscow TASS in English 1458 GMT 13 Oct 86

["Washington's Ghosts Over Reykjavik" -- TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow October 13 TASS -- TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev:

The working Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik threw unusually bright light on the tenacious imperial ambitions of the U.S. ruling circles. A historical possibility to achieve breakthrough in every area of the struggle for the limitation of nuclear weapons and truly to avert the threat of nuclear war, the possibility which became tangible thanks to the vigorous and constructive stand of the Soviet side, which put on the table a package of new proposals, was missed. The "ghost" of the American

President who said way back at the dawn of the space age that he would dominate space, would dominate the world clearly prevailed over the U.S. delegation in Iceland. The spectre of a chase for military superiority through "technological edge" was looming large over the Reykjavik meeting.

Washington's "space rush" called to mind the age of the "gold rush," when there were no constraints or sense of reality.

The Soviet leader told the U.S. President: If you want so much to know that SDI can give you we are not against your conducting research and testing in laboratories during the next 10 years. It seems a reasonable and constructive proposal. But the administration is not happy even with this. It wants a completely free hand to make preparations for the militarization of space. It does not want to think what political risks this policy is fraught with.

And these risks are very grave. First, the threat of the placement of weapons in near-earth space would cause obvious uncertainties in strategic planning, which would fuel mutual mistrust. Each side would worry all the time if the other side is not overtaking it in any way. This situation could lead to decisions which would have very grave consequences for the cause of peace. Second, in this situation one could hardly imagine any cuts in or even limitations of the strategic offensive weapons. To agree to this would mean to improve the efficiency of the first-strike potential developed under the guise of an "anti-missile shield," that is, to play into the hands of the side which is planning to "overtake" you by relying on space systems, new "superweapons."

Third, SDI work could lead to breakthroughs into entirely new types of weapons and start a qualitatively new arms race with all the pernicious consequences for mankind. Fourth, SDI would lead to the dramatic aggravation of the accidental outbreak of war as a consequence of an error, miscalculation or technical malfunction in sophisticated computer systems.

As for those for whom the arms race is today's Klondike, those who would not give up the will-o'-the-whisp of military superiority, unattainable today, would not reckon with today's realities or future dangers to civilization, time is inexorably running out. The world as a whole was given another chance to see that the "star wars" apologists are nostalgic for the past.

Mankind is imperatively demanding a cure for this chronic disease. It is only after such therapy that the accords outline in Reykjavik can be translated into reality.

Grigoryev: SDI Allies' Disappointment

LD131757 Moscow TASS in English 1755 GMT 13 Oct 86

[Text] Moscow October 13 TASS -- Political news analyst Aleksey Grigoryev writes:

Hope gave way to disappointment. The meeting in Reykjavik between the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev and the President of the United States Ronald Reagan brought both sides to a line where there had existed a full possibility of concluding large-scale agreements in the field of reducing and subsequently eliminating nuclear arms. The possibility, however, did not become reality. Why?

Several quotes to begin with. "How can one for the sake of the SDI let slip chances of considerably reducing nuclear arms? The President should have known that his rejection of the Soviet proposals would cause a serious conflict with allies..." (the West German KOELNER STADT-ANZEIGER); "Reagan did not even try to alter his 'principled' stand on the question of the Strategic Defense Initiative" (the Japanese MAINICHI); the talks in Reykjavik ended in failure when President Reagan refused to waive his support for the "star wars" programme (the London FINANCIAL TIMES). These are eloquent quotes from West German, Japanese and Italian [as received] newspapers, that is newspapers of those three countries which together with Italy have joined the United States in preparing for "star wars". The notorious SDI, which became the stumbling block at the Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik, might well become a similar stumbling block in Washington's relations with its allies.

It is an open secret that the leading firms, say, of the FRG or Japan, with the exception perhaps of Messerschmit-Belkow-Blom and Hitachi, are in no hurry to join the implementation of the SDI because they see in this programme not benefits but danger to themselves. "The hopes of seven-digit orders within the framework of SDI have turned out to be a soap bubble", it was openly stated recently by the weekly WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE, a publication of West German business circles.

It is indicative, however, that even in the political circles of the FRG, which in their time had been in an obvious though sometimes artificially generated euphoria about the American offers, a certain sobering up is beginning lately.

It is not by chance that the West German Minister of Economy Martin Bangemann, who signed the common agreement on the SDI in the American capital this spring, bitterly complains now about "Washington's bad policy". Have we really signed the agreement on SDI only to get after that a kick in the back? This statement, as reported by WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE, was made by a West German politician who is very close to Chancellor Helmut Kohl. The ruling conservative-liberal coalition in the FRG will now have to admit also the fact that the SDI, which has Bonn's official support, torpedoed not only the success of the Soviet-American meeting as a whole but also the fulfilment of the Soviet proposal to liquidate the American "Pershings" and cruise missiles and the Soviet SS-20 missiles in Europe. But it is exactly the solution of this problem that Bonn had publicly proclaimed a vital necessity on the eve of Reykjavik. Appearing in the West German ARD Television Programme, deputy chairman of the parliamentary group of the Social Democratic Party of German Horst Ehmke stated that on October 12 "the upper hand was taken by those political forces in the United States which do not want results in the field of disarmament".

This is so. But Sunday, October 12 can also be called a moment of truth which demonstrated with maximum clarity what new political thinking is and what the old confrontational mentality is.

Fesunenko: 'Conflict' Plaguing Reagan

LD132240 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2035 GMT 13 Oct 86

[From "The World Today" program presented by Igor Fesunenko]

[Excerpt] Good evening, comrades! The course of the meeting in Reykjavik has proved true the analysis by James Reston, eminent U.S. journalist and NEW YORK TIMES political observer, who wrote a few days prior to its opening about dramatic contradictions and

the conflict plaguing President Reagan who, as Reston wrote, was in the crossfire of the opposition to his meeting with the Soviet leader. Indeed, the U.S. President found himself not up to the mark in Reykjavik; he failed to place himself above dated concepts, above the plans to gain an unilateral military superiority, which have been refuted by life itself.

In short, the President failed to display a truly new political vision which would be in line with the present-day situation. That is the reason for his uneven, illogical, ambiguous behavior at his meetings with Comrade Gorbachev. When his interlocutor made concessions, when Comrade Gorbachev went for a reasonable compromise, for example, regarding our decision to accept the zero option on the medium-range missiles in Europe, the U.S. President expressed his readiness for an accord. But when he had to traverse his half of the way, and also do something concrete and significant in response to the Soviet proposals, President Reagan forgot the elementary rules of international talks calling for tolerance, a mutual understanding and readiness to go for a compromise. One tends to think that the chief reason for the meeting in Reykjavik not being successful lies precisely in that. As a result, it appears that the U.S. side has punished itself. [passage omitted]

Pozner: Flexibility Shown

LD141044 Moscow in English to North America 0000 GMT 14 Oct 86

[From the "Tonight" program; commentary by Vladimir Pozner]

[Text] Thank you and hello. Reykjavik is over. The initial emotional reaction to what it failed to achieve must be one of disappointment. With a breakthrough in sight, the U.S. refusal to honor the antiballistic missile, or ABM, treaty of 1972, proved to be an insurmountable barrier. Never before has a chance of a major success been so real. The Soviet Union has come to Reykjavik determined to achieve major steps in arms reduction. A determination reflected in its proposals.

Proposal No. 1: An across the board 50 percent cut in offensive strategic nuclear weapons, that is, intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine launched missiles, and strategic bombers. Proposal No. 2: An accepting of the original U.S. zero option proposal on intermediate-range missiles, which would mean destroying all Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe, but not counting or limiting the French or British missiles. Also the Soviets agreed to freeze their Asian intermediate-range missiles to 100 warheads.

Both of these proposals were major concessions on the Soviet side. As a third part of the package the USSR proposed that the ABM Treaty be given iron-clad guarantees for a 10-year period, during which time the proposed cuts would be made.

Also during that 10-year period the United States must limit its work on SDI to laboratory research and testing, that is, it must not go into space. And that is what President Reagan refused to do. And that is why the historic agreement that was within reach at Reykjavik eluded us.

Hence the emotional reaction I alluded to, disappointment. But emotions should not be allowed to carry the day in such a crucial area of U.S.-Soviet relations. What happened in Reykjavik demands calm, serious and profound analysis. One must ask oneself: Why did the Americans refuse to compromise, refuse the slightest concession, when by doing so they could have achieved what they have for so many described as

(?their) most fervent desire -- to get deep cuts in Soviet heavy ICBMs and rid Europe of Soviet SS-20's? Those heavy SS-18's, with their 3,000 warheads (?had) always been a number one on the American list of security concerns, and here was a concrete chance to see them cut, at first 1,500 warheads, and eventually zero.

In view of that, even SDI becomes a strange notion. What would it be defending the United States against in the absence of Soviet offensive strategic nuclear weapons? Yes, that question must be asked, and seriously analyzed. The answer may be deceptively simple. Namely that the military-industrial complex and the U.S. Administration do not really want deep cuts or disarmament. What they want is to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union, and what they have been led to believe is that the goal can be reached.

That belief has been implanted by CIA assessments of the Soviet economy and bolstered by the way U.S. think tanks have chosen to interpret Soviet readiness to compromise. Namely, as a sign of how badly the Soviets need some breathing space from military production to improve their economy. Thus the U.S. reaction, let's not give (?in). That is what Reykjavik means, at least to this observer.

Should one be disappointed? Well, not really. Reykjavik showed the world exactly where we all stand, who wants what. It showed us who is flexible and who is not. It set off the difference between traditional patterns of thought and a new approach to the whole complex of international relations. It showed that real and very substantial agreements can indeed be achieved and reached provided the desire is there. So, in an important sense Reykjavik showed an alternative, like a curtain that suddenly lifts and offers a glimpse of beauty previously only imagined. It displayed what we can really achieve, we, the people of the world and the governments that do our will. That in itself is not an insignificant result.

Druzhinin: U.S. Can Reconsider

LD141633 Moscow World Service in English 1510 GMT 14 Oct 86

[Text] Our commentator Aleksandr Druzhinin takes a look at the results of the Reykjavik summit:

Time is the most precious asset in a nuclear space age, the time still left to stop the slide towards a nuclear catastrophe, to start eliminating the stockpiles of weapons capable of killing all life on this planet. This is the reason why all countries are unanimous that at the Reykjavik summit a historic chance was missed. A major opportunity to start practical disarmament was not used.

There is no doubt that such an opportunity did exist. Mikhail Gorbachev suggested a 50 percent cut in all components of the strategic triad -- that is, ground-launched missiles, submarine-launched strategic missiles, land nuclear-capable strategic aircraft. He also suggested removing both American and Soviet medium-range missiles from Europe and the retention of British and French nuclear forces. The United States some time ago put forward the same idea, calling it zero option. The Soviet Union has now accepted it. It said once again that it would agree to any form of verification. It said it was prepared to enter into negotiations on the missiles with a range of less than 1,000 kilometers and on a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty.

Washington has often referred to disarmament as a bargain. Well, using the terminology of the American Congressman Edward Markey, the United States could strike the best-ever

bargain offered by the Russians. However, the bargain did not materialize. Politicians and the press have been unanimous in pointing to the unwillingness of the Washington administration to abandon the Star Wars program as the only cause of this. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India has said that concrete results in the field of disarmament were blocked by plans for taking the arms race to other areas, a clear reference to space. American Senator Claiborne Pell has deplored the fact that the administration sacrificed cuts in strategic arms to the Strategic Defense Initiative. The Austrian news agency says Washington's position on the issue of Star Wars was the main obstacle that prevented agreement.

One cannot but subscribe to such opinions. Genuine disarmament cannot be achieved if outer space remains open to weapons. There is no sense in shutting the front door while keeping the back door open. As he spoke on television after the Reykjavik summit, President Reagan justified his position by claims that the SDI is the insurance policy that guarantees America's safety. But aren't major arms reductions suggested by the Soviet Union at Reykjavik the best guarantees of one's security? Such reductions would make a space shield unnecessary. That Washington continues insisting on its illogical claims is evidence of its intention to seek military supremacy over the USSR, to deploy strike weapons of mass destruction in space. President Reagan in his address in effect confirmed this. He said that the United States would achieve progress in disarmament only if it relied on force. This is a dangerous delusion testifying to the lack of new political thinking. (?To rely on force) is only going to boost the arms race. It is not force but reason that can pave the way for disarmament, and the Soviet Union proceeded from this when it initiated the Reykjavik summit.

The profound understanding of today's realities prompted the USSR to advance proposals which Mikhail Gorbachev said meet the interests of the American people and the people of all other countries. As for Washington, it still has the time to consider what it lost in Reykjavik and what road it should take to remove the threat of nuclear annihilation hanging over the world before it is too late.

Levin: Offer Still 'In Force'

LD141827 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 14 Oct 86

["Latest News" commentary by Viktor Levin on President Reagan's address to the nation on the Reykjavik meeting with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev]

[Text] The fact that specific accords were not reached in Reykjavik, although they were within reach until the United States, by sticking to SDI, prevented them, caused a sense of disappointment.

But one's attention is drawn to the fact that at Reykjavik the Soviet Union proposed a whole range of solutions that meet the innermost desires of the people. Let us recall what the Soviet Union is proposing: First, to reduce its strategic weapons by 50 percent, to reduce by half each unit of strategic offensive armaments; second, to completely do away with the American and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe; third, while doing away with the American and Soviet missiles in Europe, the Soviet Union is agreeable to leaving 100 warheads on its medium-range missiles in Asia, and the Americans the same number on their missiles of the same type on U.S. territory; fourth, to strengthen the timeless ABM treaty in order to establish a guarantee that neither side secretly prepares or takes the initiative and achieves military superiority; fifth, to commence talks on a ban on nuclear explosions; sixth, the Soviet Union has reaffirmed its readiness for any form of monitoring and this has been done so

convincingly that the question of monitoring, which has for many years been the subject of political speculation in the West, is removed.

These proposals remain in force. They are not being removed, for they untie the bonds which even yesterday many thought were bound fast. The world is once again convinced that our country is not merely declaring the need for a new way of thinking, but is showing an example of how to turn this idea into practical deeds that meet the supreme objective -- the elimination of the threat of a nuclear war.

It must be said again that the Soviet Union's readiness for sensible compromises -- concessions on vital details, even -- in the interests of reaching agreements of principal importance created a strong impression. So, when speaking of strategic armaments, we have removed the question of the American medium-range missiles in Europe and have removed the question of forward-based facilities. In examining the question of medium-range missiles in Europe, we have decided to put aside the nuclear potential of France and Britain. We have also shown a readiness for concessions over the question of ending nuclear tests.

Why are we doing this? Because we must get things in motion. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev emphasized that bold, imaginative solutions are required. We are proposing such solutions. The more the world thinks about them, the more actively it will support them.

Ovchinnikov Commentary

PM170956 Moscow PRAVDA (First Edition) in Russian 17 Oct 86 p 5

[PRAVDA Political Observer Vsevolod Ovchinnikov article: "Historic Opportunity"]

[Text] People had hoped that the Reykjavik meeting would pave the way for important agreements in the security sphere. It transpired that there was even greater potential for this than many people had believed. However, the talks ended without specific results. Now everyone can see why.

The Americans came to the Icelandic capital emptyhanded, with nothing to their name. The U.S. President was not prepared to resolve fundamental issues in a large-scale way in order to really give a fillip to fruitful talks.

Thanks to the Soviet side's bold, far-reaching proposals, the participants in the meeting were at first able to arrive at important accords on strategic arms and on medium-range missiles. However, whereas the Soviet side showed a readiness for major compromises and substantial concessions, the U.S. Administration preferred to sacrifice the accords that emerged rather than forgo the "star wars" program to even a small extent.

The Soviet Union's representatives brought to Reykjavik a package of major proposals. Had they been adopted, a new, nuclear-free era in the history of mankind would have been ushered in. There was a real chance of making a cardinal breakthrough in the world situation. It could have been a matter not of the limitation of nuclear arms, as in the SALT I and SALT II treaties and others, but of the elimination of nuclear weapons in a comparatively short time. The general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee proposed to the U.S. President that right there in Reykjavik they instruct the foreign ministers and other relevant departments to prepare three draft agreements that could be signed during a Soviet-American summit in Washington.

The first of these agreements would have concerned strategic weapons. The USSR proposed that strategic weapons on land, at sea [na vode], and in the air be reduced by 50 percent over the course of 5 years and subsequently be totally eliminated, in accordance with the program for a nuclear-free world announced on 15 January this year. The Soviet side proceeded from the premise that mankind expects really bold moves, not merely cosmetic measures to reassure the public.

Of course, the structure of strategic weapons that has taken shape over their history must be taken into account and honestly balanced during radical reductions. In his recent UN speech the U.S. President tried to create the impression that Soviet ground-launched ICBM's pose the greatest threat to peace. But the reasons why these missiles became the foundation of the USSR's strategic nuclear forces are common knowledge. Back in the forties and the fifties the United States surrounded the Soviet Union with a ring of military bases, whereas our country had to counter the American threat from its own territory. This peculiarity exists to this day. Whereas the Pentagon has 1,500 bases in 32 countries, our nuclear weapons (leaving aside the small number of tactical-operational missiles in the GDR and the CSSR) are on Soviet soil. Therefore to promise the USSR, say, an increased quota of strategic bombers, which are usually deployed at foreign bases, is to seek one-sided advantages.

The talk about levels and sublevels which the Americans started in Geneva and repeated in Reykjavik is designed to confuse the substance of the question and by pass the principle of equality and identical security which is necessary at every stage of the reductions. To ensure that dubious arithmetic does not take the place of serious policy, the Soviet Union supplemented its draft with a simple, clear specification: at the first stage, to halve each component of the so-called strategic offensive arms "triad" -- ground-based strategic missiles, submarine-launched strategic missiles, and strategic bombers.

The draft agreement on strategic weapons which was proposed in Reykjavik contains major concessions by the Soviet side. Let us remember that in Geneva it advocated a 50-percent reduction in the nuclear arms of the USSR and the United States capable of reaching each other's territory. That was fair. After all, the American medium-range missiles in Western Europe are strategic weapons in relation to the Soviet Union. What about the American forward-based systems? Moscow has now consented not to count either of these categories in the overall equation. Thus the path was opened to an accord on strategic weapons.

The second Soviet proposal concerns medium-range missiles. The draft agreement on this question is also notable for the novelty and boldness of its approach and for the radical nature of the measures proposed. It envisages abandoning all the interim or temporary options hitherto under discussion, and entirely eliminating both American and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe and ridding the continent of this category of weapons. In this connection the USSR expressed readiness to make a very big concession: entirely to set aside the question of British and French nuclear weapons. Yet these two states are allies of the United States and coordinate their military activity closely with Washington. They possess an impressive nuclear potential which is continuing to grow and improve. Nonetheless the USSR was prepared to place the British and French forces "in parentheses" so as to open up the path to an agreement.

But here it became clear that despite the old calls for a "zero option," Washington is far from consumed by the desire to remove its missiles from the West European countries. The Americans, taken by surprise by the Soviet proposal, started calling for an "interim solution" in Europe and creating additional obstacles in the guise of

special concern for their allies in Asia. A fierce debate flared up, in the course of which the Soviet delegation took yet another step to meet them. It stated that given the total elimination of American and Soviet missiles in Europe, the USSR agrees to leave 100 warheads on its medium-range missiles in Asia, while the Americans would have the same number on similar missiles deployed on U.S. territory.

Prior to the Reykjavik meeting the American press was predicting that the scale of Soviet reductions in Asia would most likely be the main obstacle to an accord on medium-range missiles. Doubts were expressed as to whether the USSR would agree to any changes in the Asian part of the country. Commenting the other day on the Soviet proposal made in Reykjavik, Poindexter, national security adviser to the U.S. President, noted that for the USSR it would mean reducing its medium-range missiles in Europe by 100 percent, and in Asia by 80 percent. However, the desire to break the deadlock and seek bold, original solutions prompted the Soviet Union, on this question too, to make what was a difficult compromise for it. A breakthrough was made in yet another avenue of nuclear disarmament.

The third question which forms an integral part of the package of Soviet proposals concerned the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-ballistic Missile Systems (ABM) and the ending of nuclear tests. The Soviet approach here is as follows. [paragraph continues]

Once there is an accord on embarking on a sharp reduction in nuclear arms and on eliminating them over a 10-year period, it is necessary to have a guarantee that neither side will seek during that period to achieve military superiority or create new means capable of undermining stability and parity. It is therefore necessary to ensure reliable verification [kontrol] of the process of reductions, and also to take care that all the mechanisms, all the retarding factors, which now hamper the creation of new types of weapons and the spread of the arms race to new spheres are not only preserved, but strengthened. That is why, in its third draft, the Soviet Union proposed to the United States that the ABM Treaty's operation be strengthened by a mutual pledge by the sides not to make use of the right to withdraw from the treaty for 10 years (that is, for the period of the planned reduction and elimination of nuclear arms).

This constructive approach made it possible to find an acceptable formula on the question of nuclear explosions too. It was proposed that full-scale talks begin on the complete and final cessation of nuclear weapon tests. This was envisaged as a process in the course of which it would be possible also to examine American proposals on partial matters related to this topic, but step by step to move forward toward the elaboration of a treaty which would ban all nuclear tests forever.

Taking account of the particular adherence of the administration and of the U.S. President personally to the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the USSR did not demand the ending of work under the "star wars" program. But this was on the understanding that all the provisions of the ABM Treaty will be fully observed, that is, that research and tests will not go outside the laboratories. This was where the real conflict began between the two directions in world policy. The White House incumbent insisted to the end that the United States should have the right to test everything relating to SDI, not only in the laboratories, but also outside them, and that includes tests in space.

This was not only stubbornness. Here was the key to understanding what is really on the U.S. Administration's mind. Its profound dependence on the military-industrial complex was confirmed, as was the desire to break through to military superiority via

space. To this end the American delegation even went so far as to bury the accords almost reached in Reykjavik. After all, you cannot work toward the reduction and elimination of nuclear arsenals on the one hand, while on the other hand giving your blessing to the testing of fundamentally new types of weapons in space. The Soviet Union could not agree to this and become an accomplice in the undermining of the ABM Treaty.

The position adopted by the Americans in Reykjavik gives rise to still more doubts about the "peaceful" nature of SDI. Simple logic suggests that if there is no sword, no shield is needed. If you have decided to eliminate nuclear weapons, why create a defense against them?

Thus although they were literally a few steps away from the adoption of decisions which could have been historic for the entire nuclear and space age, the participants in the Reykjavik meeting were unable to take those steps. The American delegation did not have the political will, boldness, and responsibility to do this. Nonetheless the Reykjavik meeting was a new stage on a complex and difficult dialogue, in the quest for mutually acceptable decisions on difficult questions. The path traveled before and during the meeting is in itself valuable experience and a considerable gain. The sides have already come a long way and almost reached agreement on a great deal. Reykjavik helped to clear the way, to get rid of the obstacles, the details, trivia, and stereotypes which were fettering new approaches to the problems of peace and disarmament.

A fundamentally new situation has been created. The struggle for nuclear disarmament has reached a higher level, from where it is now necessary further to step up efforts with a view to radical reductions and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. It would be a mistake to lose a historic opportunity for the radical solution of the problems of war and peace. Everything must be done to make use of that opportunity.

Pozner Commentary

LD171048 Moscow in English to North America 0000 GMT 16 Oct 86

[Political observer Vladimir Pozner commentary]

[Excerpts] [Announcer] The Reagan administration is seeking public understanding of its position in the capital of Iceland. Claiming some of the far-reaching compromise proposals to itself, whereas in actual fact they were made by the Soviet Union, the White House focuses on the future of arms control. While few contest the importance of the summit which has brought the two nations very close on some issues, the attention is being riveted to SDI, or star wars, as the chief stumbling block. More on this from our political observer Vladimir Pozner.

[Pozner] Thank you and hello. When General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev addressed the nation on television on Tuesday evening, he gave a detailed account of what happened at Reykjavik, described the content and form of his discussions with President Reagan, the essence of the dramatic Soviet proposals which, ironically enough, President Reagan presented as having been made by the United States when he addressed the nation on Monday evening. Commenting on that, General Secretary Gorbachev noted apparently those proposals are so attractive to Americans and the nations of the world that such a ruse too becomes a way of acting, our vanity is not wounded by that. Yet it is important

that people receive a truthful picture of the way things developed at Reykjavik: And the way they developed, as we now know, was that after the two sides agreed, first, to a 50 percent across the board reduction of their offensive strategic triad -- that is, land-based strategic ballistic missiles, submarine launched missiles, and strategic bombers; and second, both Soviet and U.S., the Americans baulked at a 10-year agreement that would limit SDI research and testing to laboratory confines.

Thus SDI emerged as being the single roadblock along the way to nuclear disarmament. Let us take a closer look at that: The United States Government has indicated in the past that the Strategic Defense Initiative is a tremendous bargaining chip in dealing with the Soviets. This was reiterated by the President on Monday when he said that SDI had brought the Soviets back to the negotiating table. While that is absolutely not the case, let's say it is for argument's sake. We sat down. We negotiated. We proposed an historic and dramatic way of cutting back on nuclear weapons and the U.S. refused to use SDI for the purpose it was supposed to serve: bargaining.

So now the question arises: Just what is SDI's real purpose? And that question is not being raised just by or even mainly by the Soviet Union which never had any doubts in the first place. That question is being raised by average Americans, as well as by their elected representatives in Congress, many of whom feel not only disappointed by the failure to reach agreement at Reykjavik, but indeed misled; a nice word for conned. For what becomes apparent now is that all the talk about this great bargaining chip was a gigantic red herring. Most Americans would naturally support something that could be used to good effect in negotiations with the Soviets.

But would they support a new weapons system? A very iffy question to say the least. Now Congressmen are beginning to see SDI for what it really is. Now they want the details, the whats and the wheres and the whys. And that in itself makes Reykjavik a very meaningful and positive event. For it is crucially important that Americans know exactly how SDI is perceived by its backers. [passage omitted] In the absence of strategic nuclear weapons, where one side has SDI and the other does not, the former achieves a tremendous military advantage, for it can threaten the other side with impunity and strike it too. Therein, as I see it, lies the reason for a 50 percent cut in strategic offensive weapons over a 5-year period, and completely doing away with them over a 10-year period. And that is also why he would not agree to any limits on SDI.

Zorin Commentary

LD190212 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 18 Oct 86

[Valentin Zorin commentary; read by announcer]

[Text] I was among the few journalists out of a total of 3,000 or so newsmen from around the world who were granted access to the Hofdi Villa, the venue of the summit. I also had the opportunity to visit the "Georg Ost" cruise liner, Mikhail Gorbachev's residence. The main impression of the summit is that the talks between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan have put our countries' positions closer than ever before since the end of World War II. Mikhail Gorbachev said right after the talks with President Reagan that our positions had never been so close.

The 2-day summit was just one step away from solutions to problems that had seemed unsolvable not so very long ago. The Reykjavik meeting has shown that it is possible

to achieve major agreements between our countries on issues that not very long ago were in a stalemate. As I watched the summit I arrived at the conclusion that the American delegation was unprepared for radical solutions to the problems of disarmament suggested by the Soviet Union. President Reagan's advisers must have thought that at the best the Soviet Union had one separate proposal to offer. It's only natural that the sweeping proposals concerning cardinal questions, announced by Mikhail Gorbachev in Reykjavik, astounded the President and his (?associates). President Reagan claimed after the summit that the proposals discussed had been made by the American delegation. This is not so. In reality, President Reagan had arrived in Reykjavik with nothing in his hands. All the proposals were put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev. The Soviet leader emphasized this in his speech on national television on Tuesday, the 14th.

On the whole, as I returned from Reykjavik, I told myself that I was far more optimistic after the summit than before it. I am convinced that the far-reaching Soviet initiatives aimed at achieving nuclear disarmament and banning weapons from space are going to meet with growing support the world over, including the United States. Of course, it will take time to analyze thoroughly the Soviet proposals and see the opportunities that have been opened up. However, it's already clear that these are not time-serving proposals. They are long-term and remain in effect after Reykjavik. Mikhail Gorbachev has pointed out that now we have a (?positively) new situation. Nobody will be able to act in the old way. The meeting was useful. It has prepared a likely step towards a real turn for the better. For this to become a reality the United States must abandon the illusions it has and take a realistic position.

Kornilov Commentary

LD191612 Moscow TASS in English 1556 GMT 19 Oct 86

[Ellipses as received]

[Text] Moscow October 19 TASS -- Follows commentary by TASS News Analyst Yuriy Kornilov:

The higher the wave of indignation and protests is mounting the world over, especially in the European countries, against Washington's stand in Reykjavik, a stand, as a result of which it has become impossible to rid Europe of nuclear weapons, the more vigorously and cunningly they in Washington are trying to bring down that wave by means of propaganda ploys. Another proof of that is the interview given in Rome by U.S. Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberger, and in Washington -- by U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defence Richard Perle.

Albeit they made their statements in different places, they pursued one aim: to impress on the West Europeans that the USA is very much concerned with reaching a Soviet-American agreement on the withdrawal of all medium-range missile from Europe. Such a step, Caspar Weinberger claims, is by no means incompatible with the stand taken by the USA in Reykjavik. An agreement on medium range missiles, Richard Perle echoes him, could be concluded already next year....

This is a surprise propaganda zigzag. If one is to listen to the Pentagon chief and his closest aide, he may be led to think that it is the USA and not the USSR which proposed a radical settlement at Reykjavik, whose essence is to leave neither the American Pershing and cruise missiles, nor the Soviet SS-20 missiles in Europe.

If one is to listen to these gentlemen, he could be led to think that the USSR did not display at Reykjavik preparedness for a major compromise and remove all the Soviet and American medium range missiles from Europe, while leaving aside the corresponding nuclear weapons of Britain and France....

Yet the essence, the core of the attempts at misleading public opinion taken by Weinberger and Perle is not that, or not so much that. While expatiating at length about Washington's wish to deliver Europe from medium range nuclear weapons, these gentlemen deliberately "forget" that the proposals put forward by the Soviet Union at Reykjavik are of a complex character, are a package. This does not mean that the talks will not be conducted on each of the three areas, on which they are already being conducted at Geneva -- on space weapons, strategic offensive weapons and medium range weapons in Europe.

A separate agreement can be prepared on each of these issues. yet the decision on putting them into the effect should be taken in complex, with due regard for all the basic components of the nuclear problem.

It is certainly, not accidental that Mr. Weinberger and Mr. Perle have displayed such "forgetfulness," since both of them are zealous advocates of the Washington-sponsored aggressive programme for "star wars" preparations. But what is the real worth of the "preparedness" of the USA to cut weapons only in one area -- while it is immediately giving a green light to the weapons race in an another area -- an even by far more dangerous one -- in outer space? Can one tally Washington's speculation on the need for stabilizing the situation in Europe and its intention to destroy the Soviet-American ABM treaty of unlimited duration which makes it possible to contain the weapons race in a way?

No, these two things do not tally with one another. The Pentagon hawks' false "preparedness" to settle the question of medium-range missiles is own militaristic plans. This is, frankly speaking, a clumsy manoeuvre...

Shvets Hits Shultz Speech

LD180015 Moscow TASS in English 0000 GMT 18 Oct 86

[Text] Washington October 18 TASS -- TASS correspondent Yuriy Shvets reports:

The U.S. Administration continues an all-out propaganda campaign whose aim is to impose on the international public its interpretation of the results and significance of the Soviet-U.S. summit in Reykjavik. Speaking to Washington journalists at the National Press Club, Secretary of State George Shultz called the results of the summit "unusual," since, according to him, it was possible during the negotiations to bring much closer the positions of the sides of a broad range of arms control questions and on bilateral relations.

However, when Shultz told the gathering the administration's "new interpretation" of arms control problems, it became clear that he meant an old desire of the USA to gain a unilateral advantage over the USSR. He spoke of developing only those positive results of the summit which conformed to the U.S. interests and ignored legitimate lawful interests of the USSR in the sphere of security.

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CSO: 5200/1051

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

PRAVDA EDITORIAL ON SUMMIT AFTERMATH, ASSESSMENT

PM151740 Moscow PRAVDA (First Edition) in Russian 16 Oct 86 p 1

[Editorial: "After Reykjavik: Time for Action" -- capitalized passages are as published]

[Text] The whole world is discussing the results of the Soviet-American summit meeting in Reykjavik. It was a major political event in international life and in the struggle against the arms race, for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons, and for the removal of the threat of war from mankind. The consequences of this event will long affect international relations.

At the Reykjavik meeting the Soviet Union attached paramount importance to the main questions of world politics -- the ending of the arms race and nuclear disarmament. What was placed on the negotiating table was whole package of major measures that, had they been adopted, would have ushered in a new era in mankind's life -- a nuclear-free era. That is the essence of the Soviet proposals, which promise to culminate in a cardinal breakthrough in the world situation, the possibility of which was obvious and real.

The Soviet side's position at the Reykjavik meeting was honest and open. It was based on the principles of equality and identical security and took into account the interests of both countries, their allies, and the peoples of all states. The Soviet compromise proposals put forward at the meeting were a specific expression of the new approach toward the burning problems of our time and the new thinking.

THE FIRST PROPOSAL related to strategic offensive armaments. The Soviet side advocated a 50-percent reduction in them over the course of the first 5 years and subsequently their total elimination, as envisaged in the CPSU Central Committee general secretary's statement of 15 January this year.

THE SECOND PROPOSAL concerned medium-range missiles. It was proposed that the Soviet and American missiles of this class in Europe be totally eliminated in order to free our continent's peoples from the fear of nuclear catastrophe and then to progress further -- toward the elimination of all nuclear weapons.

THE THIRD QUESTION that formed an organic part of the package of Soviet proposals and was put to the American side is associated with the existing ABM Treaty and the prohibition of nuclear tests. The raising of this question is perfectly logical, since it is necessary to prevent anything that might undermine equality in the course of disarmament. When nuclear potentials are being radically reduced it is logical and necessary to preclude any possibility of the creation of weapons of a new type ensuring

military superiority. In view of this the Soviet side proposed measures to strengthen the ABM Treaty along with a pledge not to withdraw from [vykhodit iz] it for the duration of the 10 years over which the nuclear potentials of the USSR and the United States would be eliminated.

These are bold, imaginative proposals designed to get the cause of nuclear disarmament moving so that nuclear weapons can be totally eliminated by the end of the century. This process, the Soviet Union believes, must be subject to the most rigorous verification [kontrol], of which our country favors any forms.

During the sharp debates that developed in Reykjavik the Soviet side, desiring to reach a mutually acceptable compromise, made major new concessions. As a result a consensus was reached on questions of both strategic arms and medium-range missiles. However, it was not possible to embody this consensus in accords binding upon the sides because of the U.S. Administration's stubborn refusal to create the conditions for their implementation by strengthening ABM practices [rezhim PRO] and adopting pledges that were the same for both sides.

It was on this issue that a real collision between the two approaches in world politics toward vital problems like ending the arms race and banning nuclear weapons took place in Reykjavik. The American side insisted that the United States be able to carry out research and testing of everything relating to the SDI not only in laboratories but far beyond them, including in space. Thus the Washington administration graphically demonstrated that, believing that it has the technological edge, it is still hoping to attain the unattainable -- military superiority over the Soviet Union -- by using the SDI as the route to the militarization of outer space. The world has again been able to see for itself that the Washington administration has the same thing on its mind as the American military-industrial complex and is in the latter's power.

Nonetheless, the Reykjavik meeting was not in vain. Much work was done there and tremendous experience was acquired. Now no one can act as they did before. The meeting paved the way for a possible step forward toward a real change for the better. The ball is still in the U.S. court; it is time its leaders at last abandoned their illusions and adopted a realistic posture. The platform proposed by the Soviet Union in Reykjavik offers a historic opportunity for a cardinal solution of the problems of war and peace. Everything must be done to ensure that this opportunity is exploited in the vital interests of the USSR and U.S. peoples and in the interests of all mankind. A qualitatively new situation has now been created and the struggle for nuclear disarmament has reached a higher level.

Approving M.S. Gorbachev's activity at the meeting with R. Reagan, the CPSU Central Committee Politburo believes that it is necessary to continue to build up efforts aimed at radical reductions and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Contacts and talks, including those at Geneva, on the whole complex of questions of nuclear and space arms must be continued on the basis of the platform put forward by the Soviet side in Reykjavik.

The Soviet people ardently support the position adopted by M.S. Gorbachev at the Reykjavik meeting, a position that combines firmness of principle with flexibility in the quest for the necessary compromises. This is a living embodiment of the line adopted by the 27th CPSU Congress of delivering mankind from the nuclear threat, preventing the militarization of space, strengthening the cause of peace and universal security, and ensuring broad, honest, mutually advantageous international cooperation. The Soviet Union will continue to follow this line. "We shall act," M.S. Gorbachev

declared. "We will not abandon our line of peace and of struggling against the arms race, to prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons, and to remove the threat from the entire globe. And I am confident that we are not alone in that struggle."

What happened in Reykjavik must be a powerful incentive for all peoples, public organizations, and the governments of all states, irrespective of their orientation, to realize the necessity of joining in the common struggle for the normalization of the international situation and a way out of the deadlocks.

The time has come for action. Resolute action. The fate of all mankind depends on it.

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CSO: 5200/1053

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

NATO COMMANDERS CRITICIZE U.S. SUMMIT TACTICS

AU171115 Paris AFP in English 1100 GMT 17 Oct 86

[Excerpt] Brussels, Oct 17 (AFP) — Top commanders in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) have expressed their "displeasure" at not being properly consulted over U.S. disarmament proposals made at the Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Reykjavik, according to reliable sources here Friday.

They echoed the report in Thursday's *Financial Times* that NATO generals feel they were "not properly consulted", especially over proposed U.S. reduction of medium-range missiles in Europe.

General Hans-Joachim Mack, West German deputy supreme allied commander in Europe, told the *Financial Times* that U.S. General Bernard Rogers, his superior officer, had complained a week before Reykjavik to U.S. Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger that "the Allied Command had not been given enough notice of proposals to reduce medium-range missiles in Europe."

General Mack said NATO was concerned that their elimination might endanger the alliance strategy of flexible response, but these warnings "had been ignored."

There was general "displeasure" with U.S. negotiating tactics, General Mack told the *Financial Times* in what it called an "extraordinarily frank" interview.

NATO and diplomatic sources Friday bore out General Mack's statements, which were also made at the same time to the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC).

General Mack, making it clear that he was speaking for General Rogers, admitted that the "quick development" at Reykjavik had made it hard for the Reagan administration to keep all informed, the *Financial Times* reported, but he said it was "unacceptable" that Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) should still be largely in the dark four days after the summit. [passage omitted]

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CSO: 5200/2425

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MITTERRAND, THATCHER DISCUSS REYKJAVIK SUMMIT

PM201444 Paris LE MONDE in French 18 Oct 86 p 6

[Francis Cornu dispatch: "Mr Mitterrand Thinks That the Summit Enabled Great Progress To Be Made"]

[Excerpts]

London — The Reykjavik meeting was the main subject discussed by Mrs Thatcher and Mr Mitterrand during the brief visit which the president of the republic made to London on Thursday 16 October. "We had a great deal to say to each other," Mr Mitterrand stated, stressing that France and Britain are "the only two West European powers which have nuclear weapons." "Nuclear weapons must be reduced.... Any attempt to reach a disarmament agreement is of course an opportunity not to be missed," Mitterrand said in a news conference. The term "failure" used to describe Reykjavik strikes him as related to "the hopes raised during the meeting," but he thinks that progress was made on many points, "to such an extent that they now seem within reach," and this in his view is "great progress." He mentioned in particular the proposals for a reduction in the number of medium-range missiles in Europe. According to him, rather than seeking a "virtually universal" agreement now, Washington and Moscow ought to "step up their discussions" and aim for "more limited but extremely important objectives." He added: "The ones with the highest hopes can do the least."

Mr Mitterrand confirmed that Paris and London have very similar views on the essential issue, because the French and British both refuse to allow their nuclear arsenals to be taken into account in the Soviet-American negotiations. "We are not asking to be at the negotiating table," the president of the republic said,

adding that given the disproportion between U.S. and Soviet forces and those of France and Britain, "the Soviets and Americans would have to make a considerable reduction in their arms before we considered joining their effort." However, Mr Mitterrand pointed out that it was necessary "to keep up with developments," because of the "importance which the United States and the USSR have in the world."

Mr Mitterrand said that "before Reykjavik there was a fairly detailed exchange of correspondence" between him and President Reagan and this has been resumed since the summit. Although France and Britain intend to limit themselves to the role of close observers for the time being, Mr Mitterrand said, this does not rule out the possibility of "expressing a view or even giving advice and, 'should the opportunity arise' having some influence on American thinking," while "not going too far" because "it is other countries' disarmament which is under discussion."

The president of the republic also said that he favored a rapprochement between France and Britain on equipment and arms for the two countries' deterrent forces. But Mr Mitterrand stressed the limits of any such cooperation because Britain is part of the NATO integrated command (and France is not) and because its nuclear arsenal is partly American-made.

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CSO: 5200/2429

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTERS ON EUROMISSILES, REYKJAVIK

PM171502 Paris LE MONDE in French 17 Oct 86 p 4

[Unattributed report: "Removal of All U.S. Nuclear Arms From Europe To Be Feared"]

[Text] Foreign Minister Jean-Bernard Raimond said on Wednesday that France "is in favor of an agreement on intermediate nuclear forces (Euromissiles) more for political than for military reasons, because it fears the prospect of all U.S. nuclear arms being removed from Europe." "This would be a bad thing for the alliance and would undermine Europe's security, especially since account must be taken of other areas of imbalance, such as conventional or chemical weapons," the minister said when addressing the National Assembly.

He added: "Nuclear weapons are part of the security equation in Europe, but they are certainly the most important part."

He reaffirmed that France's preconditions for participating in disarmament "do not boil down to a 50 percent reduction in Soviet and American weapons. As far as its security is concerned, France must take account of conventional and chemical weapons in Europe, but also any defensive systems which might counter its nuclear forces in future."

Finally, Mr Raimond said that "the Soviets might well take up the idea of a separate agreement on intermediate nuclear forces again" and he reaffirmed that "what was presented as a failure" in Reykjavik must be "qualified."

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CSO: 5200/2429

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

FRANCE'S LE FIGARO ON EFFECTS OF REYKJAVIK 'FAILURE'

PM210650 Paris LE FIGARO in French 18-19 Oct 86 p 1

[Jean Francois-Poncet editorial: "Questions"]

[Text] The explanations given in Washington and Moscow on the Reykjavik meeting have certainly not clarified all aspects of it.

Three questions in particular remain.

Has the Reykjavik encounter changed the balance of forces between the two sides? In Geneva last year, Mr Reagan had imposed his views: A summit limited to establishing contact and warming up the atmosphere was the prologue rather than the first act of the negotiations. However, there is reason to wonder whether the reverse happened in Reykjavik and whether the U.S. President fell into a trap: He accepted a date which he had said he did not want; the mere exchange of views which he was envisaging turned into negotiations, and, contrary to his avowed intentions, arms were the main and virtually the only subject discussed.

What may be more serious is that the strategic defense initiative was seen as an obstacle to progress on disarmament rather than a means of promoting it. Will this advantage which the enemy has been given remain insignificant? The U.S. elections on 4 November will provide an initial indication of this.

Does the Reykjavik failure permanently jeopardize the chances of an East-West agreement? It is true that the discussions failed, that no future meeting has been arranged, and that the nuclear moratorium observed by Moscow will probably not be extended.

But it is also true that the gap between the two sides has closed considerably and that the desire to start discussions again is more obvious than ever on both sides. In these circumstances it is difficult to imagine that on the central problem — the ABM treaty banning ABM defenses — the experts will be unable to find a compromise between the limited interpretation of one side and the free interpretation of the other. In short, it may be more than just a hitch, but it is certainly not a "tragedy."

This is another reason for thinking about Europe's role. Although it was, as usual, absent from the negotiating table, it is certainly not absent from the negotiators' calculations or from what is at stake in their arguments. Can Europe think it is in its interest to see the two protagonists vie with each other to do away with arms and hence with the nuclear deterrent which has guaranteed its security for almost 50 years?

Did the U.S. ally consult its European partners before playing this dangerous game? Are the French and Germans in particular in agreement and prepared to act accordingly as far as their own arsenals are concerned? If this is not the case or if they are not interested in the subject, surely public opinion will be confused on the eve of major elections in Germany, Britain, and France.

It must be admitted that these are all questions the answers to which must not be left to chance.

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CSO: 5200/2429

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

FRENCH CP DAILY BLAMES REAGAN FOR SUMMIT 'FAILURE'

PM171500 Paris L'HUMANITE in French 14 Oct 86 p 3

[Text] The Reykjavik summit came within a hairbreadth of a historic decision for world peace. And for 24 hours those responsible for the failure — Mr Reagan and his "star wars" — have been seeing stars....

The most varied sections of French and international public opinion are saying extremely bitter things about the White House chief. In the United States itself, where a large section of the American people are showing the importance they attach to a process of nuclear reductions, there are some people who are not mincing their words. Former Secretary of State Alexander Haig expressed concern that Mr Reagan is now "depicted as an obstacle to peace." Democrat Senator Pell, who feels he has seen "a sad day for mankind," thinks that Mr Reagan "dropped the substance for the shadow by refusing to exchange what is just an outline plan for real missiles which have already been deployed." The FRG ecologists think that "the opportunities for disarmament contained in the Soviet proposals have been lost for several years."

In France, *Le Monde* suggests that the U.S. President will have a great deal of difficulty in "justifying himself to U.S. opinion," because "the two superpowers had not come so close together for a good 20 years." Even Claude Estier has to admit that the "bad news" is "due to an obstinate desire to continue with the strategic defense initiative," in other words the deployment of directed energy weapons in space.

Secretary of State George Shultz and a few U.S. allies were trying hard yesterday to remedy the disastrous effect of the Reykjavik failure with optimistic statements.

The closed files of negotiations between the two superpowers now contain an agreement in black and white which reverses the infernal process of the race to disaster. It is not just a question of a few less missiles here and there or a few warheads being destroyed, but of an entirely new military scene produced by an unprecedented disarmament process. For instance, strategic missiles would be reduced by half in 5 years and totally eliminated by 1996. Medium-range missiles (the famous SS-20 missiles on one side, and the Pershing-2 and Cruise missiles on the other) would disappear from our continent. Just imagine what that means for Europe, where two world wars have been fought, where incredible numbers of destructive weapons are stockpiled, and where all the dangers are focused. Just imagine the resources which would be released for life, for development, for combatting unemployment, and for helping famine-stricken peoples. For about 12 years the movement which is known as pacifist, in the good sense of the word, has mobilized large crowds throughout the world. It naturally played a part in this breakthrough in the Reykjavik negotiations. The files were closed in the Icelandic capital on Sunday evening and it is up to the two "superpowers" to reopen them. But the third "superpower" — the peoples mobilized for peace — can give the decisive impetus.

After all, it is mankind's survival which is at stake.

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CSO: 5200/2429

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

BELGIUM FOREIGN MINISTER ON MEETING WITH USSR'S SEMENOV

LD161928 Brussels Domestic Service in French 1800 GMT 16 Oct 86

[Interview with Foreign Minister Leo Tindemans by unidentified correspondent following his meeting with Soviet envoy Vladimir Semenov in Brussels — recorded]

[Text] East-West talks on disarmament after Reykjavik: It will be all or nothing. This is the Soviet position expressed in Moscow and also in Brussels where Ambassador Vladimir Semenov, the Soviet leader's special envoy, met today with the foreign minister. In other words, if one can, for example, negotiate about Euromissiles in Geneva, the Soviets will not sign anything before obtaining an overall agreement on the Reykjavik proposals, including agreement on the Strategic Defense Initiative on which Ronald Reagan is not going to concede and which the Soviets do not want under any circumstances. Here are Leo Tindemans' comments after his meeting with Semenov. He is interviewed by our reporter.

[Begin recording] [Tindemans] The Soviet position on cruise missiles has undoubtedly changed. I asked the question: Why were you on the verge of concluding an agreement before Reykjavik, without taking other elements into account, whereas in Reykjavik you said: All this is dependent on a global agreement and, therefore, on the U.S. attitude toward the so-called "star wars"? He explained to me: It is because in Reykjavik we went further than in Geneva. Everything is therefore incorporated in one single package, and it is the entire package which has to be accepted or else nothing is achieved.

[Reporter] The Strategic Defense Initiative, "star wars", may also be in this package. Could this type of issue hold up all the agreements on intercontinental weapons, on medium and short-range weapons, and so on?

[Tindemans] Alas, it could. The Soviet Union is permitting laboratory research, even in the case of SDI, but it will not allow the results of laboratory work to be tested and the United States says that it is unable to forgo these tests, accusing the Soviet Union of violating the ABM Treaty. This leads me to say that on both sides — please, let us not simplify things by saying that it is SDI — no, it is the interpretation and the contents of the ABM Treaty. It is really quite incredible. If the two superpowers could agree on this point everything else would be unblocked and all the agreements on verification and disarmament, all the problems would be solved. But I am asking and insisting that we concentrate now on the ABM Treaty.

[Reporter] The Soviets must know that the Americans are not prepared to negotiate on SDI as they would like. So, in a way, we can say that Moscow has come up with a global proposal, including SDI, to prevent all the other agreements. Do you think this is a weapon to block the negotiations?

[Tindemans] It is a weapon, but I would not dare to say that Moscow is determined to block everything. [end recording]

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CSO: 5200/2427

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

BELGIAN DAILY SEES REYKJAVIK 'STEP IN RIGHT DIRECTION'

PM161110 Brussels LE SOIR in French 14 Oct 86 p 3

[Pierre Lefevre commentary: "Clash Between Two Strategies"]

[Text] When they first met on the steps of the house in Reykjavik Mr Gorbachev was smiling and relaxed and Mr Reagan was stern and silent. Their appearances were a fairly good reflection of the spirit in which the two men were meeting.

For the Soviet general secretary this summit with the U.S. President was an important step in the long propaganda process which he launched as soon as he arrived in the Kremlin and which has taken him to London, Paris, and Geneva, before taking him to Washington and Tokyo. Mr Gorbachev intends to use the aspirations to peace and the fears generated by nuclear weapons as a lever with which to counter U.S. strategists. He had to look like a man of detente, goodwill, and good humor.

Mr Reagan, on the other hand, was coming to Reykjavik to play an extremely difficult game, namely to put forth a future concept of world security which only part of the U.S. political world shares and which the USSR is fiercely fighting, namely the development of the superpowers' general defense systems toward a different balance between defensive and offensive weapons.

It is a moral concept which rejects the idea of continuing to base peoples' security on the promise of mutual assured destruction. And it is a strategic concept which consists of occupying the advantageous positions space can provide for monitoring and destroying enemy weapons. It is, as we know, the Strategic

Defense Initiative.

Indeed, because the Soviets have the advantage in the sphere of offensive intercontinental nuclear weapons, Ronald Reagan wants to take the lead in defensive systems which can neutralize these strategic forces. The "star wars" race is not only full of advantages in the military sphere, but also in the economic and technological spheres.

Although Mikhail Gorbachev can play on the sensitivity of American and European opinion to force his interlocutor's hand, the U.S. President knows that the USSR no longer has adequate economic and technological resources to keep up in this "star wars" race unless he abandons the country's very economic development. These two lines of thinking clashed in Reykjavik. It was clearly a sharp clash.

The Kremlin chief put all his cards on the table. First he held up the tantalizing prospect of a liberalization in the human rights sphere in Moscow and a withdrawal of his troops from Afghanistan. This is why, contrary to all expectations, he allowed a working group to examine these taboo subjects in an all-night session. In addition to the promise of an agreement on the reduction of medium-range weapons in Europe, an agreement which was expected to be the main result of this summit, he hinted at other major reductions in the essential part of his strike force, in other words, the intercontinental missiles. And, at the crucial point in the negotiations, he made it known to the outside world that all this was on offer.

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CSO: 5200/2427

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

PORTUGAL 'SATISFIED' WITH REYKJAVIK OUTCOME

LD132305 Lisbon Domestic Service in Portuguese 2000 GMT 13 Oct 86

[Text] The Portuguese Government has described itself as satisfied with what it calls the very significant progress achieved during the Reykjavik summit.

This was stated by Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Azevedo Soares, who added that the progress in question is reflected in the presentation of new proposals and in the adoption of a more flexible approach to the issues discussed.

The Portuguese Socialist Party has issued a communique deploring the lack of a positive outcome to the Reagan-Gorbachev summit.

The Socialists say that the interests of peace demand that each superpower should desist from seeking to gain the upper hand. The Socialist Party advocates the participation of the European countries in the disarmament negotiations currently restricted to the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as the formal recognition of their exclusive competence for defending specifically European interests in matters of security.

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CSO: 5200/2425

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

SPANISH FOREIGN MINISTER COMMENTS ON REYKJAVIK

PM200943 Madrid YA in Spanish 14 Oct 86 p 23

[Jose V. Colchero report: "Spain Does Not Consider All Lost"]

[Excerpt] Madrid — If Reagan and Gorbachev were so close to achieving a "package" of agreements on nuclear disarmament, including the withdrawal of all Euromissiles from the Old Continent, the Reykjavik meeting cannot have been either's "last word." Spanish Foreign Minister Fernandez Ordonez, who did not attend the briefing given by Secretary of State Shultz at NATO headquarters in Brussels yesterday morning (Spain was represented by Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs Fernando Perpina and Ambassador Jaime de Ojeda), has avoided a pessimistic reaction and emphasized that, although agreements have not been reached now, "the possibility of securing them has been made clear — a view maintained by the Spanish Government." In the Spanish reaction there is an obvious desire not to brand Reagan or Gorbachev as guilty. "Diplomatic soft soap" has prevailed.

Withdrawal of Missiles

This is aimed at encouraging the hope that it is still possible to rid Europe of Euromissiles and that Reagan and Gorbachev will eventually withdraw them from the Atlantic to the Urals, leaving the number of these missiles at 100 on each side, which the United States should stockpile beyond the Atlantic and the Soviet Union beyond the Urals. The Spanish Government, which through the medium of its prime minister has been so skeptical in the past about the U.S. "star wars" preparations, has now avoided commenting on the tenacity with which Reagan has reserved the U.S. right not only to conduct research in laboratories but also to test SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative] technology in space. This is not the moment for blaming the U.S. ally.

Disarmament will continue to be discussed in the international forums of Geneva and Vienna, as Fernandez Ordonez pointed out, wishing to intimate that all is not yet lost and that the doors remain open for continuing to talk. His FRG counterpart, Genscher, has stressed the importance of the superpowers persevering in the effort to ensure that "in Europe there is greater security with fewer weapons." Both superpowers' allies will attempt to "push them" toward understanding, but the chances of their succeeding are slight, since on other occasions they have been unable to influence their strategic viewpoints. [passage omitted]

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

SPANISH EDITORIALS COMMENT ON REYKJAVIK SUMMIT

PM171010 [Editorial Report] Newspapers on 13 October carry editorials which comment on the Reykjavik summit.

Barcelona *La Vanguardia* in Spanish on 13 October maintains on page 5 that the reasons for U.S. President Reagan's refusal to accept the Soviet demand that the SDI be frozen for 10 years "seem difficult to find solely in the differences between the prior U.S. stance and the stance finally put forth by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in the haunted house in Reykjavik." It adds:

"The intransigence displayed by Ronald Reagan in Reykjavik could have another explanation, connected not so much with the course of the talks as with the rather unusual preliminaries to the summit. Reagan, the champion of anticommunism and one of the most conservative presidents in U.S. history, went to the meeting after provoking the anger of the U.S. ultraconservative sectors, which accused him of being prepared to make concessions to Gorbachev when the latter was being portrayed by most Western observers as substantially weakened because of the Soviet domestic situation. Even Henry Kissinger, the former secretary of state who became the architect of detente in the 1970's, joined, like Richard Nixon, in the chorus of ultraconservative lamentations, thus giving rise to the paradox that champions and opponents of coexistence with the USSR made common cause against the President who once described the Soviet regime as an 'empire of evil.'

"The rapid and unexpected resolution of such contentious cases as those of U.S. journalist Nicholas Daniloff, Soviet official Zakharov, and the USSR's UN diplomats expelled by Washington, as well as the caution with which Washington handled the accident sustained by a Soviet submarine, certainly made clear both sides' eagerness to conclude certain agreements on nuclear weapons. This eagerness could be explained by the fact that two sides believed that this moment, for various reasons, was more favorable to their interests than to those of their interlocutor. Thus the Soviets believed that a Reagan without too much luck in his latest confrontations with Congress and free from constraints in his final term would crave an agreement with his opponent in order to endorse the mark which his stay in the White House has left on international relations.

"For its part, the Republican administration was convinced that the weakness of the new Soviet leadership team, still trapped in the inertia of the murky transition begun following Brezhnev's death, would make this Reykjavik summit a unique opportunity for reaching an agreement on disarmament. However, the outcome of the summit demonstrated that Reagan, the President of 'the U.S. comeback,' was especially sensitive during those 2 days to the U.S. sectors of opinion which were now accusing him of backsliding. It has been written that Reagan would be fundamentally concerned about going down in history as the president of detente, but what seems indisputable, following the Reykjavik setback, is that Reagan preferred, in clinging to the SDI, not to squander his political capital of firmness toward Moscow. To put it another way, Reagan quailed somewhat before the specter of the 'Carter syndrome.'"

Noting that "the apparent triumph of pragmatic stances on both sides was necessary in order to reach Reykjavik," it concludes: "Now, following the failure in Reykjavik, it is to be hoped that these pragmatic stances will remain unchanged, but the fact is that the final coldness of the talks and the reactions recorded on each side portend a new period of hibernation of dialogue between the two superpowers."

Madrid *El Pais* in Spanish on 13 October states on page 10 that the SDI was "the specific cause" of the summit's failure, and continues:

"The Reykjavik summit was envisaged as a preparation for the Washington summit agreed at the Geneva meeting last year. The failure in Reykjavik seems to mean that Gorbachev's visit to the U.S. capital is being erased from the agenda. There is no doubt that this is a very grave backward step in the whole process of detente between the two superpowers. For the very reason that Reykjavik aroused many hopes, since various commentaries by reliable sources in Washington and Moscow forecast probable agreements on the reduction of various kinds of nuclear weapons, it is impossible not to recognize the gravity of a diametrically different outcome after 2 days of intensive negotiations."

After asserting that the SDI "was the decisive cause of the failure of the negotiation," it concludes:

"It is true that there are forums for discussion between the USSR and the United States, specifically in Geneva, which will continue to tackle the matters discussed in Reykjavik, but it is clear that the conditions for reaching possible agreements have deteriorated considerably. It can only be hoped that the sense of responsibility of the two superpowers' top leaders will lead them to explore all avenues in order to remove the threat of a nuclear holocaust."

Madrid YA in Spanish on 13 October contends on page 4 that "it is clear that the Russians wanted to give greater prominence than the Americans to the course taken by the talks and to the results achieved." It adds: "What mattered to the Soviets is to leave the impression that they came off best in the Reykjavik match, not only for the sake of their prestige but also because of the political problems which this could create for Reagan: To confirm the hawks' fears of the President's excessive indulgence in the final period of his term, to intensify the differences between the Defense and State Departments in his administration, and to have an adverse influence for the Republican Party, thus weakening Reagan in the coming U.S. congressional elections."

It concludes: "More than specific agreements on arms reduction and also on human rights, regional conflicts, and bilateral conflicts — as Reagan emphasized time and time again, stating that these issues were inexorably linked to that reduction — the success or failure of this minisummit was pinned in advance on ensuring the supersummit to be held in the United States, which seems to be ruled out for the present."

"It has not been long since Kissinger, a well qualified expert on the issue, stated that the danger of summits between the two superpowers' top leaders lies in imposing a burden of relations on them which should be shared out in countless other contacts and which could reduce the failure or success of those relations to a single move. This warning should make us all reflect on the need not to pin our hopes or despair on the outcome of these summit meetings. However, these summits can always assist a gradual realization by the leaders playing the leading role in them that they must examine in depth coexistence between the two sides and that that coexistence and the coexistence among all countries and inhabitants of the earth lies in their mutual understanding and not in confrontation."

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CSO: 5200/2428

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

TURKEY'S FOREIGN MINISTRY ON RESULTS OF REYKJAVIK

TA141142 Ankara Domestic Service in Turkish 1100 GMT 14 Oct 86

[Text] It has been announced that Turkey regrets that the expected results were not obtained during the Reagan-Gorbachev talks in Iceland, but desires the preservation of progress made so far and the continuation of contacts and initiatives aimed at establishing a lasting atmosphere of peace between East and West.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Yalim Eralp expressed Turkey's views during the weekly news conference held today. Eralp added that Turkey supports the process of detente which is aimed at eliminating the tension between East and West. Pointing out that Turkey favorably views all efforts toward a comprehensive and lasting disarmament aimed at preserving the security of all countries, Eralp said that Turkey continues to hope that progress will be achieved in this field.

He continued: We regret that the expected results were not obtained during the latest Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Iceland. Nevertheless, statements made during the summit and in its aftermath indicate that the two sides were able to achieve a rapprochement in their stands on various significant points. Such a constructive development has particularly been achieved in the area of limiting medium-range missiles.

We hope for the preservation of the progress made in Reykjavik so far and for the continuation of contacts and initiatives aimed at establishing a lasting atmosphere of peace between East and West.

Meanwhile, a special representative from the Soviet Union will arrive in Turkey tomorrow and another will arrive from the United States on Friday in order to brief Turkish officials on the Iceland summit.

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CSO: 5200/2426

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

VARIOUS REACTION TO REYKJAVIK SUMMIT RESULTS

Jankowitsch Expresses 'Disappointment'

AU141215 Vienna Domestic Service in German 1100 GMT 14 Oct 86

[Text] Japan — Foreign Minister Peter Jankowitsch assessed the results of Reykjavik as a disappointment during his visit to Tokyo. Jankowitsch stated that additional efforts now are needed to counteract new tensions in East-West relations. In this context particular importance is attached to the Vienna CSCE conference, he said.

KPOe Politburo Statement

AU150956 Vienna *VOLKSSTIMME* in German 15 Oct 86 p 4

[Statement issued by the Politburo of the KPOe Central Committee in Vienna; date not given]

[Text] Gorbachev's proposals in Reykjavik have proved that the most stringent disarmament measures ever are indeed possible: halving all strategic nuclear weapons, from intercontinental missiles to nuclear submarines; totally eliminating intermediate-range nuclear missiles, whose presence deeply worries Europe because their use would mean Europe's destruction.

U.S. objections were taken into consideration if they were in any way justifiable from a practical point of view; even previous American proposals were taken up and now submitted to Reagan. But this liberating possibility has not become reality.

Reagan preferred his "star wars" project. The most primitive logic says: Disarmament measures of a previously almost inconceivable scope — which were actually submitted for deliberation — are incompatible with the U.S. attempt to simultaneously develop qualitatively new weapons of destruction. The interests of the overwhelming majority of mankind, not only of those people suffering deprivation and starvation, demand that the waste of natural wealth and human labor for armament be stopped.

The destructive power of the weapons that have been accumulated so far, which is absolutely sufficient to destroy mankind many times over, requires a new way of thinking: the insight that security is necessary for all. But Reagan acts on the principle that America's supremacy, which cannot be achieved, is to make

the rest of the world as insecure as possible. Thus the breakthrough to new conditions, to a world with less justified fear, is made impossible for the present.

It is a success of the peace forces that, after hesitating for quite some time, Austria's Government has taken up a stand against Reagan's armament in space. However, this was done in such a diplomatic way that until now the majority of Austrians have not heard about it.

But there is too much at stake. The KPOe demands: Because of our neutrality and because of the interests of the Austrian people, the Austrian Government is obligated to make it absolutely clear to the American Administration that disarmament is incompatible with an arms race in space.

The Soviet proposals for a radical reduction of nuclear arsenals, which remain on the negotiating table, must not be dismissed in favor of the illusory hunt for military supremacy.

During the entire period of its existence the KPOe has been most closely linked to the struggle against war and the threat of war. This chance to reach comprehensive disarmament instead of a new, even more costly and unpredictably dangerous armament in space must not be missed. The KPOe will dedicate all its strength to that — as a party and as a part of the nonpartisan peace movement. In view of this situation, the campaign for collecting signatures for a nuclear test ban decided by the Austrian peace movement is gaining even greater importance as a first step.

[Signed] The Politburo of the KPOe Central Committee

KPOe Chairman's Assessment

AU101058 [Editorial Report] Vienna VOLKSSTIMME in German on 10 October on page 3 carries a 750-word article by KPOe Chairman Franz Muhri headlined "The Question 'War or Peace' Concerns Everyone." Muhri calls the meeting between President Reagan and CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in Reykjavik a "success of the peace forces" and stresses that the "attitude of the Soviet Union has proved to be correct." The meeting, however, "does not mean that there has been a change toward disarmament and peace in the Reagan administration's attitude." After discussing Moscow's position Muhri points out that the KPOe fully supports a signature campaign initiated by the Austrian peace movement for the cessation of all nuclear tests, which also calls on the Austrian Government to "advocate with determination an immediate halt to all nuclear tests in the spirit of an active policy of neutrality and peace."

Muhri stresses that the KPOe categorically opposes any attempts by the United States "to integrate neutral Austria into the aggressive military concepts of NATO," and criticizes the Austrian Government for partially yielding to this pressure. In conclusion Muhri emphasizes the importance of the CSCE follow-up conference in Vienna and says that "not only we Communists, but all peace-loving forces in our country expect Austria to make a positive contribution to this."

Daily Sees 'Great Chance' Missed
AU141253 Vienna NEUE AZ in German 14 Oct 86 p 6

[Robert Wiesner commentary: "Wonderful Arguments"]

[Text] Nothing has come out of the meeting of the world's two most powerful men, but nothing has happened either. Certainly, our hopes have been disappointed once more; the reduction of the nuclear threat ardently desired all over the world has once more been pushed into the remote future. From the military viewpoint everything remains the same, and that is bad enough. But not from the political point of view.

Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev themselves have provided armament opponents with wonderful arguments, when they disclosed which far-reaching disarmament measures they had almost agreed on: no intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe any longer, only half of the current number of inter-continental weapons. No one could have been more credible in giving the lie to those politicians and experts of both sides who have been trying for years to make us believe that the balance of power and thus our security is endangered without this or that weapons system, without the capability to destroy the world many times over.

In Reykjavik Ronald Reagan made himself guilty of having missed a great chance by stubbornly adhering to his SDI program. It serves the United States right if the Soviets are now successful in politically exploiting their readiness for concessions.

The Americans must not lament over that as long as they have not tried to take the other side at its word: by scrapping the SDI plans, no matter whether this is done boldly by Ronald Reagan himself or by the U.S. Congress.

Since Reykjavik we know how large a first disarmament step could be. Particularly we in Europe will not be satisfied with anything else.

DIE PRESSE Terms Meeting 'Success'
AU141244 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 13 Oct p 1

[Engelbert Washietl commentary: "The Price of Strength"]

[Excerpts] Detente lives, but those who constantly exult in the euphoria of detente must be deeply dismayed after the success of the presummit between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev. Nothing of what they have been trying to make the public in the Western world believe for years has been able to stand the test of this event. The rapprochement of the two statesmen, which has been denied the ultimate breakthrough, refutes the thesis that it is the first law of detente to deal with Soviet leaders as delicately as if one wanted to woo them. [passage omitted]

Now the Soviets are obviously willing to reduce their systems — something they would never have negotiated if the Pershing missiles had not been deployed. If the signs do not deceive, in exchange for concessions in the area of SDI Moscow would have

been prepared to set the number of admissible intermediate-range missile systems on both sides below the 150 SS-20 missiles which were already in existence before the beginning of the NATO counterarmament.

Thus the Reykjavik meeting attains a special quality. Endurance, exercised by both Reagan and Kohl [as received], is worthwhile, but success does take its time. Once more, Reagan has not given up.

/9274

CSO: 5200/2427

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRENCH PRESIDENT ON NEW 'HADES' MISSILE

PM201550 Paris LE MONDE in French 15 Oct 86 p 8

[Jacques Isnard report: "Mr Mitterrand Dissociates Himself from Defense Policy Envisaged by Messrs Chirac and Giraud"]

[Excerpts]

Mitterrand also made a brief, but not unnoticed, reference to Mr Chirac's recent statements to the institute of higher national defense studies about the role of prestrategic (or tactical) nuclear weapons, especially the Army's Hades missile, which is to replace the Pluton missile before 1992

To the prime minister's plans to use these nuclear weapons, such as the Hades missiles, "dissociated" from the strategic force, that is, as battlefield weapons rather than as part of the deterrent, the head of state replied: "We cannot arbitrarily separate this or that element of our strategy. This strategy as a whole embodies tactical or prestrategic weapons. Such weapons cannot be separated from the strategy. They are not a mere extension of a conventional battle but part of the strategic 'whole.'" In order to eliminate doubt the president made matters even clearer when he said: "The deterrence strategy comes into play when the prestrategic force is introduced."

The Hades program (for a missile to deliver a nuclear warhead over a range of more than 350 km from a truck equipped as a launch platform) is known to be the subject of reappraisals within the chiefs of staff. Originally the Hades missiles were to be grouped within a single division, under the orders of the armed forces chief of staff under direct authority from the president. Now, although the debate is not officially over, there is talk of decentralizing the Hades regiments to some extent to the level of individual corps, as with the present Pluton missiles. The opponents of this idea are afraid that such an arrangement could cause the Hades to be regarded as field guns.

In the presence of Defense Minister Andre Giraud, who accompanied him to Caylus, Mr Mitterrand expressed doubts about the choice of the new strategic nuclear "component" due to replace the Mirage IV bombers and stationary missiles on the Albion plateau of Haute-Provence after 1996. The government's plan is to produce, at an approximate cost of F25 billion, some 30 so-called "random deployment" missiles, which would be mounted on trailer trucks parked, in peace time, at military bases, to be moved to predetermined launch sites at times of serious crisis. If this plan is finally adopted, as is supposed to be Mr Giraud's intention, the result could be a delayed introduction

into operational service (after 2002) of the new improved M-5 missiles on board nuclear submarines.

After leaving the Defense Ministry Charles Hernu, who is not in favor of the immediate introduction of a mobile missile project either, proposed modernizing the Albion plateau silos to avoid delaying the completion of the M-5.

"A new component," Mr Mitterrand said, "would become necessary when the original one became obsolete. We are a still long way from that prospect. It cannot be ruled out, however. It simply means that submarines can be detected. Progress in detection is advancing very rapidly. But so too is progress enabling submarine forces to evade such detection. This is the eternal dialectic of armaments.

"I believe," the head of state added, "that since our defense rests on nuclear deterrence, which is based essentially on the submarine component, any merits of the second land-based component cannot diminish the submarines' importance. There can be no second component to the detriment of the first. This would be an illogicality which nobody would accept and which I do not accept, in any case. This first component is our security and our deterrent.... It is possible to envisage at the same time the development of the first component and the initiation of the second. This is possible and compatible with our finances. It cannot be developed to the detriment of the first component. I hope this is well understood, and it is a point on which I assert the authority required by my position."

Next, and with equal solemnity — since, he said, he is asserting the authority required by his position — the president warned the defense minister against any military plans which, for reasons of technical or financial incompatibility, entailed an acceleration of a project for a missile mounted on a trailer truck at the risk of delaying the completion of the M-5 missile destined for our nuclear submarines. The projected mobile missile would deliver a warhead up to a distance of 3,500 km [as published]. The M-5 would carry a dozen nuclear warheads and be mounted on the so-called new generation submarines. Mr Mitterrand is not opposed to the former. He is asking the government not to sacrifice the latter's modernization to it, however.

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS: U.S. EXPLODES NUCLEAR DEVICE IN NEVADA 16 OCT

TASS Report

LD162058 Moscow TASS in English 2042 GMT 16 Oct 86

[Text] Washington October 16 TASS -- The United States today exploded another nuclear device at a test site in Nevada, an official spokesman for the Department of Energy has announced. The yield of the explosion has not yet been disclosed.

It is the 22nd U.S. nuclear test since the Soviet Union introduced its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. Several activists of the anti-war movement who protested against the continued U.S. nuclear testing were arrested near the site.

Chernyshev: 'Salute' to Summit

LD162059 Moscow TASS in English 2039 GMT 16 Oct 86

[Text] Moscow October 16 TASS -- TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev:

Another nuclear device, the 22nd since the Soviet Union introduced its moratorium on all nuclear explosions, resounded in Nevada. It is a "salute" of a sort of the conclusion of the Soviet-American summit meeting in Reykjavik, an echo of the glee of the U.S. right-wing forces over the failure of the talks to produce concrete results.

Senator Sam Nunn seems to be right in saying that if an agreement to scrap all ballistic missiles had been achieved in Reykjavik, every army and airforce general and some admirals would have had a heart attack.

The latest test can also be viewed as another sign that the U.S. Administration would not show constraint in the arms race. Nuclear testing has been conducted to produce ever new warheads for strategic carriers and to develop "third generation" nuclear weapons, including those under the "star wars" programme. the Pentagon plans to have 28,000 nuclear munitions of 19 types by the early 1990s.

A sample of the thinking of those who are against any accord with the Soviet Union on nuclear arms reductions was supplied recently by American General John Chain, who last June was appointed to head the Air Force Strategic Command and the Joint Strategic Planning Staff. According to him, the U.S. cannot detract anything from emphasis on the nuclear potential and the paramount goal is to introduce new arms systems.

Nuclear testing is especially important in development work on space strike systems. It is therefore amazing that President Reagan said in his televised address after the Reykjavik meeting that SDI meant non-nuclear defences. The world knows that nuclear-pumped X-ray lasers are being developed under the "star wars" programme, lasers which the "star warriors" openly characterise as the most promising SDI weapons.

Quite recently U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, answering the question from a correspondent of an ABC TV programme if the development of SDI systems called for nuclear testing, admitted that some types of them did.

That is why nuclear blasts continue in Nevada, reaffirming, as it were, the characterisation of the incumbent President's policy in a letter to him from Les Aspin, president of the House Armed Forces Committee. The congressman said that Reagan's policy could only be characterised as two-dimensional: One of the dimensions is rhetoric about halving arms arsenals, which is never backed by deeds, whereas the other is the demands for new weapons, which are always followed up with deeds.

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CSO: 5200/1041

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

SOVIETS INVITE SCIENTISTS TO OBSERVE NUCLEAR TEST SITE

London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 1629 GMT 9 Oct 86

[Article by David Wallen]

[Text]

The Soviet Union has invited a team of British scientists to monitor activity at its main nuclear weapons test site.

The invitation was made, not to the government, but to two leading academic advocates of a global ban on nuclear tests while they were visiting Moscow this week.

The Foreign Office is not likely to object to a team being set up independently, but the government's position remains that it is striving for a full test ban treaty at the Geneva arms talks — and the question of the verification of tests is one of the most important stumbling blocks.

The invitation was made to a leading member of the British Nuclear Freeze Organisation, Mr Frank Barnaby, and geologist Dr Jeremy Leggatt. It came from the vice-president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, Academician E.P. Velikov.

Nuclear freeze is backed by a large number of leading academics, MPs, clerics and others and sees a test ban as the first step towards nuclear arms control.

If the offer is taken up, and that seems likely if the funds for a team can be found, the Britons will be joining independently-sponsored American scientists who have been at the Soviet Union's Semipalatinsk test site since July as observers.

Dr Barnaby said he hoped to hold discussions with the Foreign Office, although the presence of a British team of scientists in the Soviet Union would not depend on Foreign Office permission.

A Foreign Office spokesman said: "The government's position is that a comprehensive test ban treaty remains one of the long-term aims of its arms control policy."

But there are substantial difficulties in bringing about a comprehensive test ban treaty of which one of the most important is the problem of verification.

"We believe that the satisfactory way to deal with these problems is for all of the countries involved in the conference on disarmament in Geneva to negotiate a satisfactory verification regime.

"To that end, we have put a number of working documents, including seismic monitoring, to Geneva. Hitherto, we have not had any response from the Russians."

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CSO: 5240/012

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

IZVESTIYA REPORTS FROM 'SILENT' NUCLEAR-TEST SITE

PM131053 Moscow IZVESTIYA (Morning Edition) in Russian 30 Sep 86 p 5

[Special correspondent Boris Ivanov "Reportage From the Soviet Nuclear Test Site in Kazakhstan": "Silence Over the Degelen Hills"]

[Text] Semipalatinsk, Karkaralinsk, Moscow -- Having fiddled with the padlock for a few seconds, the youngish red-mustached major pulled at the massive steel gate. The hinges creaked as the gate slowly opened and we found ourselves at the entrance to tunnel disappearing into the granite rock which towered above us.

"Please go through," Major General Yuriy Viktorovich Lebedev, a USSR Defense Ministry expert who was standing next to us, said.

The dim light of the lamps lit up a high arched tunnel. The width of the shaft was quite sufficient for a modern electric locomotive to pass through without difficulty. In general, at first you had the impression of being in an ordinary subway tunnel. There were the same rails underfoot, strings of various thicknesses of cable along the walls, and a wide ventilation pipe along the ceiling. The only difference probably was that it all looked much less well finished and cozy than a subway. Overhead, here and there, lumps of rock were sticking out. The walls were uneven. And that is quite understandable. Subway tunnels are built for years and years of service, whereas the service of this tunnel is shortlived -- it is confined to one nuclear test.

I counted 350 strides from the entrance to where we had walked. Approximately another 400 strides remained to the end of the shaft. There at the very end of this vast cave hewn into the rock the flatcar with the nuclear explosive device and other special equipment is placed. This is where the epicenter of the explosion is during a test. Then the earth shakes and the mountains tremble, their tops cracking like egg shells, crumbling into hundreds, possibly thousands, of pieces of granite which then slowly subside. There are virtually no radiation leaks. Before every test the shaft is blocked off with dozens of steel and concrete partitions and some of the recently excavated rock is put back. Furthermore, as a result of the explosion, the mountain quakes and settles thus burying for ever, as it were, all the radioactive emanations which are trying to get out.

This is indeed what used to happen here. However, since the introduction of the unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions silence has reigned over the hills of the Degelen mountain range in Kazakhstan. For more than a year now there have no more rockslides in the mountains except for the odd stone dislodged by the arkhars (wild sheep) that have returned to these parts. Incidentally, but for the moratorium, we would not be in this tunnel. It was mothballed in July last year when on the eve of the announcement of the moratorium all work at the test site came to a halt. But for the moratorium, all we would be able to see at this spot would be a caved in hilltop.

We -- that means 20 Soviet and foreign journalists -- who, thanks to our stars, or rather the goodwill of the USSR Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, have been given the opportunity to visit the Soviet nuclear test site, all of us have on many occasions in the past read official statements or heard about the Soviet Union conducting nuclear tests. And now we are here in person, and we are here with the sole purpose of seeing for ourselves that the silence at the test site is not an abstract term coined by fellow writers as figure of speech but an entirely real, meaningful concept.

We must give their due to the people in charge of the test site: Lieutenant General Arkadiy Danilovich Ilyenko and his "crew" did everything they could to swiftly and efficiently satisfy the curiosity of our group of journalists. And there were many questions.

The area of the test site covers approximately 16,000 square kilometers. It was established in the late forties by decision of the Soviet Government when as a result of the sharp buildup in the U.S. nuclear potential our country was faced with the question of developing its own nuclear weapons as a matter of urgency. It was here that the first Soviet atomic explosion took place in August 1949, shattering the myth of the U.S. nuclear monopoly. And 4 years later the hydrogen bomb developed in the Soviet Union was tested here.

The preparation and holding of a nuclear test is a complex and expensive matter which takes a relatively long time to organize. The tunneling alone of a several-hundred-meters-long shaft through granite rock takes on average 6-8 months (the length of the tunnel is directly proportionate to the yield of the device to be exploded -- the bigger the charge, the longer the tunnel). To begin with, the construction workers use controlled explosions to make inroads into the mountain and then special equipment is brought in to cut a tunnel of the required dimensions through the granite rock. Only then do technical and scientific preparations for the explosion begin. Just as there are no two mountains in the Degelen range that are completely alike, so practically there are no tests which closely resemble each other. The parameters and conditions of every explosion and also the volume of work necessary to prepare and carry it out have to be worked out by specialists from scratch each time. In 1985, before the introduction of the moratorium, nine nuclear tests were carried out at the test site, the last of which shook the earth's crust on 25 July 1985.

Alongside the test site a settlement has grown up on the banks of the Irtysh where the military and the specialists live. Multistory houses, green parks, stores, schools. On the wall of the old 2-story hotel there is a commemorative plaque which recalls that Igor Vasilyevich Kurchatov lived and worked there 1949-1953. Nearby, in a public garden, there is a monument to the outstanding scientist who headed the Soviet nuclear weapon development program at that time.

"No one understands better the horrific destructive force inherent in nuclear weapons than we who are directly involved in carrying out nuclear tests and therefore no one desires more passionately than we do a total ban on these weapons," A.D. Ilyenko said during one of the improvised press conferences during the inspection of the test site. "You will agree that the very fact of the presence of foreign journalists at the Soviet test site is unprecedented. We have nothing to hide, we can show our cards. We have no evil designs, we are not playing any double games, we are not conducting any 'illicit' operations in contravention of the moratorium of which certain people in the West are frequently trying to accuse us. These accusations are unfounded. But seeing once is better than hearing a hundred times. This why you, journalists, are here today..."

Indeed my Western colleagues were given a truly unique opportunity: to describe what they saw in Kazakhstan with their own eyes. Do not think this will be easy for some of them. The propaganda bias which developed during the cold war years is too deeply ingrained, some journalists are simply too eager to label any step taken by the Soviet Government as "propaganda." It has happened many times before: The Soviet Union extends its unilateral moratorium and the prompt answer from across the ocean is -- propaganda; we say we are ready to come to an agreement on on-site verification and the answer we hear is, again -- propaganda; we invite Western journalists to our nuclear test site and some of them already have the familiar reply -- propaganda -- on the tip of their tongues. I would very much like to be proved wrong, but I had reason to think this. The U.S. television viewers...

The Soviet test site is silent and this silence is being constantly monitored by sensitive U.S. equipment which has been installed in the vicinity of Karkaralinsk, a small rayon center. We flew there immediately after our visit to the test site. We were met on the airfield by participants in the Soviet-American experiment to verify the absence of tests who took us to see their "establishment." The scientists' holiday center on the banks of a picturesque mountain lake.

"Following installation of equipment on the earth's surface which monitors our planet's 'breathing' we have embarked on the second stage of the project -- a 70-meter shaft drilled into the rock," Nikolay Yukhnin, senior scientific worker from the USSR Academy of Sciences Geophysics Institute, told us. "Shortly, seismometric equipment connected by a well-braided cable system to a measuring complex is to be installed in the shaft. The shaft exist will be protected by a special bunker to eliminate various kinds of atmospheric interference. I am confidence that installing the equipment underground will help to reliably register the smallest movement in the earth's depths and completely exclude extraneous noises."

Two U.S. scientists are currently working at the camp -- seismologist David Chavez and David (Carroll) a seismic equipment technician. "Modern seismological equipment, like an electronic microscope, is capable of amplifying a hundred- and thousand-fold the reverberations of even the weakest seismic waves that have traveled over long distance," David Chavez said joining our conversation. "This is why the instruments installed here registered all the nuclear explosions in Nevada without any difficulty. I must say that our work here has proved very fruitful."

David walked up to a table covered with instruments. He pressed a number of buttons and turned a few switches. The automatic recording device was set in motion, producing a strip of paper with an almost straight pale-blue line. "This is 'cardiogram' of your test site's pulse," David said, handing me the seismogram. "It is silent, and has been so for months. Unfortunately, I cannot say the same about Nevada."

As for the Soviet Union, we are not just trying to think in the new way, we are translating the principles of the new thinking into practical actions. The journalists' visit to the Soviet nuclear test site is a graphic example.

Regrettably, people across the Atlantic still prefer thinking in old, outmoded stereotypes. Hegel once said that all history merely teaches us one thing: No one learns from its lessons. Our time has added something of decisive importance to this tragic irony--namely, that if no lessons are learned from history now, there will soon be no history...

Nuclear war is a form of suicide which affects mankind as a whole. This truth gets to you as you look at the mountains through which explosions much more powerful than the explosions of all the bombs, projectiles, and mines exploded during World War II reverberated until recently.

...The Soviet nuclear test site is silent. The world knows about it. And it is waiting for the Nevada test site to fall silent too.

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CSO: 5200/1041

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

MOSCOW: NUCLEAR TEST BAN 'COULD BECOME PERMANENT'

LD061642 Moscow World Service in English 1410 GMT 6 Oct 86

[Excerpts] It is exactly 14 months since the Soviet Union introduced unilaterally a moratorium on all nuclear explosions. Here is what Radio Moscow news analyst Yuriy Solton writes:

A moratorium is a temporary ban. It will be in effect till 1 January of 1987, but it could become permanent if the United States joins it.

So far, however, Washington heeds not to the voice of reason but to the demands of the Pentagon. During the 14 months the Soviet moratorium has been in effect there were already 21 nuclear explosions at the testing site in Nevada in the United States and the Pentagon plans more and more tests.

The Soviet Union has not been conducting nuclear tests for over a year, nor is that done by another nuclear power, China. If the United States joined the Soviet moratorium hardly would Britain and France protest against that. Banning all nuclear tests is a pressing problem and ready for a solution. One can only hope that at the coming meeting in Reykjavik the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States would give due attention to it and that agreement would be reached on corresponding directives.

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CSO: 5200/1041

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

BRIEFS

USSR-JAPAN MEDICS ROUNDTABLE--Tokyo, 10 October (TASS)--A round-table meeting attended by members of the medical profession from the Soviet Union and Hokkaido Island, Japan, was held in Sapporo. The motto of the meeting was "Medics of Japan and the Soviet Union in the effort to safeguard peace and avert the threat of a nuclear war". The speakers at the meeting expressed the desire of medics in both countries to spare no efforts in order to inform the public about the disastrous consequences of a nuclear conflict. Soviet and Japanese medics expressed their determination to do everything to prevent the tragedy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki from recurring. The Japanese physicians who took part in the meeting spoke with appreciation of the Soviet peace initiatives, primarily, of the moratorium on all nuclear explosions. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1237 GMT 10 Oct 86 LD] /12858

CSO: 5200/1041

RELATED ISSUES

USSR: ARGENTINE PRESIDENT, SOVIET OFFICIALS ON ARMS ISSUES

Gromyko Speaks at Dinner

LD131857 Moscow TASS in English 1848 GMT 13 Oct 86

[Excerpt] Moscow, 13 October (TASS)--Satisfaction with the development of relations between the Soviet Union and Argentina was expressed by Andrey Gromyko, member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, president of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Speaking at a Kremlin Dinner in honour of the President of Argentina Raul Alfonsin, he said that relations between the two countries are an example of equal and friendly ties.

"The spirit of mutual trust the marks the Soviet-Argentine political dialogue", Andrey Gromyko said, "creates a businesslike atmosphere when questions of bilateral relations are studied and solved and is a contribution to the improvement of the international atmosphere".

"The Soviet Union is doing all it can to create an atmosphere of trust and cooperation between states of all regions of the world, all continents", Andrey Gromyko stressed. "The USSR demonstrated its policy of peace, disarmament and averting nuclear war at the just ended meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan in Reykjavik".

"At his press conference yesterday Mikhail Gorbachev made a principled and in-depth appraisal of the results of that meeting", Andrey Gromyko said. He stressed that "both great powers - the USSR and the USA - when discussing and solving acute and pressing international problems should further proceed from the tremendous responsibility that lies on them for the state of affairs in the world, for averting nuclear war".

Alfonsin Replies

LD132106 Moscow TASS in English 2026 GMT 13 Oct 86

[Excerpts] Moscow, 13 October (TASS)--President Raul Alfonsin of the Argentine Republic has described his visit to the USSR as the climax in the century-old history of the diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Argentina. He was addressing today a dinner given in his honour in the Kremlin on behalf of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Soviet Government.

Touching upon international issues, the president of Argentina stressed that the highest value of the international community is the right to life. Any threat concerns everybody equally, and therefore it is the paramount duty of states to ensure full exercise of that right which is today infringed upon by extremism, the arms race, discrimination in all of its forms, and the development problems. Raul Alfonsin expressed conviction that reaching agreement between the Soviet Union and the USA on putting an end to nuclear testing and preventing the spreading of the arms race into outer space can become a turning point on the way towards building a world protected from the danger of a nuclear conflict.

TASS Details 14 Oct Talks

LD141650 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1535 GMT 14 Oct 86

[Excerpts] Moscow, 14 October (TASS)--Talks were held today in the Kremlin between A.A. Gromyko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and Raul Ricardo Alfonsin, president of the Argentine Republic.

The sides expressed concern at the tension in the world. Profound anxiety is being caused by the stepping up of the arms race and attempts to transfer it into space. The participants in the talks emphasized that at the present time the main task is to keep the world from slipping toward nuclear catastrophe and to turn the threat of war away from mankind.

A.A. Gromyko drew the attention of the Argentinian president to the large-scale peace initiatives of the USSR, which are set in the decisions of the 27th party congress and in the statements of M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, including the program for full elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000 and creation of the all-embracing system of international security.

President Alfonsin expressed the positive view of Argentina toward the Soviet peace initiatives and above all toward the proposal concerning the creating of a nuclear free world by the end of the present century. He stated that Argentina is devoted to the policy of peace and disarmament. The guest highly appraised the USSR's decision to extend the moratorium on nuclear explosions until 1 January 1987. In Argentina's view, this responsible step was made in the interests of strengthening international peace and the Soviet Union's example must be followed by other nuclear powers.

In connection with the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik, between M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan, the sides expressed the joint view that the USSR and the United States will continue to bear a special responsibility for acute and unresolved problems. The participants in the Soviet-Argentinian talks expressed confidence that the Reykjavik summit had undoubtedly shown that at the present time the need for dialogue, no matter how difficult it might be, has increased still further in order to achieve agreements on key questions of international security, in order to improve the situation throughout the world.

The participants in the talks drew attention to the important role of the Nonaligned Movement in warding off the threat of war. A.A. Gromyko and R. Alfonsin noted that peace can only be preserved and strengthened by vigorous actions on the part of all

states and all peace-loving forces. In this respect the Soviet side stressed the constructive endeavors of Argentina and other states belonging to the "Group of Six", who are actively working to preserve peace.

The participants in the talks expressed support for proposals that the South Atlantic be declared a zone of peace and cooperation.

The USSR and Argentina confirmed their full commitment to the United Nation's aims and principles. They declared their support for the United Nations which is an important instrument for the preservation of peace and the solution of many acute international problems.

Meeting With Gorbachev

LD151722 Moscow TASS in English 1639 GMT 15 Oct 86

[Text] Moscow October 15 TASS -- General secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev had a meeting with President of the Republic of Argentina Raul Ricardo Alfonsin in the Kremlin today.

Welcoming the president, Mikhail Gorbachev highly appraised the realism and constructive character of the policy conducted by Argentina's civilian government towards the Soviet Union, socialist and developing countries, in questions of west-east relations and in connection with the dangers created by the arms race.

They had a frank [Moscow TASS International Service in Russian at 1530 GMT on 15 October renders this as "oktrovennyy"] and interested conversation on a broad range of present-day problems -- how to remove the nuclear threat, how to protect the environment, how to create a new world economic order, ruling out exploitation of some countries by others.

Mikhail Gorbachev drew the president's attention to initial elements of the Soviet Union's policy based on the concept of diversity and integrity of the world, with every country having the right to respect for its social and political choice.

Emphasized was the great positive role of activities of the "Delhi Six" in which Argentina is actively involved, particularly the efforts of that group of countries aimed at banning nuclear explosions. On behalf of the "Six" Raul Ricardo Alfonsin thanked Mikhail Gorbachev for the attention to its initiatives and activities. Touching upon the recent Harare conference, Mikhail Gorbachev and Raul Ricardo Alfonsin exchanged opinions on the Non-aligned Movement. This movement, representing a big part of mankind, is gaining strength, and is making a tangible and growing contribution to world politics, relying on the new political experience and its prestige. It has now linked closer the problems of disarmament and development, and this fact adds to the total potential of peace.

Mikhail Gorbachev shared with Raul Ricardo Alfonsin his impressions of the Reykjavik meeting and assessments of its results. This meeting, he stressed, was useful. The meeting showed that it is possible to approach agreements that would lay the beginning to elimination of nuclear weapons. The efforts of the Soviet Union and all peace forces were not in vain. They made it possible to reach a new, higher stage in the struggle for disarmament and detente. Our platform of new proposals, which are inseparable from each other, and we do not remove any of them, promotes invigoration of the search for mutually acceptable decisions. The situation after the meeting, stressed Mikhail Gorbachev, did not deteriorate. It opens up new possibilities. This is also a signal to all who can and must play their role in favour of detente and disarmament.

Raul Ricardo Alfonsin highly appreciated the Soviet leadership's responsible attitude to the Reykjavik meeting and its results, which is particularly important since what is at issue are the destinies of mankind.

Moscow Press Conference

LD151843 Moscow TASS in English 1629 GMT 15 Oct 86

[Excerpts] Moscow, 15 October (TASS)--The Reykjavik meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and U.S. President Ronald Reagan demonstrated anew the possibility of agreements between the two great powers, Argentine President Raul Alfonsin, who is paying an official visit to the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Soviet Government, said at a press conference here today.

I think, he stressed, that we should by no means talk about the "failure" of the Reykjavik meeting. The very fact that it did take place already is a step forward.

Raul Alfonsin told the journalists that during his meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, today, he had had an opportunity to express to the Soviet Union gratitude on behalf of the "Delhi Six" for the repeated extension of the Soviet unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions.

The Argentine leader noted that being a member of the "Delhi Six," Argentina was contributing to a search for solutions to problems of nuclear disarmament. We have the moral strength to try to convince the peoples and governments of the need of resolving these problems as soon as possible, Raul Alfonsin said.

He called for support for the efforts of Brazil to secure a non-nuclear status for the South Atlantic and stressed that an important role was attached in this context to various international forums, primarily the United Nations.

Huge resources are expended on the world's arms race and the existing arms stockpiles are enough for multiple overkill, the Argentine president said. If some of these resources are converted to peaceable goals, the developing countries will be given assistance in resolving the problems which confront them.

PRAVDA Version of Gromyko Speech

PM151137 Moscow PRAVDA (First Edition) in Russian 15 Oct 86 p 4

[TASS account of speech by USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Chairman A.A. Gromyko at 13 October Kremlin dinner for Argentine President R. Alfonsin, under the general heading "Kremlin Reception"]

[Excerpts] A dinner in honor of Argentine President Raul Ricardo Alfonsin was arranged on 13 October in the Grand Kremlin Palace on behalf of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and USSR Government. It took place in a warm and friendly atmosphere and it was attended by people accompanying the president on his trip.

Present on the Soviet side were A.A. Gromyko, G.A. Aliyev, N.V. Talyzin, and other officials.

A.A. Gromyko Gave a Speech

Today we can say that the spirit of mutual trust which distinguishes Soviet-Argentine political dialogue is now an important joint asset. It creates a businesslike atmosphere for examining and resolving questions of bilateral relations and is also a contribution to improving the international atmosphere.

Our party's 27th congress set the Soviet people gigantic tasks connected with the country's economic and social development. The congress put forward an extensive program for creating an all-embracing system of international security. The Soviet Union proposed the total elimination of nuclear arsenals before the end of the current century and is prepared to join other states immediately in struggling for the attainment of this great aim. The practical confirmation of these intentions is the nuclear tests moratorium which we have extended on four occasions.

The Soviet Union has repeatedly stated that there can be no victors in a nuclear war. This truth is acknowledged now by all serious people who are responsible for states' foreign policies, not to mention the fact that science long ago acknowledged the validity of people's anxiety for the future of mankind if nuclear war were to break out. The Soviet Union also demonstrated its policy of peace, disarmament, and prevention of nuclear war at the meeting between M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan which has just ended in Reykjavik.

M.S. Gorbachev gave a principled and profound assessment of the meeting's results at yesterday's press conference in Reykjavik, so there is no need for me to assess the meeting now. I will just say that both the great powers -- the USSR and the United States -- must continue, when discussing and tackling acute and urgent international problems, to proceed on the basis of the enormous responsibility they bear for the state of affairs in the world and for the prevention of nuclear war.

The chief weapon to which all people who cherish peace appeal, to which our people appeal, is reason. In an age characterized by the unprecedented growth of scientific and technical potential one cannot be guided by the crude instinct of force.

The Soviet Union is doing all it can to create an atmosphere of trust and cooperation between the states of all regions of the world and all continents. This idea is essentially echoed by the initiative by certain Latin American countries, including Argentina, on turning the South Atlantic into a zone of peace and cooperation, free from nuclear weapons.

Joint Statement

LD171802 Moscow PRAVDA (First Edition) in Russian 18 Oct 86 p 4

["Joint Soviet-Argentine Statement"]

[Excerpts] Raul Ricardo Alfonsin, president of the Argentine Republic, was in the Soviet Union 13-17 October 1986 on an official visit at the invitation of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and the Soviet Government.

The Argentine side noted the importance of these initiatives and stressed in particular its positive appraisal of the Soviet Union's decision to extend its unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions until 1 January 1987, seeing it as an important step which, if the other nuclear powers became a part of it, could open the path to nuclear disarmament.

The sides call upon all the nuclear powers to join in this moratorium and to come out in favor of the speediest conclusion of a treaty on the complete and universal ban on nuclear tests. In this connection the Soviet side positively appraised the new specific initiative on the monitoring of the end of nuclear tests which was submitted in the Mexican Declaration of the heads of state and government of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Tanzania and Sweden.

The sides are convinced that all states should play their part in the matter of eliminating the threat of a nuclear war, and to this end the Soviet Union and Argentina have stated their readiness to cooperate with one another and with all other states.

The Soviet side highly assesses the efforts of Argentina and the other countries in the "Group of Six" in the matter of strengthening peace and universal security, and their constructive contribution to the search for ways leading to an end to the nuclear arms race in all directions.

The Soviet Union and Argentina deem it necessary to intensify discussion of the problems that were the subject of the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva on nuclear and space armaments and questions of disarmament -- in the United Nations, at the disarmament conference and at other international forums with the aim of achieving as soon as possible specific accords and agreements, securing the reduction and curtailment of the

arms race. They noted that existing agreements and treaties on arms control must be preserved and implemented.

The sides advocated the development of international cooperation for the use of space exclusively for peaceful purposes and supported the creation of an international procedure for safety in the development of nuclear power engineering.

The sides stressed the close link between disarmament and development, and the need to transfer the resources currently spent on military purposes to peaceful use, including the socioeconomic development of the peoples of the world.

The two sides noted the effective role of the Nonaligned Movement in the world arena and its contribution toward preventing nuclear war and maintaining peace, and toward resolving acute international economic problems. The importance of the decisions taken at the Eighth Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Nonaligned Countries in Harare was stressed.

The sides agreed that the Antarctic Treaty and the agreements supplementing it comprise a many-sided legal basis that has been operating effectively and dynamically for more than 25 years. This system has guaranteed the maintenance of peace in the Antarctic, nonmilitarization, its nuclear-free status and conservation of the environment, as well as the peaceful development here of international cooperation, thereby helping to implement the goals and principles of the UN Charter. Taking this into account, the sides advocated strengthening and further improving this international legal mechanism.

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CSO: 5200/1042

RELATED ISSUES

TASS: VOSS ADDRESSES INTERPARLIAMENTARY UNION ON NT, SDI

LD102044 Moscow TASS in English 1734 GMT 10 Oct 86

[Text] Buenos Aires October 10 TASS -- "Humanity is living through a period of extreme importance. What is required of governments and parliaments in this extreme situation as never before is the highest measure of realism and responsibility, bold and at the same time thoroughly considered steps dictated not only by national and state interests but also by the aspirations of entire humanity." This was said by head of the delegation of the Parliamentary groups of the USSR, Chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Deputy Chairman of the Parliamentary Group of the USSR Avgust Voss. He addressed the 76th Conference of the Inter-Parliamentary Union under way here. "It is long since time to come to one's sense, to stop the suicidal arms race. The Soviet Union not only calls for ending this arms race but also takes practical steps toward this. The USSR has advanced of late a wide set of new important initiatives that are aimed at achieving a radical breakthrough in international affairs. A special place among them is held by a concrete programme of stage-by-stage elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction planned for a short period of 15 years, in conditions when an arms race in outer space would be reliably prevented."

"The Soviet Union has advanced an important initiative -- the idea of creating an all-embracing system of international security. Its fundamentals have been formulated all the aspects of the contemporary notion of international security -- the military, political, economic and humanitarian -- are presented in conjunction for the first time."

"And, finally, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev made recently a statement on a new, the fourth one, extension of the Soviet Union's moratorium on nuclear testing. It was a difficult, but, we believe, a very important step, one more step for the sake of our common security. "We are deeply convinced that the nuclear menace can be averted only by eliminating nuclear weapons, as the Soviet Union proposes. And the end of nuclear testing must be an initial step toward this. The moratorium on nuclear explosions would make it possible to halt the arms race, would place a barrier to its spread to space."

"The Soviet Union is countering the 'star wars' plan by declaring for a complete ban on a strike space arms, for the development of peaceful cooperation in space," Avgust Voss continued. "But we must note that Washington has not given a positive response to any of the Soviet peace initiatives. The United States answer is the speeding up of SDI," A. Voss said.

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CSO: 5200/1043

RELATED ISSUES

USSR GENERAL ON SUMMIT, SALT II, ABM, SDI

LD220735 Moscow TASS in English 0713 GMT 22 Oct 86

[Text] Stockholm October 22 TASS -- Colonel-General Nikolay Chervov, chief of a department at the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, has said that the world of late has witnessed a number of positive developments, including a Soviet moratorium on all nuclear blasts, the success of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-and Security -Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, and a convention on safety in the nuclear power industry, the notification of nuclear accidents and assistance in the case of such accidents, which has been signed in Vienna. He was speaking Tuesday 21 October at a seminar which was attended by representatives of the military and political circles and the mass media of Sweden and held at this country's foreign Policy Institute. Chervov is staying here at the institute's invitation.

"All this is encouraging," he said. "But it has not been possible to agree in Reykjavik on the central problem -- the reduction of nuclear arms. The USSR and the United States were on the verge of taking major, historic decisions. But the U.S. administration, being confident of its technological edge and seeking to win military superiority through "star wars", ultimately decided to bury accords which had already been hammered out."

"This has happened at a time when the situation demands getting down practically to stopping the arms race and finding a way out of confrontation since there is no other alternative, except, that is, a race to a nuclear catastrophe," Chervov said.

"The Soviet Union believes that European security can only be real and lasting if it is based on an essential military equivalence and subsequent lowering of the levels of opposing forces down to limits which would be sufficient for defense. The USSR has been reaffirming its readiness to follow this principle through practical actions. At the meeting in Reykjavik we have proved once again that we need peace and peace alone and that the USSR is doing everything to stop nuclear madness," Chervov said.

"Military parity is in evidence in all areas and in these conditions there can be no question of any Soviet threat. It is now simply impossible to achieve military superiority because no side will allow superiority over itself. The current nuclear balance already is too high and the continued arms race and especially its extension to outer space can raise the nuclear balance to such heights as would make parity cease to be a deterrent. It is imperative, before it is too late, to lower the level of military confrontation and destroy nuclear and other kinds of weapons of mass destruction," Chervov said.

"What can be the first steps in lowering military confrontation? First, it is needed to negotiate on equal, mutually acceptable terms, preserve the SALT-2 treaty and strictly observe the ABM treaty, especially the ban on the testing of ABM components in outer space, bearing in mind that the ABM treaty is the basis for maintaining the strategic balance and the foundation for limiting and reducing strategic offensive weapons. It is essential to press for an end to nuclear testing and for the Soviet moratorium to evolve into a treaty on a comprehensive nuclear test ban," Chervov said.

"Second, there is nothing today to prevent solving the problem of medium-range missiles in Europe. A relevant Soviet proposal made in Reykjavik has cleared the way towards a corresponding agreement. Positions have been brought closer on a radical, 50-percent cut in strategic offensive weapons.

In short, there is a real possibility to untangle a complex knot in present-day world politics and push back the threat of war. Everything now turns on the SDI: the question is either the SDI or arms control because there is no way to have both at the same time. In this connection all European countries evidently have to think over steps they can take to bring the agreements, whose outlines have emerged in Reykjavik, nearer," Chervov said.

"Third, strict compliance with the document adopted by the Stockholm conference is of great significance to Europe. Taking advantage of the success of Stockholm, it is also expedient to go further and press for a real reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe," he said.

"The key issue today is that of preventing an arms race in outer space and preserving the ABM treaty in its current interpretation. 'Star wars', once they break out of the laboratory and into space and blow away the ABM Treaty, will bring the world closer to a point of no return, beyond which developments will be unpredictable," Chervov said.

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CSO: 5200/1043

RELATED ISSUES

TASS: U.S. ARMS UPGRADING PROGRAMS, TESTING, ASAT HIT

PM131017 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (Second Edition) in Russian 5 Oct 86 p 3

[Military observer V. Chernyshev "TASS Commentary for KRASNAYA ZVEZDA":
"The Pentagon's Quest for Superiority"]

[Text] The U.S. Air Force has announced that the first of 50 of the latest B-1B strategic bombers deployed at the Dyess Air Force base (Texas) has been put on standby alert. This is yet another indication of the Pentagon's unwillingness to take any practical steps to promote an atmosphere of mutual restraint in the sphere of strategic offensive arms limitation. Washington has not curtailed or amended in favor of limitation a single one of its military programs. On the contrary, a comprehensive program for a massive arms buildup in all the components of the U.S. strategic triad -- new ICBM's, missile-carrying submarines, and heavy bombers -- has been drawn up and is being implemented. Ground-, sea-, and air-launched cruise missiles are being manufactured and deployed.

It is planned, for instance, to deploy before the end of the year 10 first-strike MX missiles which possess enhanced accuracy and a tremendous destructive force; 130 B-52's have been adapted to carry cruise missiles; and work has begun on the modification of the 131st such aircraft to make it capable of carrying cruise missiles. If this delivery vehicle is added to the arsenal it will mean the violation of the SALT II Treaty. In August this year the U.S. Navy took delivery of the eighth Trident class nuclear submarine and the ninth missile carrier is to be launched in November. Five more submarines of this class are being built at shipyards. This year 8 surface vessels and 15 submarines are to be equipped with nuclear-tipped cruise missiles; as a result of this the total number of U.S. floating cruise missile carriers will double in comparison with the current level and, as a spokesman for the U.S. Navy frankly declared in congress, "the number of targets on USSR territory that the United States will be able to hit will increase substantially.

All this amounts to material preparations for a world war which are taking place at a scientifically and technically new level of the arms race and in the presence of colossal arsenals of weapons capable of wiping out our planet's civilization in a matter of days. Such are the military and political practices and the level of responsibility of the people who regard the arms race as a gold mine, the people who refuse to give up their illusory dream of military superiority which is fraught with danger for the whole of mankind, and who are trying to destroy the strategic parity between the USSR and the United States which is the basis of stability in the world. Their actions are fraught with serious consequences for international security.

And how is one to interpret the following facts, for instance: A few hours after the announcement of the Soviet-American accord to hold a summit meeting at Reykjavik, another explosion of a U.S. nuclear device was carried out at the Nevada test site -- the 21st such explosion since the announcement of the unilateral Soviet moratorium on all nuclear explosions; furthermore, another, the fifth, test of an ASAT antisatellite system has been carried out. It is quite obvious that such steps are hardly likely to contribute to a climate of confidence and cooperation between our countries.

This policy has been described by T. Hoopes, former assistant secretary of the U.S. Air Force, as provocative and damaging to the United States itself. One can only agree with this assessment. A historic opportunity now exists for a substantial improvement in the relations between the USSR and the United States, prospects have opened up for the conclusion of practical agreements in the sphere of arms limitation and reduction. However if the course dictated by the U.S. military-industrial complex continues to be pursued, then this opportunity will be lost.

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CSO: 5200/1043

RELATED ISSUES

TASS: FRG POPULACE OPPOSES U.S. MISSILES, TESTING

LD111624 Moscow TASS in English 1558 GMT 11 Oct 86

[Text] Moscow October 11 TASS -- By TASS commentator Leonid Ponomarev:

The number of U.S. nuclear-tipped medium-range cruise missiles deployed in West Germany keeps growing. An official spokesman for the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, Friedhelm Ost, told a news conference in Bonn Thursday that a first batch of such missiles had already been stationed in that country and was in operational readiness. The weapons systems in question make up the 1st missile squadron of the 38th Tactical wing of the U.S. Air Force. Work is now under way to install cruise missiles at a base in Hasselbach, Rhineland-Pfalz.

All in all, 96 nuclear-tipped cruise missiles are to be sited in West Germany in addition to Pershing-2s of which, according to DER SPIEGEL magazine, a total of 156 are already on station.

Broad sections of the German population are protesting the presence of the American nuclear missiles in their country. Protest rallies and marches and other actions such as blocking approach roads to the bases where the weapons are deployed have become part of a nationwide anti-nuke campaign which has continued without a letup since late 1983 when U.S. nuclear missiles began to arrive in West Germany.

A major demonstration for peace, disarmament and an immediate withdrawal of American nuclear missiles from West Germany, for example, is planned at Hasselbach today. According to reports from there, it started with anti-war campaigners forming a ten-kilometer human chain around the U.S. military base. Their demands, inscribed on their streamers, are that all U.S. nuclear missiles be removed from West Germany and that the FRG renounce participation in U.S. plans to militarize outer space.

The concern of the West German people is quite understandable. The movement of these missiles forward to the European theater has worsened the political climate on the continent and increased the danger of war considerably.

A halt to all nuclear testing in the world would be a real step to reducing East-West tension. The peace champions in West Germany, including those attending the rally at Hasselbach, and in other West European countries stand strongly for ending all nuclear blasts on earth.

Silence at the testing ranges would be a good prerequisite for general detente and for an atmosphere of trust.

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CSO: 5200/1043

RELATED ISSUES

MOSCOW RADIO: DPRK-SOVIET PROPOSALS ON WEAPONS ELIMINATIONS, NFZ

SK160432 Moscow International Service in Korean 0930 GMT 11 Oct 86

[Text] Twelve October 1948 was an important day in Soviet-Korean relations. On that day the Soviet Union recognized the DPRK in advance of others and established diplomatic relations with the Republic. In this connection, our station commentator (Aleksandrov) says:

The Soviet plan to liquidate nuclear and chemical weapons by the end of this century, the Soviet decision to extend the period of freezing nuclear testing to 1 January 1987, and the Soviet proposal to include the Asian and Pacific region in a comprehensive international security system have won broad support from the Korean friends.

Meanwhile, the political activities of People's Korea in the international community have shown that People's Korea is an important ally of the Soviet Union and the other fraternal socialist countries in the struggle for international security and contributes to practically realizing the idea of turning Asia into a zone of peace and cooperation. The peace proposals which the DPRK has put forth to improve the situation in Korea and in the whole of Asia agree with the Soviet plan to handle the question of the Asian security comprehensively. The DPRK proposals for replacing the Korean Armistice Agreement with a peace agreement, for adopting a North-South declaration of nonaggression, for halting large military exercises on the Korean peninsula, and for turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free peace zone have aroused broad international repercussions.

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CSO: 5200/1043

RELATED ISSUES

BUDAPEST: BESSMERTNYKH QUERIED ON NON-LAB SDI TESTS, SUMMIT, ABM

LD221006 Budapest MTI in English 1753 GMT 22 Oct 86

[Text] Budapest, October 22 (MTI) -- Wednesday's MAGYAR HIRLAP carries an interview with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh. According to the position of the Soviet Government, security issues continue to take a central place in Soviet-American relations after Reykjavik, Bessmertnykh said. From these issues the Soviet Union attributes distinguished importance to nuclear disarmament and the prevention of space armament. After Reykjavik the U.S. Administration has to make a choice as the innovative and creative proposals which were put forward there and some aspects of which were not yet interpreted precisely enough are still in force.

The Soviet deputy foreign minister termed the statement that the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is merely a defensive system as unacceptable. If we hold talks on a 50 percent cut in strategic weapons, Bessmertnykh said, SDI is dangerous for the Soviet Union even as a defensive system as it makes a nuclear first strike possible.

Bessmertnykh resolutely denied that it would be more reasonable for the Soviet Government to wait for a new U.S. Administration coming to power. We have not adopted tactics of that kind, he said. Our policy is not based on internal clashes in the United States; we will not freeze our relations or withdraw any proposal we have made. It would be a loss of time, and we do not believe that the reserves of reasonability have been exhausted.

Answering a question whether Gorbachev will leave for Washington the Soviet deputy foreign minister said that the official visit has not been removed from the agenda, the Soviet party attributes invariable importance to it, and preparations are going on.

Bessmertnykh made a remark on the rumours attracting attention in the Sunday issue of THE NEW YORK TIMES that the Soviet Union would consider it acceptable to test some components of the space defence system outside laboratories provided that the USSR and the USA reach a comprehensive agreement. Bessmertnykh said that the ABM Treaty allowed indeed to carry out stationary tests on earth outside laboratory. The Soviet side, however, is unwilling to sign an agreement that makes it possible to test a space defence system in outer space.

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CSO: 5200/1043

RELATED ISSUES

TOKYO: USSR'S KAPITSA BRIEFINGS ON REYKJAVIK, SDI, ABM

Talks With Deputy Minister Yanai

OW201149 Tokyo KYODO in English 1139 GMT 20 Oct 86

[Excerpts] Tokyo, 20 Oct (KYODO)--Kapitsa, a special Soviet envoy here on a four-day visit since Sunday to brief Japan on the outcome of the U.S.-Soviet summit in Reykjavik, Iceland on October 11-12, said the Soviet Union had proposed in the summit on disarmament programs as a package, which contained a 50 percent reduction in strategic nuclear weapons, a zero option of intermediate-range missiles in Europe and reduction of them in Asia and confinement on [as received] a laboratory research and tests of strategic defense initiative. (SDI).

The Soviet Union had been opposed in the summit to ground and space tests of SDI and asked the U.S. to remain in the Antiballistic Missile (AMB) Treaty over 10 years, he said. But that had caused an obstacle in the negotiations with the U.S. in Reykjavik, Kapitsa was quoted as telling Yanai.

It is regretted that the summit failed to conclude agreements, but efforts can and must be continued, Kapitsa said, adding that progress (on disarmament) can be expected because of the (potential) agreements on a high level (reached in the summit), the official said.

Yanai said Japan expects both superpowers to produce positive results, starting from the high-level agreements, the official said.

But Yanai showed regret over Soviet linkage between inf, strategic nuclear weapons and SDI. He also said Japan remains unchanged in seeking a zero option of SS-20 missiles on a global basis, the official said.

NHK Interview

OW211400 Tokyo NHK Television Network in Japanese 1200 GMT 21 Oct 86

[From the "New Center 9" program; interview "conducted recently" with Mikhail Stepanovich Kapitsa, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs, by NHK Newscaster Taro Kimura; Kapitsa shown seated in unidentified office speaking in Russian; Kimura shown in television studio speaking in English, with Japanese subtitles for both shown on screen; Kapitsa remarks translated from the Russian, Kimura' transcribed from English -- recorded]

[Text] [Kimura] I actually returned from Reykjavik recently very disappointed. I wonder what is your view on having those two leaders meet again very soon?

[Kapitsa] I think you have grounds for disappointment, but you have no grounds for not being an optimist. We were also disappointed by the fact that in Reykjavik the leaders of the two powers were very close to an agreement on liquidating, on reducing and liquidating strategic arms, very close to an agreement on intermediate-range missiles, but everything was frustrated due to the U.S. insistence on its program for creating space arms. We cannot agree with this.

[Kimura] This SDI problem is really confusing. You have said now that it has to be packaged with the other issue. But I understand Mr Karpov in Europe -- he is the chief negotiator -- he said recently in Great Britain and in Germany that it could be separate deal [as heard]. I mean, which represents the USSR policy? Which voice?

[Kapitsa] Karpov's position, Karpov's statement was interpreted incorrectly. Karpov did not make a statement like this. We believe all three elements must be fixed and all three agreements signed simultaneously -- the agreement on reducing and subsequently liquidating nuclear arms, the agreement on intermediate-range missiles, and the agreement on observing the ABM treaty for a 10-day period. This is the package.

I must say that I was most disappointed by Japan's position in this regard. It would seem that Japan would be interested in the most rapid liquidation of nuclear arms. But as a result of the talks that I have had, at least until today, I have come to hold the opinion that Japan is defending the U.S. position. One can be an ally, one can even be a good ally. But one must have one's own independent foreign policy.

[Kimura] But don't you think the situation is reversed rather than clarified, as just you said that Japan being allied to the United States and also committed herself to take part in developing SDI, the situation seems to be very difficult for Japan to welcome Mr Gorbachev at this time.

[Kapitsa] I had in mind not the political situation in this case but the time factor. the General Secretary's visit to the United States will not take place in the near future so there is some free time.

[Kimura] It may view for the others as USSR is trying to strike an wedge between Japan and the United States by Gorbachev's visit to Japan.

Meets With Foreign Minister

LD211324 Moscow TASS in English 1318 GMT 21 Oct 86

[Text] Tokyo October 21 TASS -- Mikhail Kapitsa, a special envoy of the Soviet Government and a deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, and the Soviet Union's ambassador to Japan, Nikolay Solovov, today had a meeting with Japan's Foreign Minister Tadashi Kuranari and presented the Soviet view of the Soviet-American summit meeting in Reykjavik.

The Soviet officials stressed that the Soviet Union had laid emphasis at the Iceland meeting on the key problems of international politics, such as the termination of the arms race and nuclear disarmament. It put on the negotiating table a package of major measures which, if they had been accepted, would usher in a new age, an age without nuclear weapons, in human history.

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